| /* |
| * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> |
| * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland |
| * All rights reserved |
| * Created: Fri Mar 17 17:09:28 1995 ylo |
| * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, and |
| * performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards |
| * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted |
| * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication |
| * agent connections. |
| * |
| * SSH2 implementation, |
| * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.125 2000/08/17 20:06:34 markus Exp $"); |
| |
| #include "xmalloc.h" |
| #include "rsa.h" |
| #include "ssh.h" |
| #include "pty.h" |
| #include "packet.h" |
| #include "cipher.h" |
| #include "mpaux.h" |
| #include "servconf.h" |
| #include "uidswap.h" |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "buffer.h" |
| |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include "kex.h" |
| #include <openssl/dsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include "key.h" |
| #include "dsa.h" |
| |
| #include "auth.h" |
| #include "myproposal.h" |
| #include "authfile.h" |
| |
| #ifdef LIBWRAP |
| #include <tcpd.h> |
| #include <syslog.h> |
| int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; |
| int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; |
| #endif /* LIBWRAP */ |
| |
| #ifndef O_NOCTTY |
| #define O_NOCTTY 0 |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Server configuration options. */ |
| ServerOptions options; |
| |
| /* Name of the server configuration file. */ |
| char *config_file_name = SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; |
| |
| /* |
| * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. |
| * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. |
| */ |
| #ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT |
| int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; |
| #else |
| int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug |
| * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system |
| * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing |
| * the first connection. |
| */ |
| int debug_flag = 0; |
| |
| /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ |
| int inetd_flag = 0; |
| |
| /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ |
| int log_stderr = 0; |
| |
| /* argv[0] without path. */ |
| char *av0; |
| |
| /* Saved arguments to main(). */ |
| char **saved_argv; |
| int saved_argc; |
| |
| /* |
| * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP |
| * signal handler. |
| */ |
| #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 |
| int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; |
| int num_listen_socks = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, |
| * sshd will skip the version-number exchange |
| */ |
| char *client_version_string = NULL; |
| char *server_version_string = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this |
| * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so |
| * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some |
| * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) |
| * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is |
| * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. |
| */ |
| struct { |
| RSA *private_key; /* Private part of empheral server key. */ |
| RSA *host_key; /* Private part of host key. */ |
| Key *dsa_host_key; /* Private DSA host key. */ |
| } sensitive_data; |
| |
| /* |
| * Flag indicating whether the current session key has been used. This flag |
| * is set whenever the key is used, and cleared when the key is regenerated. |
| */ |
| int key_used = 0; |
| |
| /* This is set to true when SIGHUP is received. */ |
| int received_sighup = 0; |
| |
| /* Public side of the server key. This value is regenerated regularly with |
| the private key. */ |
| RSA *public_key; |
| |
| /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ |
| unsigned char session_id[16]; |
| |
| /* same for ssh2 */ |
| unsigned char *session_id2 = NULL; |
| int session_id2_len = 0; |
| |
| /* record remote hostname or ip */ |
| unsigned int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; |
| |
| /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ |
| void do_ssh1_kex(); |
| void do_ssh2_kex(); |
| |
| /* |
| * Close all listening sockets |
| */ |
| void |
| close_listen_socks(void) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) |
| close(listen_socks[i]); |
| num_listen_socks = -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; |
| * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate |
| * the server key). |
| */ |
| void |
| sighup_handler(int sig) |
| { |
| received_sighup = 1; |
| signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. |
| * Restarts the server. |
| */ |
| void |
| sighup_restart() |
| { |
| log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); |
| close_listen_socks(); |
| execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); |
| log("RESTART FAILED: av0='%s', error: %s.", av0, strerror(errno)); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. |
| * These close the listen socket; not closing it seems to cause "Address |
| * already in use" problems on some machines, which is inconvenient. |
| */ |
| void |
| sigterm_handler(int sig) |
| { |
| log("Received signal %d; terminating.", sig); |
| close_listen_socks(); |
| unlink(options.pid_file); |
| exit(255); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then |
| * reap any zombies left by exited c. |
| */ |
| void |
| main_sigchld_handler(int sig) |
| { |
| int save_errno = errno; |
| int status; |
| |
| while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0) |
| ; |
| |
| signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); |
| errno = save_errno; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. |
| */ |
| void |
| grace_alarm_handler(int sig) |
| { |
| /* Close the connection. */ |
| packet_close(); |
| |
| /* Log error and exit. */ |
| fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this |
| * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not |
| * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. |
| * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution |
| * problems. |
| */ |
| /* XXX do we really want this work to be done in a signal handler ? -m */ |
| void |
| key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) |
| { |
| int save_errno = errno; |
| |
| /* Check if we should generate a new key. */ |
| if (key_used) { |
| /* This should really be done in the background. */ |
| log("Generating new %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits); |
| |
| if (sensitive_data.private_key != NULL) |
| RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key); |
| sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new(); |
| |
| if (public_key != NULL) |
| RSA_free(public_key); |
| public_key = RSA_new(); |
| |
| rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key, |
| options.server_key_bits); |
| arc4random_stir(); |
| key_used = 0; |
| log("RSA key generation complete."); |
| } |
| /* Reschedule the alarm. */ |
| signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); |
| alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); |
| errno = save_errno; |
| } |
| |
| void |
| sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) |
| { |
| int i, mismatch; |
| int remote_major, remote_minor; |
| int major, minor; |
| char *s; |
| char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ |
| char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ |
| |
| if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && |
| (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { |
| major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; |
| minor = 99; |
| } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { |
| major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; |
| minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; |
| } else { |
| major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; |
| minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; |
| } |
| snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); |
| server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); |
| |
| if (client_version_string == NULL) { |
| /* Send our protocol version identification. */ |
| if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) |
| != strlen(server_version_string)) { |
| log("Could not write ident string to %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); |
| fatal_cleanup(); |
| } |
| |
| /* Read other side\'s version identification. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { |
| if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { |
| log("Did not receive ident string from %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); |
| fatal_cleanup(); |
| } |
| if (buf[i] == '\r') { |
| buf[i] = '\n'; |
| buf[i + 1] = 0; |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (buf[i] == '\n') { |
| /* buf[i] == '\n' */ |
| buf[i + 1] = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; |
| client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept |
| * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. |
| */ |
| if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", |
| &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { |
| s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; |
| (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); |
| close(sock_in); |
| close(sock_out); |
| log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", |
| client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); |
| fatal_cleanup(); |
| } |
| debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", |
| remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); |
| |
| compat_datafellows(remote_version); |
| |
| mismatch = 0; |
| switch(remote_major) { |
| case 1: |
| if (remote_minor == 99) { |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) |
| enable_compat20(); |
| else |
| mismatch = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { |
| mismatch = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (remote_minor < 3) { |
| packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " |
| "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); |
| } else if (remote_minor == 3) { |
| /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ |
| enable_compat13(); |
| } |
| break; |
| case 2: |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { |
| enable_compat20(); |
| break; |
| } |
| /* FALLTHROUGH */ |
| default: |
| mismatch = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| chop(server_version_string); |
| chop(client_version_string); |
| debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); |
| |
| if (mismatch) { |
| s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; |
| (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); |
| close(sock_in); |
| close(sock_out); |
| log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", |
| get_remote_ipaddr(), |
| server_version_string, client_version_string); |
| fatal_cleanup(); |
| } |
| if (compat20) |
| packet_set_ssh2_format(); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void |
| destroy_sensitive_data(void) |
| { |
| /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */ |
| if (public_key) |
| RSA_free(public_key); |
| if (sensitive_data.private_key) |
| RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key); |
| if (sensitive_data.host_key) |
| RSA_free(sensitive_data.host_key); |
| if (sensitive_data.dsa_host_key != NULL) |
| key_free(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. |
| * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability |
| * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until |
| * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups |
| */ |
| int |
| drop_connection(int startups) |
| { |
| double p, r; |
| |
| if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) |
| return 0; |
| if (startups >= options.max_startups) |
| return 1; |
| if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) |
| return 1; |
| |
| p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; |
| p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; |
| p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); |
| p += options.max_startups_rate; |
| p /= 100.0; |
| r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; |
| |
| debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); |
| return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| int *startup_pipes = NULL; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ |
| int startup_pipe; /* in child */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Main program for the daemon. |
| */ |
| int |
| main(int ac, char **av) |
| { |
| extern char *optarg; |
| extern int optind; |
| int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1; |
| pid_t pid; |
| socklen_t fromlen; |
| int silent = 0; |
| fd_set *fdset; |
| struct sockaddr_storage from; |
| const char *remote_ip; |
| int remote_port; |
| FILE *f; |
| struct linger linger; |
| struct addrinfo *ai; |
| char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| int listen_sock, maxfd; |
| int startup_p[2]; |
| int startups = 0; |
| |
| init_rng(); |
| |
| /* Save argv[0]. */ |
| saved_argc = ac; |
| saved_argv = av; |
| if (strchr(av[0], '/')) |
| av0 = strrchr(av[0], '/') + 1; |
| else |
| av0 = av[0]; |
| |
| /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ |
| initialize_server_options(&options); |
| |
| /* Parse command-line arguments. */ |
| while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:diqQ46")) != EOF) { |
| switch (opt) { |
| case '4': |
| IPv4or6 = AF_INET; |
| break; |
| case '6': |
| IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; |
| break; |
| case 'f': |
| config_file_name = optarg; |
| break; |
| case 'd': |
| debug_flag = 1; |
| options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG; |
| break; |
| case 'i': |
| inetd_flag = 1; |
| break; |
| case 'Q': |
| silent = 1; |
| break; |
| case 'q': |
| options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; |
| break; |
| case 'b': |
| options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'p': |
| options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; |
| if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) |
| fatal("too many ports.\n"); |
