| /* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc. |
| * |
| * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any |
| * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
| * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
| * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
| * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION |
| * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN |
| * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <utility> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/hkdf.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| namespace bssl { |
| |
| // kMaxKeyUpdates is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates that will be |
| // processed. Without this limit an attacker could force unbounded processing |
| // without being able to return application data. |
| static const uint8_t kMaxKeyUpdates = 32; |
| |
| int tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, |
| enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context) { |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64 + 33 + 1 + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) { |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0x20)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *context; |
| size_t context_len; |
| if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_server) { |
| // Include the NUL byte. |
| static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
| context = (const uint8_t *)kContext; |
| context_len = sizeof(kContext); |
| } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_client) { |
| static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; |
| context = (const uint8_t *)kContext; |
| context_len = sizeof(kContext); |
| } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_channel_id) { |
| static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, Channel ID"; |
| context = (const uint8_t *)kContext; |
| context_len = sizeof(kContext); |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), context, context_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t context_hash_len; |
| if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), context_hash, context_hash_len) || |
| !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out, out_len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg, |
| int allow_anonymous) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| CBS body = msg.body, context, certificate_list; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) || |
| CBS_len(&context) != 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list) || |
| CBS_len(&body) != 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> certs(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null()); |
| if (!certs) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const bool retain_sha256 = |
| ssl->server && ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs; |
| UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey; |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| CBS certificate, extensions; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions) || |
| CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) { |
| pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate); |
| if (!pkey) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| // TLS 1.3 always uses certificate keys for signing thus the correct |
| // keyUsage is enforced. |
| if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&certificate)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (retain_sha256) { |
| // Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. |
| SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), |
| hs->new_session->peer_sha256); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, ssl->ctx->pool)); |
| if (!buf || |
| !PushToStack(certs.get(), std::move(buf))) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Parse out the extensions. |
| bool have_status_request = false, have_sct = false; |
| CBS status_request, sct; |
| const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { |
| {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, &have_status_request, &status_request}, |
| {TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, &have_sct, &sct}, |
| }; |
| |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, |
| OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), |
| 0 /* reject unknown */)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // All Certificate extensions are parsed, but only the leaf extensions are |
| // stored. |
| if (have_status_request) { |
| if (ssl->server || !ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t status_type; |
| CBS ocsp_response; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&status_request, &status_type) || |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&status_request, &ocsp_response) || |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&status_request) != 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->ocsp_response); |
| hs->new_session->ocsp_response = |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool); |
| if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (have_sct) { |
| if (ssl->server || !ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list = |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&sct, ssl->ctx->pool); |
| if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Store a null certificate list rather than an empty one if the peer didn't |
| // send certificates. |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) { |
| certs.reset(); |
| } |
| |
| hs->peer_pubkey = std::move(pkey); |
| |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| hs->new_session->certs = certs.release(); |
| |
| if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) { |
| if (!allow_anonymous) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is |
| // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. |
| hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
| |
| // No certificate, so nothing more to do. |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = retain_sha256; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBS body = msg.body, signature; |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &signature_algorithm) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &signature) || |
| CBS_len(&body) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; |
| |
| uint8_t *input = NULL; |
| size_t input_len; |
| if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( |
| hs, &input, &input_len, |
| ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_client : ssl_cert_verify_server)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_input(input); |
| |
| int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, CBS_data(&signature), |
| CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm, |
| hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input, input_len); |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| sig_ok = 1; |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| #endif |
| if (!sig_ok) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg, |
| int use_saved_value) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| uint8_t verify_data_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| const uint8_t *verify_data; |
| size_t verify_data_len; |
| if (use_saved_value) { |
| assert(ssl->server); |
| verify_data = hs->expected_client_finished; |
| verify_data_len = hs->hash_len; |
| } else { |
| if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data_buf, &verify_data_len, |
| !ssl->server)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| verify_data = verify_data_buf; |
| } |
| |
| int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, verify_data, verify_data_len); |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| finished_ok = 1; |
| #endif |
| if (!finished_ok) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body, certificate_list; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || |
| // The request context is always empty in the handshake. |
| !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) || |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { |
| return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()); |
| } |
| |
| CERT *cert = ssl->cert; |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0); |
| CBB leaf, extensions; |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &leaf) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&leaf, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf_buf), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf_buf)) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (hs->scts_requested && ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) { |
| CBB contents; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes( |
| &contents, |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list)) || |
| !CBB_flush(&extensions)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested && |
| ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL) { |
| CBB contents, ocsp_response; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&contents, &ocsp_response) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) || |
| !CBB_flush(&extensions)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain); i++) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, i); |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buf), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buf)) || |
| !CBB_add_u16(&certificate_list, 0 /* no extensions */)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()); |
| } |
| |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm; |
| if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) { |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; |
| } |
| |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) || |
| !CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; |
| } |
| |
| // Sign the digest. |
| CBB child; |
| const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get()); |
| uint8_t *sig; |
| size_t sig_len; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || |
| !CBB_reserve(&child, &sig, max_sig_len)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *msg = NULL; |
| size_t msg_len; |
| if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( |
| hs, &msg, &msg_len, |
| ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_server : ssl_cert_verify_client)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; |
| } |
| UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_msg(msg); |
| |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign( |
| hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg, msg_len); |
| if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) { |
| return sign_result; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || |
| !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { |
| return ssl_private_key_failure; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl_private_key_success; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| size_t verify_data_len; |
| uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->server)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&body, verify_data, verify_data_len) || |
| !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { |
| CBS body = msg.body; |
| uint8_t key_update_request; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&body, &key_update_request) || |
| CBS_len(&body) != 0 || |
| (key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED && |
| key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Acknowledge the KeyUpdate |
| if (key_update_request == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED && |
| !ssl->s3->key_update_pending) { |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| CBB body_cbb; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body_cbb, |
| SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(&body_cbb, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED) || |
| !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()) || |
| !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the |
| // wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and |
| // write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section |
| // 4.5.3. |
| ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { |
| if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
| ssl->s3->key_update_count++; |
| if (ssl->s3->key_update_count > kMaxKeyUpdates) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return tls13_receive_key_update(ssl, msg); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0; |
| |
| if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET && !ssl->server) { |
| return tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl, msg); |
| } |
| |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace bssl |