doc/help/security.html - platform/external/libcups - Gitiles

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 <!-- SECTION: Getting Started -->
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 	<TITLE>Server Security</TITLE>
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 <H1 CLASS="title">Server Security</H1>

 <P>In the default "standalone" configuration, there are few
 potential security risks - the CUPS server does not accept remote
 connections, and only accepts shared printer information from the
 local subnet. When you share printers and/or enable remote
 administration, you expose your system to potential unauthorized
 access. This help page provides an analysis of possible CUPS
 security concerns and describes how to better secure your
 server.</P>

 <H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="AUTHENTICATION">Authentication Issues</A></H2>

 <P>When you enable remote administration, the server will use Basic authentication for administration tasks. The current CUPS server supports Basic, Kerberos, and local certificate authentication:</P>

 <OL>

 	<LI>Basic authentication essentially places the clear
 	text of the username and password on the network.

 	<P>Since CUPS uses the system username and password
 	account information, the authentication information could
 	be used to gain access to possibly privileged accounts on
 	the server.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Enable encryption to hide the
 	username and password information - this is the default on
 	macOS and systems with GNU TLS installed.</P></LI>

 	<LI>Local certificate authentication passes 128-bit
 	"certificates" that identify an authenticated user.
 	Certificates are created on-the-fly from random data and
 	stored in files under <VAR>/var/run/cups/certs</VAR>.
 	They have restricted read permissions: root +
 	system-group(s) for the root certificate, and lp + lp
 	for CGI certificates.

 	<P>Because certificates are only available on the local
 	system, the CUPS server does not accept local
 	authentication unless the client is connected to the
 	loopback interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) or domain
 	socket.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Ensure that unauthorized users
 	are not added to the system group(s).</P></LI>

 </OL>

 <H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="DOS">Denial of Service Attacks</A></H2>

 <P>When printer sharing or remote administration is enabled, the
 CUPS server, like all Internet services, is vulnerable to a
 variety of denial of service attacks:</P>

 <OL>

 	<LI>Establishing multiple connections to the server until
 	the server will accept no more.

 	<P>This cannot be protected against by any known
 	software. The <CODE>MaxClientsPerHost</CODE> directive
 	can be used to configure CUPS to limit the number of
 	connections allowed from a single host, however that does
 	not prevent a distributed attack.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Limit access to trusted systems
 	and networks.</P></LI>

 	<LI>Repeatedly opening and closing connections to the
 	server as fast as possible.

 	<P>There is no easy way of protecting against this in the
 	CUPS software. If the attack is coming from outside the
 	local network, it may be possible to filter such an
 	attack. However, once the connection request has been
 	received by the server it must at least accept the
 	connection to find out who is connecting.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> None.</P></LI>

 	<LI>Sending partial IPP requests; specifically, sending
 	part of an attribute value and then stopping
 	transmission.

 	<P>The current code will wait up to 1 second before
 	timing out the partial value and closing the connection.
 	This will slow the server responses to valid requests and
 	may lead to dropped browsing packets, but will otherwise
 	not affect the operation of the server.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Block IPP packets from foreign
 	or untrusted networks using a router or
 	firewall.</P></LI>

 	<LI>Sending large/long print jobs to printers, preventing
 	other users from printing.

 	<P>There are limited facilities for protecting against
 	large print jobs (the <CODE>MaxRequestSize</CODE>
 	attribute), however this will not protect printers from
 	malicious users and print files that generate hundreds or
 	thousands of pages.</P>

 	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Restrict printer access to
 	known hosts or networks, and add user-level access
 	controls as needed for expensive printers.</P></LI>

 </OL>

 <H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="ENCRYPTION">Encryption Issues</A></H2>

 <P>CUPS supports 128-bit TLS encryption of network connections via the GNU TLS library, macOS Security framework, and Windows Schannel APIs. Secure deployment of TLS depends on proper certificate management and software maintenance.</P>

