blob: 32e6c2cdbdf707b6064ccb5b4b90239d59ba7920 [file] [log] [blame]
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -07007 *
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08008 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070014 *
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080015 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070021 *
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080022 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070036 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080037 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070039 *
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080040 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070051 *
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080052 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
56 */
57/* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
59 *
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
62 * are met:
63 *
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -070065 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -080066 *
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
70 * distribution.
71 *
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
76 *
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
81 *
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
85 *
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
87 * acknowledgment:
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
90 *
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
104 *
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
108 *
109 */
110/* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -0700112 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800113 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
114 */
115/* ====================================================================
116 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
117 *
118 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
119 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
120 * license.
121 *
122 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
123 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
124 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
125 *
126 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
127 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
128 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
129 *
130 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
131 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
132 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
133 * to make use of the Contribution.
134 *
135 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
136 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
137 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
138 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
139 * OTHERWISE. */
140
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000141#include <openssl/ssl.h>
142
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800143#include <assert.h>
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700144#include <string.h>
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800145
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700146#include <openssl/buf.h>
147#include <openssl/err.h>
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800148#include <openssl/md5.h>
149#include <openssl/mem.h>
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800150#include <openssl/sha.h>
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700151#include <openssl/stack.h>
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800152
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700153#include "internal.h"
David Benjaminf0c4a6c2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400154#include "../crypto/internal.h"
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800155
156
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -0700157namespace bssl {
158
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700159// kCiphers is an array of all supported ciphers, sorted by id.
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800160static const SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700161 // The RSA ciphers
162 // Cipher 02
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000163 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800164 SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700165 "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800166 SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
167 SSL_kRSA,
168 SSL_aRSA,
169 SSL_eNULL,
170 SSL_SHA1,
171 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000172 },
173
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700174 // Cipher 0A
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700175 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800176 SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700177 "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800178 SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
179 SSL_kRSA,
180 SSL_aRSA,
181 SSL_3DES,
182 SSL_SHA1,
183 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700184 },
185
186
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700187 // New AES ciphersuites
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700188
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700189 // Cipher 2F
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700190 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800191 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700192 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800193 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
194 SSL_kRSA,
195 SSL_aRSA,
196 SSL_AES128,
197 SSL_SHA1,
198 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700199 },
200
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700201 // Cipher 35
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700202 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800203 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700204 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800205 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
206 SSL_kRSA,
207 SSL_aRSA,
208 SSL_AES256,
209 SSL_SHA1,
210 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700211 },
212
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700213
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700214 // TLS v1.2 ciphersuites
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700215
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700216 // Cipher 3C
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700217 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800218 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700219 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800220 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
221 SSL_kRSA,
222 SSL_aRSA,
223 SSL_AES128,
224 SSL_SHA256,
225 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700226 },
227
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700228 // Cipher 3D
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700229 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800230 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700231 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800232 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
233 SSL_kRSA,
234 SSL_aRSA,
235 SSL_AES256,
236 SSL_SHA256,
237 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700238 },
239
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700240 // PSK cipher suites.
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700241
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700242 // Cipher 8C
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700243 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800244 TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700245 "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800246 TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
247 SSL_kPSK,
248 SSL_aPSK,
249 SSL_AES128,
250 SSL_SHA1,
251 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700252 },
253
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700254 // Cipher 8D
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700255 {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800256 TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700257 "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800258 TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
259 SSL_kPSK,
260 SSL_aPSK,
261 SSL_AES256,
262 SSL_SHA1,
263 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700264 },
265
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700266 // GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700267
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700268 // Cipher 9C
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700269 {
270 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700271 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800272 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
273 SSL_kRSA,
274 SSL_aRSA,
275 SSL_AES128GCM,
276 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000277 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700278 },
279
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700280 // Cipher 9D
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700281 {
282 TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700283 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800284 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
285 SSL_kRSA,
286 SSL_aRSA,
287 SSL_AES256GCM,
288 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000289 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700290 },
291
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700292 // TLS 1.3 suites.
