The principle characteristics of crosvm are:
A typical session of crosvm starts in main.rs where command line parsing is done to build up a Config structure. The Config is used by run_config in linux/mod.rs to setup and execute a VM. Broken down into rough steps:
Arch::build_vm (located in x86_64/src/lib.rs or aarch64/src/lib.rs).Arch::build_vm will itself invoke the provided create_devices function from linux/mod.rscreate_devices creates every PCI device, including the virtio devices, that were configured in Config, along with matching minijail configs for each.Arch::generate_pci_root, using a list of every PCI device with optional Minijail, will finally jail the PCI devices and construct a PciRoot that communicates with them.RunnableLinuxVm object that is used by the VCPUs and control loop to service requests until shutdown.During the device creation routine, each device will be created and then wrapped in a ProxyDevice which will internally fork (but not exec) and minijail the device, while dropping it for the main process. The only interaction that the device is capable of having with the main process is via the proxied trait methods of BusDevice, shared memory mappings such as the guest memory, and file descriptors that were specifically allowed by that device's security policy. This can lead to some surprising behavior to be aware of such as why some file descriptors which were once valid are now invalid.
Every sandbox is made with minijail and starts with create_base_minijail in linux/jail_helpers.rs which set some very restrictive settings. Linux namespaces and seccomp filters are used extensively. Each seccomp policy can be found under seccomp/{arch}/{device}.policy and should start by @include-ing the common_device.policy. With the exception of architecture specific devices (such as Pl030 on ARM or I8042 on x86_64), every device will need a different policy for each supported architecture.
For the operations that devices need to perform on the global VM state, such as mapping into guest memory address space, there are the vm control sockets. There are a few kinds, split by the type of request and response that the socket will process. This also proves basic security privilege separation in case a device becomes compromised by a malicious guest. For example, a rogue device that is able to allocate MSI routes would not be able to use the same socket to (de)register guest memory. During the device initialization stage, each device that requires some aspect of VM control will have a constructor that requires the corresponding control socket. The control socket will get preserved when the device is sandboxed and the other side of the socket will be waited on in the main process's control loop.
The socket exposed by crosvm with the --socket command line argument is another form of the VM control socket. Because the protocol of the control socket is internal and unstable, the only supported way of using that resulting named unix domain socket is via crosvm command line subcommands such as crosvm stop.
GuestMemory and its friends VolatileMemory, VolatileSlice, MemoryMapping, and SharedMemory, are common types used throughout crosvm to interact with guest memory. Know which one to use in what place using some guidelines
GuestMemory is for sending around references to all of the guest memory. It can be cloned freely, but the underlying guest memory is always the same. Internally, it's implemented using MemoryMapping and SharedMemory. Note that GuestMemory is mapped into the host address space, but it is non-contiguous. Device memory, such as mapped DMA-Bufs, are not present in GuestMemory.SharedMemory wraps a memfd and can be mapped using MemoryMapping to access its data. SharedMemory can't be cloned.VolatileMemory is a trait that exposes generic access to non-contiguous memory. GuestMemory implements this trait. Use this trait for functions that operate on a memory space but don't necessarily need it to be guest memory.VolatileSlice is analogous to a Rust slice, but unlike those, a VolatileSlice has data that changes asynchronously by all those that reference it. Exclusive mutability and data synchronization are not available when it comes to a VolatileSlice. This type is useful for functions that operate on contiguous shared memory, such as a single entry from a scatter gather table, or for safe wrappers around functions which operate on pointers, such as a read or write syscall.MemoryMapping is a safe wrapper around anonymous and file mappings. Provides RAII and does munmap after use. Access via Rust references is forbidden, but indirect reading and writing is available via VolatileSlice and several convenience functions. This type is most useful for mapping memory unrelated to GuestMemory.Bus/BusDeviceThe root of the crosvm device model is the Bus structure and its friend the BusDevice trait. The Bus structure is a virtual computer bus used to emulate the memory-mapped I/O bus and also I/O ports for x86 VMs. On a read or write to an address on a VM's bus, the corresponding Bus object is queried for a BusDevice that occupies that address. Bus will then forward the read/write to the BusDevice. Because of this behavior, only one BusDevice may exist at any given address. However, a BusDevice may be placed at more than one address range. Depending on how a BusDevice was inserted into the Bus, the forwarded read/write will be relative to 0 or to the start of the address range that the BusDevice occupies (which would be ambiguous if the BusDevice occupied more than one range).
Only the base address of a multi-byte read/write is used to search for a device, so a device implementation should be aware that the last address of a single read/write may be outside its address range. For example, if a BusDevice was inserted at base address 0x1000 with a length of 0x40, a 4-byte read by a VCPU at 0x39 would be forwarded to that BusDevice.
Each BusDevice is reference counted and wrapped in a mutex, so implementations of BusDevice need not worry about synchronizing their access across multiple VCPUs and threads. Each VCPU will get a complete copy of the Bus, so there is no contention for querying the Bus about an address. Once the BusDevice is found, the Bus will acquire an exclusive lock to the device and forward the VCPU's read/write. The implementation of the BusDevice will block execution of the VCPU that invoked it, as well as any other VCPU attempting access, until it returns from its method.
Most devices in crosvm do not implement BusDevice directly, but some are examples are i8042 and Serial. With the exception of PCI devices, all devices are inserted by architecture specific code (which may call into the architecture-neutral arch crate). A BusDevice can be proxied to a sandboxed process using ProxyDevice, which will create the second process using a fork, with no exec.
