Thomas Gleixner | d2912cb | 2019-06-04 10:11:33 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 2 | /* |
| 3 | * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*, |
| 4 | * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure |
| 5 | * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based |
| 6 | * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is: |
| 7 | * |
| 8 | * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source |
| 9 | * Security Inc. |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 10 | */ |
| 11 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt |
| 12 | |
| 13 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
Kees Cook | 314eed3 | 2019-09-17 11:00:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 14 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 15 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
Ingo Molnar | 5b825c3 | 2017-02-02 17:54:15 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 16 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
Ingo Molnar | 2993002 | 2017-02-08 18:51:36 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 17 | #include <linux/sched/task.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> |
Sahara | 96dc4f9 | 2017-02-16 18:29:15 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 19 | #include <linux/thread_info.h> |
Chris von Recklinghausen | b5cb15d | 2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 20 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/jump_label.h> |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 22 | #include <asm/sections.h> |
| 23 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 24 | /* |
| 25 | * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current |
| 26 | * stack frame (if possible). |
| 27 | * |
| 28 | * Returns: |
| 29 | * NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack |
| 30 | * GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame |
| 31 | * GOOD_STACK: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking) |
| 32 | * BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame) |
| 33 | */ |
| 34 | static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len) |
| 35 | { |
| 36 | const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current); |
| 37 | const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE; |
| 38 | int ret; |
| 39 | |
| 40 | /* Object is not on the stack at all. */ |
| 41 | if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj) |
| 42 | return NOT_STACK; |
| 43 | |
| 44 | /* |
| 45 | * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the |
| 46 | * the check above means at least one end is within the stack, |
| 47 | * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack). |
| 48 | */ |
| 49 | if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len) |
| 50 | return BAD_STACK; |
| 51 | |
| 52 | /* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */ |
| 53 | ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len); |
| 54 | if (ret) |
| 55 | return ret; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | return GOOD_STACK; |
| 58 | } |
| 59 | |
Kees Cook | b394d46 | 2018-01-10 14:22:38 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 60 | /* |
Kees Cook | afcc90f8 | 2018-01-10 15:17:01 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 61 | * If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found |
| 62 | * an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call. |
Kees Cook | b394d46 | 2018-01-10 14:22:38 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 63 | * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the |
| 64 | * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never |
| 65 | * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check. |
Kees Cook | afcc90f8 | 2018-01-10 15:17:01 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 66 | * For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of |
| 67 | * bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and |
| 68 | * useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware |
| 69 | * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and |
| 70 | * carefully audit the whitelist range). |
Kees Cook | b394d46 | 2018-01-10 14:22:38 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | */ |
Kees Cook | afcc90f8 | 2018-01-10 15:17:01 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 72 | void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user, |
| 73 | unsigned long offset, unsigned long len) |
| 74 | { |
| 75 | WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n", |
| 76 | to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite", |
| 77 | to_user ? "from" : "to", |
| 78 | name ? : "unknown?!", |
| 79 | detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "", |
| 80 | offset, len); |
| 81 | } |
| 82 | |
Kees Cook | b394d46 | 2018-01-10 14:22:38 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 83 | void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail, |
| 84 | bool to_user, unsigned long offset, |
| 85 | unsigned long len) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 86 | { |
Kees Cook | b394d46 | 2018-01-10 14:22:38 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 87 | pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n", |
| 88 | to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite", |
| 89 | to_user ? "from" : "to", |
| 90 | name ? : "unknown?!", |
| 91 | detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "", |
| 92 | offset, len); |
| 93 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 94 | /* |
| 95 | * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(), |
| 96 | * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch |
| 97 | * Oops code, so that is used here instead. |
| 98 | */ |
| 99 | BUG(); |
| 100 | } |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */ |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 103 | static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n, |
| 104 | unsigned long low, unsigned long high) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 105 | { |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 106 | const unsigned long check_low = ptr; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 107 | unsigned long check_high = check_low + n; |
| 108 | |
| 109 | /* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */ |
Josh Poimboeuf | 94cd97a | 2016-08-22 11:53:59 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 110 | if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 111 | return false; |
| 112 | |
| 113 | return true; |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | |
| 116 | /* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 117 | static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr, |
| 118 | unsigned long n, bool to_user) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 119 | { |
| 120 | unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; |
| 121 | unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; |
| 122 | unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear; |
| 123 | |
| 124 | if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 125 | usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 126 | |
| 127 | /* |
| 128 | * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary |
| 129 | * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual |
| 130 | * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually |
| 131 | * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that |
| 132 | * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected |
| 133 | * and checked: |
| 134 | */ |
Laura Abbott | 46f6236 | 2017-01-10 13:35:45 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 135 | textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 136 | /* No different mapping: we're done. */ |
| 137 | if (textlow_linear == textlow) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 138 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 139 | |
| 140 | /* Check the secondary mapping... */ |
Laura Abbott | 46f6236 | 2017-01-10 13:35:45 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 141 | texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 142 | if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 143 | usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user, |
| 144 | ptr - textlow_linear, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 145 | } |
| 146 | |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 147 | static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n, |
| 148 | bool to_user) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 149 | { |
| 150 | /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */ |
Isaac J. Manjarres | 9515316 | 2019-08-13 15:37:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 151 | if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 152 | usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 153 | |