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400293
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700294 // Cipher 1301
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400295 {
296 TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700297 "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400298 TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
299 SSL_kGENERIC,
300 SSL_aGENERIC,
301 SSL_AES128GCM,
302 SSL_AEAD,
303 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
304 },
305
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700306 // Cipher 1302
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400307 {
308 TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700309 "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400310 TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
311 SSL_kGENERIC,
312 SSL_aGENERIC,
313 SSL_AES256GCM,
314 SSL_AEAD,
315 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
316 },
317
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700318 // Cipher 1303
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400319 {
320 TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700321 "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -0400322 TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
323 SSL_kGENERIC,
324 SSL_aGENERIC,
325 SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
326 SSL_AEAD,
327 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
328 },
329
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700330 // Cipher C009
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700331 {
332 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700333 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800334 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
335 SSL_kECDHE,
336 SSL_aECDSA,
337 SSL_AES128,
338 SSL_SHA1,
339 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700340 },
341
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700342 // Cipher C00A
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700343 {
344 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700345 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800346 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
347 SSL_kECDHE,
348 SSL_aECDSA,
349 SSL_AES256,
350 SSL_SHA1,
351 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700352 },
353
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700354 // Cipher C013
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700355 {
356 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700357 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800358 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
359 SSL_kECDHE,
360 SSL_aRSA,
361 SSL_AES128,
362 SSL_SHA1,
363 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700364 },
365
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700366 // Cipher C014
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700367 {
368 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700369 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800370 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
371 SSL_kECDHE,
372 SSL_aRSA,
373 SSL_AES256,
374 SSL_SHA1,
375 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700376 },
377
378
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700379 // HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700380
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700381 // Cipher C023
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700382 {
383 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700384 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800385 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
386 SSL_kECDHE,
387 SSL_aECDSA,
388 SSL_AES128,
389 SSL_SHA256,
390 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700391 },
392
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700393 // Cipher C024
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700394 {
395 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700396 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800397 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
398 SSL_kECDHE,
399 SSL_aECDSA,
400 SSL_AES256,
401 SSL_SHA384,
402 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700403 },
404
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700405 // Cipher C027
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700406 {
407 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700408 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800409 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
410 SSL_kECDHE,
411 SSL_aRSA,
412 SSL_AES128,
413 SSL_SHA256,
414 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700415 },
416
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700417 // Cipher C028
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700418 {
419 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700420 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800421 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
422 SSL_kECDHE,
423 SSL_aRSA,
424 SSL_AES256,
425 SSL_SHA384,
426 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700427 },
428
429
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700430 // GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700431
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700432 // Cipher C02B
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700433 {
434 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700435 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800436 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
437 SSL_kECDHE,
438 SSL_aECDSA,
439 SSL_AES128GCM,
440 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000441 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700442 },
443
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700444 // Cipher C02C
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700445 {
446 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700447 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800448 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
449 SSL_kECDHE,
450 SSL_aECDSA,
451 SSL_AES256GCM,
452 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000453 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700454 },
455
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700456 // Cipher C02F
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700457 {
458 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700459 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800460 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
461 SSL_kECDHE,
462 SSL_aRSA,
463 SSL_AES128GCM,
464 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000465 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700466 },
467
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700468 // Cipher C030
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700469 {
470 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700471 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800472 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
473 SSL_kECDHE,
474 SSL_aRSA,
475 SSL_AES256GCM,
476 SSL_AEAD,
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000477 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700478 },
479
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700480 // ECDHE-PSK cipher suites.
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700481
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700482 // Cipher C035
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700483 {
484 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700485 "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700486 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800487 SSL_kECDHE,
488 SSL_aPSK,
489 SSL_AES128,
490 SSL_SHA1,
491 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700492 },
493
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700494 // Cipher C036
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700495 {
496 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700497 "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700498 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800499 SSL_kECDHE,
500 SSL_aPSK,
501 SSL_AES256,
502 SSL_SHA1,
503 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700504 },
505
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700506 // ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.
Adam Langley0e6bb1c2015-06-15 13:52:15 -0700507
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700508 // Cipher CCA8
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800509 {
510 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700511 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800512 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
513 SSL_kECDHE,
514 SSL_aRSA,
515 SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
516 SSL_AEAD,
517 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
518 },
519
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700520 // Cipher CCA9
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800521 {
522 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700523 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800524 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
525 SSL_kECDHE,
526 SSL_aECDSA,
527 SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
528 SSL_AEAD,
529 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
530 },
531
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700532 // Cipher CCAB
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800533 {
534 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -0700535 "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800536 TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
537 SSL_kECDHE,
538 SSL_aPSK,
539 SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
540 SSL_AEAD,
541 SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
542 },
David Benjamind316cba2016-06-02 16:17:39 -0400543
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700544};
545
David Benjaminf0c4a6c2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400546static const size_t kCiphersLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers);
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700547
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800548#define CIPHER_ADD 1
549#define CIPHER_KILL 2
550#define CIPHER_DEL 3
551#define CIPHER_ORD 4
552#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
553
554typedef struct cipher_order_st {
555 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700556 bool active;
557 bool in_group;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800558 struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
559} CIPHER_ORDER;
560
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700561typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700562 // name is the name of the cipher alias.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700563 const char *name;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800564
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700565 // The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
566 // |SSL_CIPHER|. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
567 // bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
568 // all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use |~0u| for the default value.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700569 uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
570 uint32_t algorithm_auth;
571 uint32_t algorithm_enc;
572 uint32_t algorithm_mac;
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800573
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700574 // min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
575 // particular protocol version.
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800576 uint16_t min_version;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700577} CIPHER_ALIAS;
578
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700579static const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700580 // "ALL" doesn't include eNULL. It must be explicitly enabled.
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800581 {"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700582
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700583 // The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800584
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700585 // key exchange aliases
586 // (some of those using only a single bit here combine
587 // multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs.
