Adam Langley | d9e397b | 2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. |
| 2 | * |
| 3 | * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any |
| 4 | * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
| 5 | * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
| 8 | * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| 9 | * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
| 10 | * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| 11 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION |
| 12 | * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN |
| 13 | * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ |
| 14 | |
| 15 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 16 | |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 17 | #include <assert.h> |
Adam Langley | f4e4272 | 2015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 18 | #include <limits.h> |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 19 | #include <string.h> |
| 20 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 21 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 22 | #include <unistd.h> |
| 23 | #endif |
| 24 | |
Kenny Root | b849459 | 2015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 25 | #include <openssl/chacha.h> |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 26 | #include <openssl/cpu.h> |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 27 | #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| 28 | |
| 29 | #include "internal.h" |
Robert Sloan | 9254e68 | 2017-04-24 09:42:06 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 30 | #include "../../internal.h" |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 31 | #include "../delocate.h" |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 32 | |
| 33 | |
| 34 | /* It's assumed that the operating system always has an unfailing source of |
| 35 | * entropy which is accessed via |CRYPTO_sysrand|. (If the operating system |
| 36 | * entropy source fails, it's up to |CRYPTO_sysrand| to abort the process—we |
| 37 | * don't try to handle it.) |
| 38 | * |
| 39 | * In addition, the hardware may provide a low-latency RNG. Intel's rdrand |
| 40 | * instruction is the canonical example of this. When a hardware RNG is |
| 41 | * available we don't need to worry about an RNG failure arising from fork()ing |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 42 | * the process or moving a VM, so we can keep thread-local RNG state and use it |
| 43 | * as an additional-data input to CTR-DRBG. |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 44 | * |
| 45 | * (We assume that the OS entropy is safe from fork()ing and VM duplication. |
| 46 | * This might be a bit of a leap of faith, esp on Windows, but there's nothing |
| 47 | * that we can do about it.) */ |
| 48 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 49 | /* kReseedInterval is the number of generate calls made to CTR-DRBG before |
| 50 | * reseeding. */ |
| 51 | static const unsigned kReseedInterval = 4096; |
| 52 | |
| 53 | /* CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE is the number of bytes in a “block” for the purposes of the |
| 54 | * continuous random number generator test in FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. */ |
| 55 | #define CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE 16 |
| 56 | |
| 57 | /* rand_thread_state contains the per-thread state for the RNG. */ |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 58 | struct rand_thread_state { |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 59 | CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg; |
| 60 | /* calls is the number of generate calls made on |drbg| since it was last |
| 61 | * (re)seeded. This is bound by |kReseedInterval|. */ |
| 62 | unsigned calls; |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 63 | /* last_block_valid is non-zero iff |last_block| contains data from |
| 64 | * |CRYPTO_sysrand|. */ |
| 65 | int last_block_valid; |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 66 | |
| 67 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 68 | /* last_block contains the previous block from |CRYPTO_sysrand|. */ |
| 69 | uint8_t last_block[CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| 70 | /* next and prev form a NULL-terminated, double-linked list of all states in |
| 71 | * a process. */ |
| 72 | struct rand_thread_state *next, *prev; |
| 73 | #endif |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 74 | }; |
| 75 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 76 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 77 | /* thread_states_list is the head of a linked-list of all |rand_thread_state| |
| 78 | * objects in the process, one per thread. This is needed because FIPS requires |
| 79 | * that they be zeroed on process exit, but thread-local destructors aren't |
| 80 | * called when the whole process is exiting. */ |
| 81 | DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list); |
| 82 | DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(thread_states_list_lock); |
| 83 | |
| 84 | static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) __attribute__((destructor)); |
| 85 | static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) { |
| 86 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 87 | for (struct rand_thread_state *cur = *thread_states_list_bss_get(); |
| 88 | cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| 89 | CTR_DRBG_clear(&cur->drbg); |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | /* |thread_states_list_lock is deliberately left locked so that any threads |
| 92 | * that are still running will hang if they try to call |RAND_bytes|. */ |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | #endif |
| 95 | |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 96 | /* rand_thread_state_free frees a |rand_thread_state|. This is called when a |
| 97 | * thread exits. */ |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 98 | static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state_in) { |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 99 | struct rand_thread_state *state = state_in; |
| 100 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 101 | if (state_in == NULL) { |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 102 | return; |
| 103 | } |
| 104 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 105 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 106 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 107 | |
