blob: f179415d0c38e2bf4efe0e0cf345b51d009522d7 [file] [log] [blame]
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#ifdef RPC_DEBUG
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
static inline int
gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length)
{
/* Most of the code is block-size independent but currently we
* use only 8: */
BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
return 8 - (length & 7);
}
static inline void
gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize)
{
int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset);
char *p;
struct kvec *iov;
if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len)
iov = &buf->tail[0];
else
iov = &buf->head[0];
p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
iov->iov_len += padding;
buf->len += padding;
memset(p, padding, padding);
}
static inline int
gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize)
{
u8 *ptr;
u8 pad;
int len = buf->len;
if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1);
if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len)
return -EINVAL;
buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
goto out;
} else
len -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
if (len <= buf->page_len) {
int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
>>PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
& (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last], KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
pad = *(ptr + offset);
kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA);
goto out;
} else
len -= buf->page_len;
BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len);
pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1);
out:
/* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent
* a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need
* to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data.
* However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless.
* In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server
* also uses length and head length together to determine the original
* start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's
* easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem.
* It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and
* tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the
* server to attempt to parse the padding.
* XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism
* wrap/unwrap functions. */
if (pad > blocksize)
return -EINVAL;
if (buf->len > pad)
buf->len -= pad;
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static inline void
make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize)
{
static u64 i = 0;
u64 *q = (u64 *)p;
/* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really
* necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in
* our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support
* rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt
* already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets
* I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring
* uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
* don't care enough. */
BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
*q = i++;
}
/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
* The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
* them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
* and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
u32
gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
s32 checksum_type;
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
s32 now;
int headlen;
struct page **tmp_pages;
u32 seq_send;
dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n");
now = get_seconds();
switch (kctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
default:
dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->signalg %d not"
" supported\n", kctx->signalg);
goto out_err;
}
if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) {
dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n",
kctx->sealalg);
goto out_err;
}
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
plainlen = blocksize + buf->len - offset;
headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen) -
(buf->len - offset);
ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
/* shift data to make room for header. */
/* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
/* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */
memmove(ptr + headlen, ptr, buf->head[0].iov_len - offset);
buf->head[0].iov_len += headlen;
buf->len += headlen;
BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen, &ptr);
*ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff);
*ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff);
/* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24;
/* XXXJBF: */ BUG_ON(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset + headlen != msg_start + blocksize);
*(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(kctx->signalg);
memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
*(u16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(kctx->sealalg);
make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize);
/* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
tmp_pages = buf->pages;
buf->pages = pages;
if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, buf,
offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum))
goto out_err;
buf->pages = tmp_pages;
switch (kctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
goto out_err;
memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16,
md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH,
KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH);
dprintk("RPC: make_seal_token: cksum data: \n");
print_hexl((u32 *) (krb5_hdr + 16), KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, 0);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
seq_send = kctx->seq_send++;
spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
/* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
* and encrypt at the same time: */
if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
goto out_err;
if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize,
pages))
goto out_err;
return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE);
out_err:
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
u32
gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
{
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id;
int signalg;
int sealalg;
s32 checksum_type;
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
s32 now;
int direction;
s32 seqnum;
unsigned char *ptr;
int bodysize;
u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
void *data_start, *orig_start;
int data_len;
int blocksize;
dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
buf->len - offset))
goto out;
if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
(*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) )
goto out;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
/* get the sign and seal algorithms */
signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
/* Sanity checks */
if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
goto out;
if (sealalg == 0xffff)
goto out;
/* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg)
goto out;
/* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms,
but few enough that we can try them all. */
if ((kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD))
goto out;
if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
goto out;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the the cksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
default:
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto out;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf,
ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto out;
}
break;
default:
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto out;
}
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
now = get_seconds();
ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
if (now > kctx->endtime)
goto out;
/* do sequencing checks */
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum)))
goto out;
if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
goto out;
/* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
* better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize;
orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start);
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
goto out;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
out:
return ret;
}