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800588 {"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800589
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800590 {"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
591 {"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
592 {"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800593
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800594 {"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800595
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700596 // server authentication aliases
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800597 {"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Steven Valdeze7531f02016-12-14 13:29:57 -0500598 {"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
599 {"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800600 {"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800601
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700602 // aliases combining key exchange and server authentication
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800603 {"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
604 {"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800605 {"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800606 {"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800607
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700608 // symmetric encryption aliases
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800609 {"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800610 {"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0},
Steven Valdeze7531f02016-12-14 13:29:57 -0500611 {"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
612 {"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
613 {"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
David Benjaminf31229b2017-01-25 14:08:15 -0500614 {"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800615
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700616 // MAC aliases
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800617 {"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
618 {"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
Steven Valdeze7531f02016-12-14 13:29:57 -0500619 {"SHA256", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA256, 0},
620 {"SHA384", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA384, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800621
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700622 // Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
623 // same as "SSLv3".
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800624 {"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
625 {"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
626 {"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800627
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700628 // Legacy strength classes.
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800629 {"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
630 {"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800631};
632
David Benjaminf0c4a6c2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400633static const size_t kCipherAliasesLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherAliases);
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700634
635static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
Robert Sloana12bf462017-07-17 07:08:26 -0700636 const SSL_CIPHER *a = reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_a);
637 const SSL_CIPHER *b = reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_b);
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700638
639 if (a->id > b->id) {
640 return 1;
641 } else if (a->id < b->id) {
642 return -1;
643 } else {
644 return 0;
645 }
646}
647
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700648bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
649 size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
650 size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
651 uint16_t version, int is_dtls) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800652 *out_aead = NULL;
653 *out_mac_secret_len = 0;
654 *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
655
Robert Sloan8ff03552017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700656 const int is_tls12 = version == TLS1_2_VERSION && !is_dtls;
657
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500658 if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) {
659 if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
Robert Sloan8ff03552017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700660 *out_aead =
661 is_tls12 ? EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12() : EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800662 *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500663 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
Robert Sloan8ff03552017-06-14 12:40:58 -0700664 *out_aead =
665 is_tls12 ? EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12() : EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800666 *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500667 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800668 *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
669 *out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500670 } else {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700671 return false;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500672 }
673
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700674 // In TLS 1.3, the iv_len is equal to the AEAD nonce length whereas the code
675 // above computes the TLS 1.2 construction.
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500676 if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
677 *out_fixed_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(*out_aead);
678 }
679 } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) {
680 if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
681 if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
682 *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_ssl3();
683 } else {
684 *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls();
685 }
686 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES) {
687 if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
688 *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
689 *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
690 } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
691 *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
692 *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
693 } else {
694 *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
695 }
696 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
697 if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
698 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
699 *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
700 } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
701 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
702 *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
703 } else {
704 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
705 }
706 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
707 if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
708 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
709 *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
710 } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
711 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
712 *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
713 } else {
714 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
715 }
716 } else {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700717 return false;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500718 }
719
720 *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
721 } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) {
722 if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
723 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls();
724 } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
725 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls();
726 } else {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700727 return false;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500728 }
729
730 *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
731 } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA384) {
732 if (cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_AES256) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700733 return false;
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -0500734 }
735
736 *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls();
737 *out_mac_secret_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
738 } else {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700739 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800740 }
David Benjaminc895d6b2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400741
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700742 return true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800743}
744
Robert Sloan84377092017-08-14 09:33:19 -0700745const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
746 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
747 switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000748 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
Robert Sloan5d625782017-02-13 09:55:39 -0800749 return version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_md5_sha1();
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000750 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
751 return EVP_sha256();
752 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
753 return EVP_sha384();
754 default:
Robert Sloan84377092017-08-14 09:33:19 -0700755 assert(0);
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +0000756 return NULL;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800757 }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800758}
759
Robert Sloanfe7cd212017-08-07 09:03:39 -0700760static bool is_cipher_list_separator(char c, int is_strict) {
761 if (c == ':') {
762 return true;
763 }
764 return !is_strict && (c == ' ' || c == ';' || c == ',');
765}
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800766
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700767// rule_equals returns whether the NUL-terminated string |rule| is equal to the
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700768// |buf_len| bytes at |buf|.
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700769static bool rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700770 // |strncmp| alone only checks that |buf| is a prefix of |rule|.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700771 return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
772}
773
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800774static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
775 CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
776 if (curr == *tail) {
777 return;
778 }
779 if (curr == *head) {
780 *head = curr->next;
781 }
782 if (curr->prev != NULL) {
783 curr->prev->next = curr->next;
784 }
785 if (curr->next != NULL) {
786 curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
787 }
788 (*tail)->next = curr;
789 curr->prev = *tail;
790 curr->next = NULL;
791 *tail = curr;
792}
793
794static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
795 CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
796 if (curr == *head) {
797 return;
798 }
799 if (curr == *tail) {
800 *tail = curr->prev;
801 }
802 if (curr->next != NULL) {
803 curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
804 }
805 if (curr->prev != NULL) {
806 curr->prev->next = curr->next;
807 }
808 (*head)->prev = curr;
809 curr->next = *head;
810 curr->prev = NULL;
811 *head = curr;
812}
813
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800814static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800815 CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
816 CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -0700817 size_t co_list_num = 0;
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800818 for (const SSL_CIPHER &cipher : kCiphers) {
819 // TLS 1.3 ciphers do not participate in this mechanism.