| 108 | if (state->prev != NULL) { |
| 109 | state->prev->next = state->next; |
| 110 | } else { |
| 111 | *thread_states_list_bss_get() = state->next; |
| 112 | } |
| 113 | |
| 114 | if (state->next != NULL) { |
| 115 | state->next->prev = state->prev; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 119 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 120 | CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg); |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 121 | #endif |
| 122 | |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 123 | OPENSSL_free(state); |
| 124 | } |
| 125 | |
David Benjamin | 4969cc9 | 2016-04-22 15:02:23 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 126 | #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \ |
Steven Valdez | 909b19f | 2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 127 | !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 128 | |
| 129 | /* These functions are defined in asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl */ |
| 130 | extern int CRYPTO_rdrand(uint8_t out[8]); |
| 131 | extern int CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t len); |
| 132 | |
| 133 | static int have_rdrand(void) { |
Robert Sloan | 2424d84 | 2017-05-01 07:46:28 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 134 | return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_get()[1] & (1u << 30)) != 0; |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 135 | } |
| 136 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 137 | static int hwrand(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) { |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 138 | if (!have_rdrand()) { |
| 139 | return 0; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | |
| 142 | const size_t len_multiple8 = len & ~7; |
| 143 | if (!CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(buf, len_multiple8)) { |
| 144 | return 0; |
| 145 | } |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 146 | const size_t remainder = len - len_multiple8; |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 147 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 148 | if (remainder != 0) { |
| 149 | assert(remainder < 8); |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 150 | |
| 151 | uint8_t rand_buf[8]; |
| 152 | if (!CRYPTO_rdrand(rand_buf)) { |
| 153 | return 0; |
| 154 | } |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 155 | OPENSSL_memcpy(buf + len_multiple8, rand_buf, remainder); |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 156 | } |
| 157 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 158 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG) |
| 159 | // This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS |
| 160 | // 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed(). |
| 161 | OPENSSL_memset(buf, 0, len); |
| 162 | #endif |
| 163 | |
Kenny Root | e99801b | 2015-11-06 15:31:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 164 | return 1; |
| 165 | } |
| 166 | |
| 167 | #else |
| 168 | |
| 169 | static int hwrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { |
| 170 | return 0; |
| 171 | } |
| 172 | |
| 173 | #endif |
| 174 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 175 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 176 | |
| 177 | static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state, |
| 178 | uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) { |
| 179 | if (!state->last_block_valid) { |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 180 | if (!hwrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block))) { |
| 181 | CRYPTO_sysrand(state->last_block, sizeof(state->last_block)); |
| 182 | } |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 183 | state->last_block_valid = 1; |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 184 | } |
| 185 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 186 | /* We overread from /dev/urandom or RDRAND by a factor of 10 and XOR to |
| 187 | * whiten. */ |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 188 | #define FIPS_OVERREAD 10 |
| 189 | uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * FIPS_OVERREAD]; |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 190 | |
| 191 | if (!hwrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy))) { |
| 192 | CRYPTO_sysrand(entropy, sizeof(entropy)); |
| 193 | } |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 194 | |
| 195 | /* See FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. This is the “continuous random number |
| 196 | * generator test” which causes the program to randomly abort. Hopefully the |
| 197 | * rate of failure is small enough not to be a problem in practice. */ |
| 198 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(state->last_block, entropy, CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 199 | printf("CRNGT failed.\n"); |
| 200 | BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort(); |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 201 | } |
| 202 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 203 | for (size_t i = CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE; i < sizeof(entropy); |
| 204 | i += CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) { |
| 205 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(entropy + i - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, entropy + i, |
| 206 | CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 207 | printf("CRNGT failed.\n"); |
| 208 | BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort(); |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 209 | } |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | OPENSSL_memcpy(state->last_block, |
| 212 | entropy + sizeof(entropy) - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, |
| 213 | CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE); |
| 214 | |
| 215 | OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN); |
| 216 | |
| 217 | for (size_t i = 1; i < FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) { |
| 218 | for (size_t j = 0; j < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; j++) { |
| 219 | seed[j] ^= entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * i + j]; |
| 220 | } |
| 221 | } |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | |
| 224 | #else |
| 225 | |
| 226 | static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state, |
