| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> |
| * |
| * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any |
| * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
| * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
| * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR |
| * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN |
| * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF |
| * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
| */ |
| |
| /* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.45 2019/10/31 21:23:19 djm Exp $ */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h> |
| #include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h> |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include "sshbuf.h" |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "sshkey.h" |
| #include "authfile.h" |
| #include "misc.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "digest.h" |
| #include "bitmap.h" |
| |
| #include "krl.h" |
| |
| /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KRL |
| # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x |
| #else |
| # define KRL_DBG(x) |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows |
| * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ |
| struct revoked_serial { |
| u_int64_t lo, hi; |
| RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; |
| }; |
| static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); |
| RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); |
| RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); |
| |
| /* Tree of key IDs */ |
| struct revoked_key_id { |
| char *key_id; |
| RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; |
| }; |
| static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); |
| RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); |
| RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); |
| |
| /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ |
| struct revoked_blob { |
| u_char *blob; |
| size_t len; |
| RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; |
| }; |
| static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); |
| RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); |
| RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); |
| |
| /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ |
| struct revoked_certs { |
| struct sshkey *ca_key; |
| struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; |
| struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; |
| TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; |
| }; |
| TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); |
| |
| struct ssh_krl { |
| u_int64_t krl_version; |
| u_int64_t generated_date; |
| u_int64_t flags; |
| char *comment; |
| struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; |
| struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; |
| struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s; |
| struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ |
| static int |
| serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) |
| { |
| if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) |
| return 0; |
| return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) |
| { |
| return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) |
| { |
| int r; |
| |
| if (a->len != b->len) { |
| if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0) |
| return r; |
| return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; |
| } else |
| return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); |
| } |
| |
| struct ssh_krl * |
| ssh_krl_init(void) |
| { |
| struct ssh_krl *krl; |
| |
| if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); |
| RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); |
| RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s); |
| TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); |
| return krl; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) |
| { |
| struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; |
| struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; |
| |
| RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); |
| free(rs); |
| } |
| RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); |
| free(rki->key_id); |
| free(rki); |
| } |
| sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) |
| { |
| struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; |
| struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; |
| |
| if (krl == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| free(krl->comment); |
| RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); |
| free(rb->blob); |
| free(rb); |
| } |
| RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); |
| free(rb->blob); |
| free(rb); |
| } |
| RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) { |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb); |
| free(rb->blob); |
| free(rb); |
| } |
| TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { |
| TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); |
| revoked_certs_free(rc); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) |
| { |
| krl->krl_version = version; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) |
| { |
| free(krl->comment); |
| if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then |
| * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. |
| */ |
| static int |
| revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, |
| struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) |
| { |
| struct revoked_certs *rc; |
| int r; |
| |
| *rcp = NULL; |
| TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { |
| if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || |
| sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { |
| *rcp = rc; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!allow_create) |
| return 0; |
| /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ |
| if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| if (ca_key == NULL) |
| rc->ca_key = NULL; |
| else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { |
| free(rc); |
| return r; |
| } |
| RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); |
| RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); |
| TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__, |
| ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); |
| *rcp = rc; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) |
| { |
| struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; |
| |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); |
| memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); |
| rs.lo = lo; |
| rs.hi = hi; |
| ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); |
| if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { |
| /* No entry matches. Just insert */ |
| if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); |
| ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); |
| if (ers != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); |
| /* Shouldn't happen */ |
| free(irs); |
| return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| ers = irs; |
| } else { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, |
| ers->lo, ers->hi)); |
| /* |
| * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the |
| * existing entry. |
| */ |
| if (ers->lo > lo) |
| ers->lo = lo; |
| if (ers->hi < hi) |
| ers->hi = hi; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; |
| * coalesce as necessary. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Check predecessors */ |
| while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); |
| if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) |
| break; |
| /* This entry overlaps. */ |
| if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { |
| ers->lo = crs->lo; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, |
| ers->lo, ers->hi)); |
| } |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); |
| free(crs); |
| } |
| /* Check successors */ |
| while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); |
| if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) |
| break; |
| /* This entry overlaps. */ |
| if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { |
| ers->hi = crs->hi; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, |
| ers->lo, ers->hi)); |
| } |
| RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); |
| free(crs); |
| } |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, |
| u_int64_t serial) |
| { |
| return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, |
| const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) |
| { |
| struct revoked_certs *rc; |
| int r; |
| |
| if (lo > hi || lo == 0) |
| return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, |
| const char *key_id) |
| { |
| struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; |
| struct revoked_certs *rc; |
| int r; |
| |
| if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id)); |
| if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || |
| (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { |
| free(rki); |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| } |
| erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); |
| if (erki != NULL) { |
| free(rki->key_id); |
| free(rki); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ |
| static int |
| plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) |
| { |
| struct sshkey *kcopy; |
| int r; |
| |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { |
| if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { |
| sshkey_free(kcopy); |
| return r; |
| } |
| } |
| r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); |
| sshkey_free(kcopy); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ |
| static int |
| revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) |
| { |
| struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; |
| |