820 if (cipher.algorithm_mkey != SSL_kGENERIC) {
821 co_list[co_list_num].cipher = &cipher;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800822 co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
823 co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700824 co_list[co_list_num].active = false;
825 co_list[co_list_num].in_group = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800826 co_list_num++;
827 }
828 }
829
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700830 // Prepare linked list from list entries.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800831 if (co_list_num > 0) {
832 co_list[0].prev = NULL;
833
834 if (co_list_num > 1) {
835 co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
836
David Benjamin7c0d06c2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400837 for (size_t i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800838 co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
839 co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
840 }
841
842 co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
843 }
844
845 co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
846
847 *head_p = &co_list[0];
848 *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
849 }
850}
851
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700852// ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type |rule| to ciphers matching its
853// parameters in the linked list from |*head_p| to |*tail_p|. It writes the new
854// head and tail of the list to |*head_p| and |*tail_p|, respectively.
855//
856// - If |cipher_id| is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
857// - Otherwise, if |strength_bits| is non-negative, it selects ciphers
858// of that strength.
859// - Otherwise, it selects ciphers that match each bitmasks in |alg_*| and
860// |min_version|.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800861static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700862 uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800863 uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, uint16_t min_version, int rule,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700864 int strength_bits, bool in_group, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800865 CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800866 CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
867 const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700868 bool reverse = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800869
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800870 if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && min_version == 0 &&
871 (alg_mkey == 0 || alg_auth == 0 || alg_enc == 0 || alg_mac == 0)) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700872 // The rule matches nothing, so bail early.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700873 return;
874 }
875
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800876 if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700877 // needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700878 reverse = true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800879 }
880
881 head = *head_p;
882 tail = *tail_p;
883
884 if (reverse) {
885 next = tail;
886 last = head;
887 } else {
888 next = head;
889 last = tail;
890 }
891
892 curr = NULL;
893 for (;;) {
894 if (curr == last) {
895 break;
896 }
897
898 curr = next;
899 if (curr == NULL) {
900 break;
901 }
902
903 next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
904 cp = curr->cipher;
905
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700906 // Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
907 // |strength_bits|, or the algorithms used.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -0700908 if (cipher_id != 0) {
909 if (cipher_id != cp->id) {
910 continue;
911 }
912 } else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800913 if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, NULL)) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800914 continue;
915 }
David Benjaminc895d6b2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400916 } else {
917 if (!(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
918 !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
919 !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
920 !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -0800921 (min_version != 0 && SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != min_version) ||
922 // The NULL cipher must be selected explicitly.
923 cp->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
David Benjaminc895d6b2016-08-11 13:26:41 -0400924 continue;
925 }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800926 }
927
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700928 // add the cipher if it has not been added yet.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800929 if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700930 // reverse == false
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800931 if (!curr->active) {
932 ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700933 curr->active = true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800934 curr->in_group = in_group;
935 }
936 }
937
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700938 // Move the added cipher to this location
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800939 else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700940 // reverse == false
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800941 if (curr->active) {
942 ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700943 curr->in_group = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800944 }
945 } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700946 // reverse == true
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800947 if (curr->active) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700948 // most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
949 // for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
950 // works in reverse to maintain the order)
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800951 ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700952 curr->active = false;
953 curr->in_group = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800954 }
955 } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700956 // reverse == false
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800957 if (head == curr) {
958 head = curr->next;
959 } else {
960 curr->prev->next = curr->next;
961 }
962
963 if (tail == curr) {
964 tail = curr->prev;
965 }
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700966 curr->active = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800967 if (curr->next != NULL) {
968 curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
969 }
970 if (curr->prev != NULL) {
971 curr->prev->next = curr->next;
972 }
973 curr->next = NULL;
974 curr->prev = NULL;
975 }
976 }
977
978 *head_p = head;
979 *tail_p = tail;
980}
981
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700982static bool ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
983 CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -0700984 // This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
985 // keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
986 // '+' movement to the end of the list.
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700987 int max_strength_bits = 0;
988 CIPHER_ORDER *curr = *head_p;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800989 while (curr != NULL) {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -0800990 if (curr->active &&
991 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL) > max_strength_bits) {
992 max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -0800993 }
994 curr = curr->next;
995 }
996
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -0700997 Array<int> number_uses;
998 if (!number_uses.Init(max_strength_bits + 1)) {
999 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001000 }
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001001 OPENSSL_memset(number_uses.data(), 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001002
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001003 // Now find the strength_bits values actually used.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001004 curr = *head_p;
1005 while (curr != NULL) {
1006 if (curr->active) {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001007 number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL)]++;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001008 }
1009 curr = curr->next;
1010 }
1011
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001012 // Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order.