PciConfigIo/PciConfigMmioIn order to use the more complex PCI bus, there are a couple adapters that implement BusDevice and call into a PciRoot with higher level calls to config_space_read/config_space_write. The PciConfigMmio is a BusDevice for insertion into the MMIO Bus for ARM devices. For x86_64, PciConfigIo is inserted into the I/O port Bus. There is only one implementation of PciRoot that is used by either of the PciConfig* structures. Because these devices are very simple, they have very little code or state. They aren't sandboxed and are run as part of the main process.
PciRoot/PciDevice/VirtioPciDeviceThe PciRoot, analogous to BusDevice for Buss, contains all the PciDevice trait objects. Because of a shortcut (or hack), the ProxyDevice only supports jailing BusDevice traits. Therefore, PciRoot only contains BusDevices, even though they also implement PciDevice. In fact, every PciDevice also implements BusDevice because of a blanket implementation (impl<T: PciDevice> BusDevice for T { … }). There are a few PCI related methods in BusDevice to allow the PciRoot to still communicate with the underlying PciDevice (yes, this abstraction is very leaky). Most devices will not implement PciDevice directly, instead using the VirtioPciDevice implementation for virtio devices, but the xHCI (USB) controller is an example that implements PciDevice directly. The VirtioPciDevice is an implementation of PciDevice that wraps a VirtioDevice, which is how the virtio specified PCI transport is adapted to a transport agnostic VirtioDevice implementation.
VirtioDeviceThe VirtioDevice is the most widely implemented trait among the device traits. Each of the different virtio devices (block, rng, net, etc.) implement this trait directly and they follow a similar pattern. Most of the trait methods are easily filled in with basic information about the specific device, but activate will be the heart of the implementation. It's called by the virtio transport after the guest's driver has indicated the device has been configured and is ready to run. The virtio device implementation will receive the run time related resources (GuestMemory, Interrupt, etc.) for processing virtio queues and associated interrupts via the arguments to activate, but activate can't spend its time actually processing the queues. A VCPU will be blocked as long as activate is running. Every device uses activate to launch a worker thread that takes ownership of run time resources to do the actual processing. There is some subtlety in dealing with virtio queues, so the smart thing to do is copy a simpler device and adapt it, such as the rng device (rng.rs).
Because of the multi-process nature of crosvm, communication is done over several IPC primitives. The common ones are shared memory pages, unix sockets, anonymous pipes, and various other file descriptor variants (DMA-buf, eventfd, etc.). Standard methods (read/write) of using these primitives may be used, but crosvm has developed some helpers which should be used where applicable.
PollContext/EpollContextMost threads in crosvm will have a wait loop using a PollContext, which is a wrapper around Linux's epoll primitive for selecting over file descriptors. EpollContext is very similar but has slightly fewer features, but is usable by multiple threads at once. In either case, each FD is added to the context along with an associated token, whose type is the type parameter of PollContext. This token must be convertible to and from a u64, which is a limitation imposed by how epoll works. There is a custom derive #[derive(PollToken)] which can be applied to an enum declaration that makes it easy to use your own enum in a PollContext.
Note that the limitations of PollContext are the same as the limitations of epoll. The same FD can not be inserted more than once, and the FD will be automatically removed if the process runs out of references to that FD. A dup/fork call will increment that reference count, so closing the original FD will not actually remove it from the PollContext. It is possible to receive tokens from PollContext for an FD that was closed because of a race condition in which an event was registered in the background before the close happened. Best practice is to remove an FD before closing it so that events associated with it can be reliably eliminated.
serde with Descriptors.Using raw sockets and pipes to communicate is very inconvenient for rich data types. To help make this easier and less error prone, crosvm uses the serde crate. To allow transmitting types with embedded descriptors (FDs on Linux or HANDLEs on Windows), a module is provided for sending and receiving descriptors alongside the plain old bytes that serde consumes.
Source code is organized into crates, each with their own unit tests.
./src/ - The top-level binary front-end for using crosvm.aarch64 - Support code specific to 64 bit ARM architectures.base - Safe wrappers for small system facilities which provides cross-platform-compatible interfaces. For Linux, this is basically a thin wrapper of sys_util.bin - Scripts for code health such as wrappers of rustfmt and clippy.ci - Scripts for continuous integration.cros_async - Runtime for async/await programming. This crate provides a Future executor based on io_uring and one based on epoll.devices - Virtual devices exposed to the guest OS.disk - Library to create and manipulate several types of disks such as raw disk, qcow, etc.hypervisor - Abstract layer to interact with hypervisors. For Linux, this crate is a wrapper of kvm.integration_tests - End-to-end tests that run a crosvm VM.kernel_loader - Loads elf64 kernel files to a slice of memory.kvm_sys - Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for using KVM.kvm - Unsafe, low-level wrapper code for using kvm_sys.media/libvda - Safe wrapper of libvda, a Chrome OS HW-accelerated video decoding/encoding library.net_sys - Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for creating TUN/TAP devices.net_util - Wrapper for creating TUN/TAP devices.qcow_util - A library and a binary to manipulate qcow disks.seccomp - Contains minijail seccomp policy files for each sandboxed device. Because some syscalls vary by architecture, the seccomp policies are split by architecture.sync - Our version of std::sync::Mutex and std::sync::Condvar.sys_util - Mostly safe wrappers for small system facilities such as eventfd or syslog.third_party - Third-party libraries which we are maintaining on the Chrome OS tree or the AOSP tree.vfio_sys - Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures, constants and ioctls for VFIO.vhost - Wrappers for creating vhost based devices.virtio_sys - Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for interfacing with kernel vhost support.vm_control - IPC for the VM.vm_memory - Vm-specific memory objects.x86_64 - Support code specific to 64 bit intel machines.