 </BODY>
 </HTML>
	<HTML>
	<!-- SECTION: Getting Started -->
	<HEAD>
	<TITLE>Server Security</TITLE>
	<LINK REL="STYLESHEET" TYPE="text/css" HREF="../cups-printable.css">
	</HEAD>
	<BODY>

	<H1 CLASS="title">Server Security</H1>

	<P>In the default "standalone" configuration, there are few
	potential security risks - the CUPS server does not accept remote
	connections, and only accepts shared printer information from the
	local subnet. When you share printers and/or enable remote
	administration, you expose your system to potential unauthorized
	access. This help page provides an analysis of possible CUPS
	security concerns and describes how to better secure your
	server.</P>

	<H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="AUTHENTICATION">Authentication Issues</A></H2>

	<P>When you enable remote administration, the server will use Basic authentication for administration tasks. The current CUPS server supports Basic, Kerberos, and local certificate authentication:</P>

	<OL>

	<LI>Basic authentication essentially places the clear
	text of the username and password on the network.

	<P>Since CUPS uses the system username and password
	account information, the authentication information could
	be used to gain access to possibly privileged accounts on
	the server.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Enable encryption to hide the
	username and password information - this is the default on
	macOS and systems with GNU TLS installed.</P></LI>

	<LI>Local certificate authentication passes 128-bit
	"certificates" that identify an authenticated user.
	Certificates are created on-the-fly from random data and
	stored in files under <VAR>/var/run/cups/certs</VAR>.
	They have restricted read permissions: root +
	system-group(s) for the root certificate, and lp + lp
	for CGI certificates.

	<P>Because certificates are only available on the local
	system, the CUPS server does not accept local
	authentication unless the client is connected to the
	loopback interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) or domain
	socket.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Ensure that unauthorized users
	are not added to the system group(s).</P></LI>

	</OL>

	<H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="DOS">Denial of Service Attacks</A></H2>

	<P>When printer sharing or remote administration is enabled, the
	CUPS server, like all Internet services, is vulnerable to a
	variety of denial of service attacks:</P>

	<OL>

	<LI>Establishing multiple connections to the server until
	the server will accept no more.

	<P>This cannot be protected against by any known
	software. The <CODE>MaxClientsPerHost</CODE> directive
	can be used to configure CUPS to limit the number of
	connections allowed from a single host, however that does
	not prevent a distributed attack.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Limit access to trusted systems
	and networks.</P></LI>

	<LI>Repeatedly opening and closing connections to the
	server as fast as possible.

	<P>There is no easy way of protecting against this in the
	CUPS software. If the attack is coming from outside the
	local network, it may be possible to filter such an
	attack. However, once the connection request has been
	received by the server it must at least accept the
	connection to find out who is connecting.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> None.</P></LI>

	<LI>Sending partial IPP requests; specifically, sending
	part of an attribute value and then stopping
	transmission.

	<P>The current code will wait up to 1 second before
	timing out the partial value and closing the connection.
	This will slow the server responses to valid requests and
	may lead to dropped browsing packets, but will otherwise
	not affect the operation of the server.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Block IPP packets from foreign
	or untrusted networks using a router or
	firewall.</P></LI>

	<LI>Sending large/long print jobs to printers, preventing
	other users from printing.

	<P>There are limited facilities for protecting against
	large print jobs (the <CODE>MaxRequestSize</CODE>
	attribute), however this will not protect printers from
	malicious users and print files that generate hundreds or
	thousands of pages.</P>

	<P><B>Recommendation:</B> Restrict printer access to
	known hosts or networks, and add user-level access
	controls as needed for expensive printers.</P></LI>

	</OL>

	<H2 CLASS="title"><A NAME="ENCRYPTION">Encryption Issues</A></H2>

	<P>CUPS supports 128-bit TLS encryption of network connections via the GNU TLS library, macOS Security framework, and Windows Schannel APIs. Secure deployment of TLS depends on proper certificate management and software maintenance.</P>

	</BODY>
	</HTML>