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001013 for (int i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001014 if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001015 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, false, head_p,
1016 tail_p);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001017 }
1018 }
1019
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001020 return true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001021}
1022
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -08001023static bool ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001024 CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
1025 CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, bool strict) {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001026 uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
1027 uint16_t min_version;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001028 const char *l, *buf;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001029 int rule;
1030 bool multi, skip_rule, in_group = false, has_group = false;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001031 size_t j, buf_len;
1032 uint32_t cipher_id;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001033 char ch;
1034
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001035 l = rule_str;
1036 for (;;) {
1037 ch = *l;
1038
1039 if (ch == '\0') {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001040 break; // done
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001041 }
1042
1043 if (in_group) {
1044 if (ch == ']') {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001045 if (*tail_p) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001046 (*tail_p)->in_group = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001047 }
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001048 in_group = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001049 l++;
1050 continue;
1051 }
1052
1053 if (ch == '|') {
1054 rule = CIPHER_ADD;
1055 l++;
1056 continue;
1057 } else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
1058 !(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001059 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001060 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001061 } else {
1062 rule = CIPHER_ADD;
1063 }
1064 } else if (ch == '-') {
1065 rule = CIPHER_DEL;
1066 l++;
1067 } else if (ch == '+') {
1068 rule = CIPHER_ORD;
1069 l++;
1070 } else if (ch == '!') {
1071 rule = CIPHER_KILL;
1072 l++;
1073 } else if (ch == '@') {
1074 rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
1075 l++;
1076 } else if (ch == '[') {
Robert Sloanf6200e72017-07-10 08:09:18 -07001077 assert(!in_group);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001078 in_group = true;
1079 has_group = true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001080 l++;
1081 continue;
1082 } else {
1083 rule = CIPHER_ADD;
1084 }
1085
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001086 // If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
1087 // Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001088 if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001089 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001090 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001091 }
1092
Robert Sloanfe7cd212017-08-07 09:03:39 -07001093 if (is_cipher_list_separator(ch, strict)) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001094 l++;
1095 continue;
1096 }
1097
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001098 multi = false;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001099 cipher_id = 0;
1100 alg_mkey = ~0u;
1101 alg_auth = ~0u;
1102 alg_enc = ~0u;
1103 alg_mac = ~0u;
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001104 min_version = 0;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001105 skip_rule = false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001106
1107 for (;;) {
1108 ch = *l;
1109 buf = l;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001110 buf_len = 0;
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -07001111 while ((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ||
1112 (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || ch == '-' || ch == '.' || ch == '_') {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001113 ch = *(++l);
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001114 buf_len++;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001115 }
1116
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001117 if (buf_len == 0) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001118 // We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
1119 // nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001120 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001121 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001122 }
1123
1124 if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001125 break;
1126 }
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001127
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001128 // Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
1129 // rules.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001130 if (!multi && ch != '+') {
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -07001131 for (j = 0; j < kCiphersLen; j++) {
1132 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[j];
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -07001133 if (rule_equals(cipher->name, buf, buf_len) ||
1134 rule_equals(cipher->standard_name, buf, buf_len)) {
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001135 cipher_id = cipher->id;
1136 break;
1137 }
1138 }
1139 }
1140 if (cipher_id == 0) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001141 // If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias.
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -07001142 for (j = 0; j < kCipherAliasesLen; j++) {
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001143 if (rule_equals(kCipherAliases[j].name, buf, buf_len)) {
1144 alg_mkey &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mkey;
1145 alg_auth &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_auth;
1146 alg_enc &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_enc;
1147 alg_mac &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mac;
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001148
1149 if (min_version != 0 &&
1150 min_version != kCipherAliases[j].min_version) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001151 skip_rule = true;
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001152 } else {
1153 min_version = kCipherAliases[j].min_version;
1154 }
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001155 break;
1156 }
1157 }
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -07001158 if (j == kCipherAliasesLen) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001159 skip_rule = true;
Robert Sloan7c50ec52017-02-27 08:17:21 -08001160 if (strict) {
1161 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001162 return false;
Robert Sloan7c50ec52017-02-27 08:17:21 -08001163 }
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001164 }
1165 }
1166
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001167 // Check for a multipart rule.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001168 if (ch != '+') {
1169 break;
1170 }
1171 l++;
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001172 multi = true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001173 }
1174
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001175 // Ok, we have the rule, now apply it.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001176 if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
Robert Sloanf6200e72017-07-10 08:09:18 -07001177 if (buf_len != 8 || strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) != 0) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001178 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001179 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001180 }
Robert Sloanf6200e72017-07-10 08:09:18 -07001181 if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p)) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001182 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001183 }
1184
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001185 // We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
1186 // the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found.
Robert Sloanfe7cd212017-08-07 09:03:39 -07001187 while (*l != '\0' && !is_cipher_list_separator(*l, strict)) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001188 l++;
1189 }
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001190 } else if (!skip_rule) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001191 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001192 min_version, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, tail_p);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001193 }
1194 }
1195
1196 if (in_group) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001197 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001198 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001199 }
1200
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001201 return true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001202}
1203
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001204bool ssl_create_cipher_list(
Robert Sloan1c9db532017-03-13 08:03:59 -07001205 struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **out_cipher_list,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001206 const char *rule_str, bool strict) {
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -05001207 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack = NULL;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001208 CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001209 uint8_t *in_group_flags = NULL;
1210 unsigned int num_in_group_flags = 0;
1211 struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *pref_list = NULL;
1212
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001213 // Return with error if nothing to do.