| 227 | uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]) { |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 228 | /* If not in FIPS mode, we don't overread from the system entropy source and |
| 229 | * we don't depend only on the hardware RDRAND. */ |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 230 | CRYPTO_sysrand(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN); |
| 231 | } |
| 232 | |
| 233 | #endif |
| 234 | |
| 235 | void RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, |
| 236 | const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]) { |
| 237 | if (out_len == 0) { |
| 238 | return; |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 241 | /* Additional data is mixed into every CTR-DRBG call to protect, as best we |
| 242 | * can, against forks & VM clones. We do not over-read this information and |
| 243 | * don't reseed with it so, from the point of view of FIPS, this doesn't |
| 244 | * provide “prediction resistance”. But, in practice, it does. */ |
| 245 | uint8_t additional_data[32]; |
| 246 | if (!hwrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data))) { |
| 247 | /* Without a hardware RNG to save us from address-space duplication, the OS |
| 248 | * entropy is used. This can be expensive (one read per |RAND_bytes| call) |
| 249 | * and so can be disabled by applications that we have ensured don't fork |
| 250 | * and aren't at risk of VM cloning. */ |
| 251 | if (!rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled()) { |
| 252 | CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data)); |
| 253 | } else { |
| 254 | OPENSSL_memset(additional_data, 0, sizeof(additional_data)); |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 255 | } |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 256 | } |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 257 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 258 | for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(additional_data); i++) { |
| 259 | additional_data[i] ^= user_additional_data[i]; |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 262 | struct rand_thread_state stack_state; |
| 263 | struct rand_thread_state *state = |
| 264 | CRYPTO_get_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND); |
| 265 | |
| 266 | if (state == NULL) { |
| 267 | state = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct rand_thread_state)); |
| 268 | if (state == NULL || |
| 269 | !CRYPTO_set_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND, state, |
| 270 | rand_thread_state_free)) { |
| 271 | /* If the system is out of memory, use an ephemeral state on the |
| 272 | * stack. */ |
| 273 | state = &stack_state; |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | |
| 276 | state->last_block_valid = 0; |
| 277 | uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]; |
| 278 | rand_get_seed(state, seed); |
| 279 | if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, NULL, 0)) { |
| 280 | abort(); |
| 281 | } |
| 282 | state->calls = 0; |
| 283 | |
| 284 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 285 | if (state != &stack_state) { |
| 286 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 287 | struct rand_thread_state **states_list = thread_states_list_bss_get(); |
| 288 | state->next = *states_list; |
| 289 | if (state->next != NULL) { |
| 290 | state->next->prev = state; |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | state->prev = NULL; |
| 293 | *states_list = state; |
| 294 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | #endif |
| 297 | } |
| 298 | |
| 299 | if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval) { |
| 300 | uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]; |
| 301 | rand_get_seed(state, seed); |
| 302 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 303 | /* Take a read lock around accesses to |state->drbg|. This is needed to |
| 304 | * avoid returning bad entropy if we race with |
| 305 | * |rand_thread_state_clear_all|. |
| 306 | * |
| 307 | * This lock must be taken after any calls to |CRYPTO_sysrand| to avoid a |
| 308 | * bug on ppc64le. glibc may implement pthread locks by wrapping user code |
| 309 | * in a hardware transaction, but, on some older versions of glibc and the |
| 310 | * kernel, syscalls made with |syscall| did not abort the transaction. */ |
| 311 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 312 | #endif |
| 313 | if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&state->drbg, seed, NULL, 0)) { |
| 314 | abort(); |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | state->calls = 0; |
| 317 | } else { |
| 318 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 319 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 320 | #endif |
| 321 | } |
| 322 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 323 | int first_call = 1; |
| 324 | while (out_len > 0) { |
| 325 | size_t todo = out_len; |
| 326 | if (todo > CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH) { |
| 327 | todo = CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH; |
| 328 | } |
| 329 | |
| 330 | if (!CTR_DRBG_generate(&state->drbg, out, todo, additional_data, |
| 331 | first_call ? sizeof(additional_data) : 0)) { |
| 332 | abort(); |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | |
| 335 | out += todo; |
| 336 | out_len -= todo; |
| 337 | state->calls++; |
| 338 | first_call = 0; |
| 339 | } |
| 340 | |
| 341 | if (state == &stack_state) { |
| 342 | CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg); |
| 343 | } |
| 344 | |
Robert Sloan | 8ff0355 | 2017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 345 | #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) |
| 346 | CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()); |
| 347 | #endif |
| 348 | |
Robert Sloan | 572a4e2 | 2017-04-17 10:52:19 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 349 | return; |
| 350 | } |
| 351 | |
| 352 | int RAND_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) { |
| 353 | static const uint8_t kZeroAdditionalData[32] = {0}; |
| 354 | RAND_bytes_with_additional_data(out, out_len, kZeroAdditionalData); |
Adam Langley | e9ada86 | 2015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 355 | return 1; |
| 356 | } |
Adam Langley | d9e397b | 2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 357 | |
| 358 | int RAND_pseudo_bytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { |
| 359 | return RAND_bytes(buf, len); |
| 360 | } |