| if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| rb->blob = blob; |
| rb->len = len; |
| erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); |
| if (erb != NULL) { |
| free(rb->blob); |
| free(rb); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| u_char *blob; |
| size_t len; |
| int r; |
| |
| debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); |
| if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len) |
| { |
| u_char *blob; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */ |
| if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| memcpy(blob, p, len); |
| if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) { |
| free(blob); |
| return r; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) |
| { |
| debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__); |
| if (len != 20) |
| return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) |
| { |
| debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__); |
| if (len != 32) |
| return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| /* XXX replace with SHA256? */ |
| if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) |
| return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); |
| |
| if (key->cert->serial == 0) { |
| return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, |
| key->cert->signature_key, |
| key->cert->key_id); |
| } else { |
| return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, |
| key->cert->signature_key, |
| key->cert->serial); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on |
| * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial |
| * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. |
| * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type |
| * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. |
| */ |
| static int |
| choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, |
| u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) |
| { |
| int new_state; |
| u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; |
| |
| /* |
| * Avoid unsigned overflows. |
| * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. |
| */ |
| contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31); |
| last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); |
| next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. |
| * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their |
| * switching cost is independent of the current_state. |
| */ |
| cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; |
| cost_range = 8; |
| switch (current_state) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| cost_list = 8; |
| cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| case 0: |
| cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; |
| cost_list = 8; |
| } |
| |
| /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ |
| cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); |
| cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); |
| cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); |
| cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); |
| |
| /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ |
| cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; |
| cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; |
| cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; |
| cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; |
| |
| /* Now pick the best choice */ |
| *force_new_section = 0; |
| new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; |
| cost = cost_bitmap; |
| if (cost_range < cost) { |
| new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; |
| cost = cost_range; |
| } |
| if (cost_list < cost) { |
| new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; |
| cost = cost_list; |
| } |
| if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { |
| new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; |
| *force_new_section = 1; |
| cost = cost_bitmap_restart; |
| } |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" |
| "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " |
| "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, |
| (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, |
| (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, |
| (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, |
| (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, |
| *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); |
| return new_state; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) |
| { |
| size_t len; |
| u_char *blob; |
| int r; |
| |
| len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); |
| if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { |
| free(blob); |
| return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); |
| free(blob); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ |
| static int |
| revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) |
| { |
| int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; |
| struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; |
| struct revoked_key_id *rki; |
| int next_state, state = 0; |
| struct sshbuf *sect; |
| struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; |
| |
| if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| |
| /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ |
| if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } else { |
| if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Store the revoked serials. */ |
| for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); |
| rs != NULL; |
| rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, |
| (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, |
| state)); |
| |
| /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ |
| nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); |
| final = nrs == NULL; |
| gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; |
| contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); |
| |
| /* Choose next state based on these */ |
| next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, |
| state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); |
| |
| /* |
| * If the current section is a range section or has a different |
| * type to the next section, then finish it off now. |
| */ |
| if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || |
| state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); |
| switch (state) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| bitmap_free(bitmap); |
| bitmap = NULL; |
| break; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ |
| if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, |
| next_state)); |
| state = next_state; |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| switch (state) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| bitmap_start = rs->lo; |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, |
| bitmap_start)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Perform section-specific processing */ |
| switch (state) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { |
| error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { |
| if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, |
| rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| last = rs->hi; |
| } |
| /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ |
| if (state != 0) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", |
| __func__, state)); |
| switch (state) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| bitmap_free(bitmap); |
| bitmap = NULL; |
| break; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__)); |
| |
| /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id)); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| r = 0; |
| out: |
| bitmap_free(bitmap); |
| sshbuf_free(sect); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, |
| struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) |
| { |
| int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| struct revoked_certs *rc; |
| struct revoked_blob *rb; |
| struct sshbuf *sect; |
| u_char *sblob = NULL; |
| size_t slen, i; |
| |
| if (krl->generated_date == 0) |
| krl->generated_date = time(NULL); |
| |
| if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| |
| /* Store the header */ |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ |
| TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, |
| KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sshbuf_reset(sect); |
| RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, |
| KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__, |
| sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, |
| sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| r = 0; |
| out: |
| free(sblob); |
| sshbuf_free(sect); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) |
| { |
| time_t t; |
| struct tm *tm; |
| |
| t = timestamp; |
| tm = localtime(&t); |
| if (tm == NULL) |
| strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts); |
| else { |
| *ts = '\0'; |
| strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) |
| { |
| int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| u_char type; |
| const u_char *blob; |
| size_t blen, nbits; |
| struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; |
| u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; |
| struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; |
| char *key_id = NULL; |
| struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; |
| |
| if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| |
| /* Header: key, reserved */ |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { |
| sshbuf_free(subsect); |
| subsect = NULL; |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type)); |
| /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: |
| while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, |
| ca_key, serial)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, |
| ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: |
| if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, |
| &blob, &blen)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); |
| for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { |
| if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { |
| error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) |
| continue; |
| if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, |
| ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| bitmap_free(bitmap); |
| bitmap = NULL; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: |
| while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, |
| &key_id, NULL)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, |
| ca_key, key_id)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| free(key_id); |
| key_id = NULL; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { |
| error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| r = 0; |
| out: |
| if (bitmap != NULL) |
| bitmap_free(bitmap); |
| free(key_id); |
| sshkey_free(ca_key); |
| sshbuf_free(subsect); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree, |
| size_t expected_len) |
| { |
| u_char *rdata = NULL; |
| size_t rlen = 0; |
| int r; |
| |
| while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) { |
| error("%s: bad length", __func__); |
| free(rdata); |
| return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| } |
| if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) { |
| free(rdata); |
| return r; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ |
| int |
| ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, |
| const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) |
| { |
| struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; |
| struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; |
| char timestamp[64]; |
| int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; |
| struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; |
| u_char type; |
| const u_char *blob; |
| size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used; |
| u_int format_version; |
| |
| nca_used = 0; |
| *krlp = NULL; |
| if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || |
| memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { |
| debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); |
| return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; |
| } |
| |
| /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ |
| if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); |
| debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", |
| (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, |
| *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); |
| |
| /* |
| * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid |
| * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. |
| */ |
| sig_seen = 0; |
| if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { |
| /* Shouldn't happen */ |
| r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); |
| while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); |
| if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { |
| if (sig_seen) { |
| error("KRL contains non-signature section " |
| "after signature"); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| /* Not interested for now. */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| sig_seen = 1; |
| /* First string component is the signing key */ |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { |
| /* Shouldn't happen */ |
| r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); |
| /* Second string component is the signature itself */ |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ |
| if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, |
| sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ |
| for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { |
| if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { |
| error("KRL signed more than once with " |
| "the same key"); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ |
| tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, |
| sizeof(*ca_used)); |
| if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| ca_used = tmp_ca_used; |
| ca_used[nca_used++] = key; |
| key = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { |
| /* Shouldn't happen */ |
| r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point |
| * where the section start. |
| */ |
| sshbuf_free(copy); |
| if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { |
| sshbuf_free(sect); |
| sect = NULL; |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: |
| if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: |
| if ((r = blob_section(sect, |
| &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: |
| if ((r = blob_section(sect, |
| &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256: |
| if ((r = blob_section(sect, |
| &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: |
| /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ |
| sshbuf_free(sect); |
| sect = NULL; |
| if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| break; |
| default: |
| error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { |
| error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ |
| sig_seen = 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { |
| if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) |
| sig_seen = 1; |
| else { |
| sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); |
| ca_used[i] = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { |
| error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); |
| r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ |
| if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { |
| sig_seen = 0; |
| for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { |
| for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { |
| if (ca_used[j] == NULL) |
| continue; |
| if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { |
| sig_seen = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (!sig_seen) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; |
| error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *krlp = krl; |
| r = 0; |
| out: |
| if (r != 0) |
| ssh_krl_free(krl); |
| for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) |
| sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); |
| free(ca_used); |
| sshkey_free(key); |
| sshbuf_free(copy); |
| sshbuf_free(sect); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ |
| static int |
| is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) |
| { |
| struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; |
| struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; |
| |
| /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ |
| memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); |
| rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; |
| erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); |
| if (erki != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__)); |
| return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the |
| * CA doesn't specify one). |
| */ |
| if (key->cert->serial == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); |
| rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; |
| ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); |
| if (ers != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, |
| key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); |
| return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ |
| static int |
| is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; |
| struct revoked_certs *rc; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ |
| memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); |
| if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, |
| &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); |
| free(rb.blob); |
| if (erb != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__)); |
| return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| } |
| memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); |
| if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, |
| &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); |
| free(rb.blob); |
| if (erb != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__)); |
| return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| } |
| |
| /* Next, explicit keys */ |
| memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); |
| if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); |
| free(rb.blob); |
| if (erb != NULL) { |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__)); |
| return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ |
| if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, |
| &rc, 0)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| if (rc != NULL) { |
| if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ |
| if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| if (rc != NULL) { |
| if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| int r; |
| |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__)); |
| if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { |
| debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); |
| if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; |
| struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; |
| int oerrno = 0, r, fd; |
| |
| if (path == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
| if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { |
| r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| oerrno = errno; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) { |
| oerrno = errno; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); |
| r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); |
| out: |
| if (fd != -1) |
| close(fd); |
| sshbuf_free(krlbuf); |
| ssh_krl_free(krl); |
| if (r != 0) |
| errno = oerrno; |
| return r; |
| } |