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001214 if (rule_str == NULL || out_cipher_list == NULL) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001215 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001216 }
1217
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001218 // Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
1219 // We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
1220 // allocation.
Robert Sloana12bf462017-07-17 07:08:26 -07001221 co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * kCiphersLen);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001222 if (co_list == NULL) {
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001223 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001224 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001225 }
1226
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -08001227 ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(co_list, &head, &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001228
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001229 // Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
1230 // TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001231
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001232 // Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA over other
1233 // key exchange mechanisms
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001234 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001235 false, &head, &tail);
1236 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001237 &head, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001238 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001239 &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001240
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001241 // Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
1242 // CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
1243 // AES_GCM. Of the two CHACHA20 variants, the new one is preferred over the
1244 // old one.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001245 if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001246 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
1247 false, &head, &tail);
1248 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
1249 false, &head, &tail);
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001250 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001251 -1, false, &head, &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001252 } else {
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001253 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001254 -1, false, &head, &tail);
1255 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
1256 false, &head, &tail);
1257 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
1258 false, &head, &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001259 }
1260
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001261 // Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_128_CBC, AES_256_CBC,
1262 // 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001263 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001264 &head, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001265 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
David Benjamin4969cc92016-04-22 15:02:23 -04001266 &head, &tail);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001267 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
1268 &head, &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001269
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001270 // Temporarily enable everything else for sorting
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001271 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false, &head,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001272 &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001273
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001274 // Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end.
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001275 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kPSK), ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ORD,
1276 -1, false, &head, &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001277
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001278 // Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!)
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001279 ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001280 &tail);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001281
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001282 // If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
1283 // using the (possibly available) additional rules.
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -05001284 const char *rule_p = rule_str;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001285 if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -08001286 if (!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
1287 strict)) {
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -05001288 goto err;
1289 }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001290 rule_p += 7;
1291 if (*rule_p == ':') {
1292 rule_p++;
1293 }
1294 }
1295
Steven Valdez909b19f2016-11-21 15:35:44 -05001296 if (*rule_p != '\0' &&
Robert Sloanb1b54b82017-11-06 13:50:02 -08001297 !ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, strict)) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001298 goto err;
1299 }
1300
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001301 // Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
1302 // if we cannot get one.
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001303 cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
1304 if (cipherstack == NULL) {
1305 goto err;
1306 }
1307
Robert Sloana12bf462017-07-17 07:08:26 -07001308 in_group_flags = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(kCiphersLen);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001309 if (!in_group_flags) {
1310 goto err;
1311 }
1312
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001313 // The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
1314 // to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001315 for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
1316 if (curr->active) {
1317 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) {
1318 goto err;
1319 }
1320 in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
1321 }
1322 }
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001323 OPENSSL_free(co_list); // Not needed any longer
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001324 co_list = NULL;
1325
Robert Sloana12bf462017-07-17 07:08:26 -07001326 pref_list = (ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *)OPENSSL_malloc(
1327 sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001328 if (!pref_list) {
1329 goto err;
1330 }
1331 pref_list->ciphers = cipherstack;
Robert Sloand1d118f2017-09-11 09:00:48 -07001332 pref_list->in_group_flags = NULL;
1333 if (num_in_group_flags) {
1334 pref_list->in_group_flags = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(num_in_group_flags);
1335 if (!pref_list->in_group_flags) {
1336 goto err;
1337 }
1338 OPENSSL_memcpy(pref_list->in_group_flags, in_group_flags,
1339 num_in_group_flags);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001340 }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001341 OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
1342 in_group_flags = NULL;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001343 if (*out_cipher_list != NULL) {
1344 ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(*out_cipher_list);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001345 }
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001346 *out_cipher_list = pref_list;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001347 pref_list = NULL;
1348
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001349 // Configuring an empty cipher list is an error but still updates the
1350 // output.
Robert Sloan1c9db532017-03-13 08:03:59 -07001351 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num((*out_cipher_list)->ciphers) == 0) {
1352 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001353 return false;
Robert Sloan1c9db532017-03-13 08:03:59 -07001354 }
1355
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001356 return true;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001357
1358err:
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001359 OPENSSL_free(co_list);
1360 OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
1361 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001362 if (pref_list) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001363 OPENSSL_free(pref_list->in_group_flags);
1364 }
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001365 OPENSSL_free(pref_list);
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001366 return false;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001367}
1368
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -07001369uint16_t ssl_cipher_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1370 uint32_t id = cipher->id;
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001371 // All ciphers are SSLv3.
Adam Langleyf4e42722015-06-04 17:45:09 -07001372 assert((id & 0xff000000) == 0x03000000);
1373 return id & 0xffff;
1374}
1375
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -07001376uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key) {
1377 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
1378 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
1379 return SSL_aRSA;
1380 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
1381 case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001382 // Ed25519 keys in TLS 1.2 repurpose the ECDSA ciphers.