| 154 | /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */ |
| 155 | if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 156 | usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 157 | } |
| 158 | |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 159 | /* Checks for allocs that are marked in some way as spanning multiple pages. */ |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 160 | static inline void check_page_span(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, |
| 161 | struct page *page, bool to_user) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 162 | { |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 163 | #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 164 | const void *end = ptr + n - 1; |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 165 | struct page *endpage; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 166 | bool is_reserved, is_cma; |
| 167 | |
| 168 | /* |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 169 | * Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see |
| 170 | * check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover |
| 171 | * rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly. |
| 172 | */ |
| 173 | |
| 174 | /* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved). */ |
| 175 | if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata && |
| 176 | end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) { |
| 177 | if (!to_user) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 178 | usercopy_abort("rodata", NULL, to_user, 0, n); |
| 179 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 180 | } |
| 181 | |
| 182 | /* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */ |
| 183 | if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 184 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 185 | |
| 186 | /* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */ |
| 187 | if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start && |
| 188 | end <= (const void *)__bss_stop) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 189 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 190 | |
| 191 | /* Is the object wholly within one base page? */ |
| 192 | if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) == |
| 193 | ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK))) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 194 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 195 | |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 196 | /* Allow if fully inside the same compound (__GFP_COMP) page. */ |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 197 | endpage = virt_to_head_page(end); |
| 198 | if (likely(endpage == page)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 199 | return; |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 200 | |
| 201 | /* |
| 202 | * Reject if range is entirely either Reserved (i.e. special or |
| 203 | * device memory), or CMA. Otherwise, reject since the object spans |
| 204 | * several independently allocated pages. |
| 205 | */ |
| 206 | is_reserved = PageReserved(page); |
| 207 | is_cma = is_migrate_cma_page(page); |
| 208 | if (!is_reserved && !is_cma) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 209 | usercopy_abort("spans multiple pages", NULL, to_user, 0, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 210 | |
| 211 | for (ptr += PAGE_SIZE; ptr <= end; ptr += PAGE_SIZE) { |
| 212 | page = virt_to_head_page(ptr); |
| 213 | if (is_reserved && !PageReserved(page)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 214 | usercopy_abort("spans Reserved and non-Reserved pages", |
| 215 | NULL, to_user, 0, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 216 | if (is_cma && !is_migrate_cma_page(page)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 217 | usercopy_abort("spans CMA and non-CMA pages", NULL, |
| 218 | to_user, 0, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 219 | } |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 220 | #endif |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 221 | } |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 222 | |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 223 | static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, |
| 224 | bool to_user) |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 225 | { |
| 226 | struct page *page; |
| 227 | |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 228 | if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr)) |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 229 | return; |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 230 | |
Kees Cook | 314eed3 | 2019-09-17 11:00:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 231 | /* |
| 232 | * When CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, kmap_to_page() will give either the |
| 233 | * highmem page or fallback to virt_to_page(). The following |
| 234 | * is effectively a highmem-aware virt_to_head_page(). |
| 235 | */ |
| 236 | page = compound_head(kmap_to_page((void *)ptr)); |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 237 | |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 238 | if (PageSlab(page)) { |
| 239 | /* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */ |
| 240 | __check_heap_object(ptr, n, page, to_user); |
| 241 | } else { |
| 242 | /* Verify object does not incorrectly span multiple pages. */ |
| 243 | check_page_span(ptr, n, page, to_user); |
| 244 | } |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 245 | } |
| 246 | |
Chris von Recklinghausen | b5cb15d | 2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 247 | static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks); |
| 248 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 249 | /* |
| 250 | * Validates that the given object is: |
| 251 | * - not bogus address |
Qian Cai | 7bff3c0 | 2019-01-08 15:23:04 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 252 | * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available) |
| 253 | * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available) |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 254 | * - not in kernel text |
| 255 | */ |
| 256 | void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) |
| 257 | { |
Chris von Recklinghausen | b5cb15d | 2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 258 | if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks)) |
| 259 | return; |
| 260 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 261 | /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */ |
| 262 | if (!n) |
| 263 | return; |
| 264 | |
| 265 | /* Check for invalid addresses. */ |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 266 | check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 267 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 268 | /* Check for bad stack object. */ |
| 269 | switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) { |
| 270 | case NOT_STACK: |
| 271 | /* Object is not touching the current process stack. */ |
| 272 | break; |
| 273 | case GOOD_FRAME: |
| 274 | case GOOD_STACK: |
| 275 | /* |
| 276 | * Object is either in the correct frame (when it |
| 277 | * is possible to check) or just generally on the |
| 278 | * process stack (when frame checking not available). |
| 279 | */ |
| 280 | return; |
| 281 | default: |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 282 | usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user, 0, n); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 283 | } |
| 284 | |
Qian Cai | 7bff3c0 | 2019-01-08 15:23:04 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 285 | /* Check for bad heap object. */ |
| 286 | check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); |
| 287 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 288 | /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */ |
Kees Cook | f4e6e28 | 2018-01-10 14:48:22 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 289 | check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user); |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 290 | } |
| 291 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size); |
Chris von Recklinghausen | b5cb15d | 2018-07-03 15:43:08 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 292 | |
| 293 | static bool enable_checks __initdata = true; |
| 294 | |
| 295 | static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str) |
| 296 | { |
| 297 | return strtobool(str, &enable_checks); |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | |
| 300 | __setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy); |
| 301 | |
| 302 | static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void) |
| 303 | { |
| 304 | if (enable_checks == false) |
| 305 | static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks); |
| 306 | return 1; |
| 307 | } |
| 308 | |
| 309 | late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy); |