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -07001383 return SSL_aECDSA;
1384 default:
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387}
1388
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001389bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -07001390 return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT) != 0;
1391}
1392
Robert Sloanae1abf92017-10-05 12:50:08 -07001393bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1394 // Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. It is
1395 // optional or omitted in all others.
1396 return (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) != 0;
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -07001397}
1398
1399size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1400 size_t block_size;
1401 switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
1402 case SSL_3DES:
1403 block_size = 8;
1404 break;
1405 case SSL_AES128:
1406 case SSL_AES256:
1407 block_size = 16;
1408 break;
1409 default:
1410 return 0;
1411 }
1412
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001413 // All supported TLS 1.0 ciphers use SHA-1.
Robert Sloanb6d070c2017-07-24 08:40:01 -07001414 assert(cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1);
1415 size_t ret = 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1416 ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
1417 return ret;
1418}
1419
1420} // namespace bssl
1421
1422using namespace bssl;
1423
1424const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
1425 SSL_CIPHER c;
1426
1427 c.id = 0x03000000L | value;
1428 return reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(bsearch(
1429 &c, kCiphers, kCiphersLen, sizeof(SSL_CIPHER), ssl_cipher_id_cmp));
1430}
1431
1432uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->id; }
1433
Robert Sloan84377092017-08-14 09:33:19 -07001434int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
Steven Valdezb0b45c62017-01-17 16:23:54 -05001435 return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) != 0;
1436}
1437
Robert Sloan84377092017-08-14 09:33:19 -07001438int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1439 switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
1440 case SSL_eNULL:
1441 return NID_undef;
1442 case SSL_3DES:
1443 return NID_des_ede3_cbc;
1444 case SSL_AES128:
1445 return NID_aes_128_cbc;
1446 case SSL_AES256:
1447 return NID_aes_256_cbc;
1448 case SSL_AES128GCM:
1449 return NID_aes_128_gcm;
1450 case SSL_AES256GCM:
1451 return NID_aes_256_gcm;
1452 case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
1453 return NID_chacha20_poly1305;
1454 }
1455 assert(0);
1456 return NID_undef;
1457}
1458
1459int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1460 switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
1461 case SSL_AEAD:
1462 return NID_undef;
1463 case SSL_SHA1:
1464 return NID_sha1;
1465 case SSL_SHA256:
1466 return NID_sha256;
1467 case SSL_SHA384:
1468 return NID_sha384;
1469 }
1470 assert(0);
1471 return NID_undef;
1472}
1473
1474int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1475 switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
1476 case SSL_kRSA:
1477 return NID_kx_rsa;
1478 case SSL_kECDHE:
1479 return NID_kx_ecdhe;
1480 case SSL_kPSK:
1481 return NID_kx_psk;
1482 case SSL_kGENERIC:
1483 return NID_kx_any;
1484 }
1485 assert(0);
1486 return NID_undef;
1487}
1488
1489int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1490 switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1491 case SSL_aRSA:
1492 return NID_auth_rsa;
1493 case SSL_aECDSA:
1494 return NID_auth_ecdsa;
1495 case SSL_aPSK:
1496 return NID_auth_psk;
1497 case SSL_aGENERIC:
1498 return NID_auth_any;
1499 }
1500 assert(0);
1501 return NID_undef;
1502}
1503
Robert Sloan2e9e66a2017-09-25 09:08:29 -07001504int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1505 switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
1506 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
1507 return NID_md5_sha1;
1508 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
1509 return NID_sha256;
1510 case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
1511 return NID_sha384;
1512 }
1513 assert(0);
1514 return NID_undef;
1515}
1516
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001517int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
David Benjamin7c0d06c2016-08-11 13:26:41 -04001518 return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) == 0 &&
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001519 cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
1520}
1521
Adam Langleyfad63272015-11-12 12:15:39 -08001522uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001523 if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
1524 cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
1525 return TLS1_3_VERSION;
1526 }
1527
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001528 if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001529 // Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
1530 // afterwards specify a particular hash.
Adam Langleyfad63272015-11-12 12:15:39 -08001531 return TLS1_2_VERSION;
1532 }
1533 return SSL3_VERSION;
1534}
1535
David Benjaminc895d6b2016-08-11 13:26:41 -04001536uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001537 if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
1538 cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
David Benjaminc895d6b2016-08-11 13:26:41 -04001539 return TLS1_3_VERSION;
1540 }
1541 return TLS1_2_VERSION;
1542}
1543
Robert Sloana27a6a42017-09-05 08:39:28 -07001544// return the actual cipher being used
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001545const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1546 if (cipher != NULL) {
1547 return cipher->name;
1548 }
1549
1550 return "(NONE)";
1551}
1552
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -07001553const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1554 return cipher->standard_name;
1555}
1556
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001557const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1558 if (cipher == NULL) {
1559 return "";
1560 }
1561
1562 switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
1563 case SSL_kRSA:
1564 return "RSA";
1565
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001566 case SSL_kECDHE:
1567 switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1568 case SSL_aECDSA:
1569 return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
1570 case SSL_aRSA:
1571 return "ECDHE_RSA";
1572 case SSL_aPSK:
1573 return "ECDHE_PSK";
1574 default:
1575 assert(0);
1576 return "UNKNOWN";
1577 }
1578
1579 case SSL_kPSK:
1580 assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
1581 return "PSK";
1582
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001583 case SSL_kGENERIC:
1584 assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC);
1585 return "GENERIC";
1586
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001587 default:
1588 assert(0);
1589 return "UNKNOWN";
1590 }
1591}
1592
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001593char *SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1594 if (cipher == NULL) {
1595 return NULL;
1596 }
1597
Robert Sloane56da3e2017-06-26 08:26:42 -07001598 return OPENSSL_strdup(SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(cipher));
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001599}
1600
1601int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
1602 if (cipher == NULL) {
1603 return 0;
1604 }
1605
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001606 int alg_bits, strength_bits;
1607 switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
1608 case SSL_AES128:
1609 case SSL_AES128GCM:
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001610 alg_bits = 128;
1611 strength_bits = 128;
1612 break;
1613
1614 case SSL_AES256:
1615 case SSL_AES256GCM:
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001616 case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
1617 alg_bits = 256;
1618 strength_bits = 256;
1619 break;
1620
1621 case SSL_3DES:
1622 alg_bits = 168;
1623 strength_bits = 112;
1624 break;
1625
1626 case SSL_eNULL:
1627 alg_bits = 0;
1628 strength_bits = 0;
1629 break;
1630
1631 default:
1632 assert(0);
1633 alg_bits = 0;
1634 strength_bits = 0;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001635 }
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001636
1637 if (out_alg_bits != NULL) {
1638 *out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
1639 }
1640 return strength_bits;
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001641}
1642
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001643const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
1644 int len) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001645 const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001646 uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001647
1648 alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1649 alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
1650 alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
1651 alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001652
1653 switch (alg_mkey) {
1654 case SSL_kRSA:
1655 kx = "RSA";
1656 break;
1657
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001658 case SSL_kECDHE:
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001659 kx = "ECDH";
1660 break;
1661
1662 case SSL_kPSK:
1663 kx = "PSK";
1664 break;
1665
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001666 case SSL_kGENERIC:
1667 kx = "GENERIC";
1668 break;
1669
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001670 default:
1671 kx = "unknown";
1672 }
1673
1674 switch (alg_auth) {
1675 case SSL_aRSA:
1676 au = "RSA";
1677 break;
1678
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001679 case SSL_aECDSA:
1680 au = "ECDSA";
1681 break;
1682
1683 case SSL_aPSK:
1684 au = "PSK";
1685 break;
1686
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001687 case SSL_aGENERIC:
1688 au = "GENERIC";
1689 break;
1690
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001691 default:
1692 au = "unknown";
1693 break;
1694 }
1695
1696 switch (alg_enc) {
1697 case SSL_3DES:
1698 enc = "3DES(168)";
1699 break;
1700
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001701 case SSL_AES128:
1702 enc = "AES(128)";
1703 break;
1704
1705 case SSL_AES256:
1706 enc = "AES(256)";
1707 break;
1708
1709 case SSL_AES128GCM:
1710 enc = "AESGCM(128)";
1711 break;
1712
1713 case SSL_AES256GCM:
1714 enc = "AESGCM(256)";
1715 break;
1716
Adam Langley4139edb2016-01-13 15:00:54 -08001717 case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001718 enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
1719 break;
1720
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001721 case SSL_eNULL:
1722 enc="None";
1723 break;
1724
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001725 default:
1726 enc = "unknown";
1727 break;
1728 }
1729
1730 switch (alg_mac) {
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001731 case SSL_SHA1:
1732 mac = "SHA1";
1733 break;
1734
1735 case SSL_SHA256:
1736 mac = "SHA256";
1737 break;
1738
1739 case SSL_SHA384:
1740 mac = "SHA384";
1741 break;
1742
1743 case SSL_AEAD:
1744 mac = "AEAD";
1745 break;
1746
1747 default:
1748 mac = "unknown";
1749 break;
1750 }
1751
1752 if (buf == NULL) {
1753 len = 128;
Robert Sloana12bf462017-07-17 07:08:26 -07001754 buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001755 if (buf == NULL) {
1756 return NULL;
1757 }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001758 } else if (len < 128) {
1759 return "Buffer too small";
1760 }
1761
David Benjamin4969cc92016-04-22 15:02:23 -04001762 BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n",
1763 cipher->name, kx, au, enc, mac);
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001764 return buf;
1765}
1766
Adam Langleye9ada862015-05-11 17:20:37 -07001767const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
1768 return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001769}
1770
Robert Sloan8ff03552017-06-14 12:40:58 -07001771STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001772
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001773int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001774
Kenny Rootb8494592015-09-25 02:29:14 +00001775const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return NULL; }
Adam Langleyd9e397b2015-01-22 14:27:53 -08001776
Robert Sloanab8b8882018-03-26 11:39:51 -07001777const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->name; }
1778
1779int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->id; }
1780
Steven Valdezbb1ceac2016-10-07 10:34:51 -04001781void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) {}