| options.ports[options.num_ports++] = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'g': |
| options.login_grace_time = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'k': |
| options.key_regeneration_time = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'h': |
| options.host_key_file = optarg; |
| break; |
| case 'V': |
| client_version_string = optarg; |
| /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ |
| inetd_flag = 1; |
| break; |
| case 'u': |
| utmp_len = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case '?': |
| default: |
| fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); |
| fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", av0); |
| fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 300)\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n", |
| HOST_KEY_FILE); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n"); |
| fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n"); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host |
| * key (unless started from inetd) |
| */ |
| log_init(av0, |
| options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, |
| options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, |
| !silent && !inetd_flag); |
| |
| /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */ |
| read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); |
| |
| /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ |
| fill_default_server_options(&options); |
| |
| /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ |
| if (optind < ac) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| |
| debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); |
| |
| sensitive_data.dsa_host_key = NULL; |
| sensitive_data.host_key = NULL; |
| |
| /* check if RSA support exists */ |
| if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && |
| rsa_alive() == 0) { |
| log("no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto. See ssl(8)"); |
| log("Disabling protocol version 1"); |
| options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; |
| } |
| /* Load the RSA/DSA host key. It must have empty passphrase. */ |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { |
| Key k; |
| sensitive_data.host_key = RSA_new(); |
| k.type = KEY_RSA; |
| k.rsa = sensitive_data.host_key; |
| errno = 0; |
| if (!load_private_key(options.host_key_file, "", &k, NULL)) { |
| error("Could not load host key: %.200s: %.100s", |
| options.host_key_file, strerror(errno)); |
| log("Disabling protocol version 1"); |
| options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; |
| } |
| k.rsa = NULL; |
| } |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { |
| sensitive_data.dsa_host_key = key_new(KEY_DSA); |
| if (!load_private_key(options.host_dsa_key_file, "", sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, NULL)) { |
| |
| error("Could not load DSA host key: %.200s", options.host_dsa_key_file); |
| log("Disabling protocol version 2"); |
| options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; |
| } |
| } |
| if (! options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2)) { |
| if (silent == 0) |
| fprintf(stderr, "sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.\n"); |
| log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.\n"); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check certain values for sanity. */ |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { |
| if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || |
| options.server_key_bits > 32768) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| /* |
| * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This |
| * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I |
| * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels |
| */ |
| if (options.server_key_bits > |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && |
| options.server_key_bits < |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { |
| options.server_key_bits = |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; |
| debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", |
| options.server_key_bits); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ |
| if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) |
| log_stderr = 1; |
| log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); |
| |
| /* |
| * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect |
| * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process |
| * exits. |
| */ |
| if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) { |
| #ifdef TIOCNOTTY |
| int fd; |
| #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ |
| if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) |
| fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); |
| |
| /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ |
| #ifdef TIOCNOTTY |
| fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); |
| if (fd >= 0) { |
| (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ |
| } |
| /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ |
| log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); |
| |
| /* Do not display messages to stdout in RSA code. */ |
| rsa_set_verbose(0); |
| |
| /* Initialize the random number generator. */ |
| arc4random_stir(); |
| |
| /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be |
| unmounted if desired. */ |
| chdir("/"); |
| |
| /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ |
| if (inetd_flag) { |
| int s1, s2; |
| s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ |
| s2 = dup(s1); |
| sock_in = dup(0); |
| sock_out = dup(1); |
| startup_pipe = -1; |
| /* |
| * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 |
| * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if |
| * ttyfd happens to be one of those. |
| */ |
| debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); |
| |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { |
| public_key = RSA_new(); |
| sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new(); |
| log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits); |
| rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key, |
| options.server_key_bits); |
| arc4random_stir(); |
| log("RSA key generation complete."); |
| } |
| } else { |
| for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { |
| if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) |
| continue; |
| if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) |
| fatal("Too many listen sockets. " |
| "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); |
| if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, |
| ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), |
| NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { |
| error("getnameinfo failed"); |
| continue; |
| } |
| /* Create socket for listening. */ |
| listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); |
| if (listen_sock < 0) { |
| /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ |
| verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { |
| error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| close(listen_sock); |
| continue; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Set socket options. We try to make the port |
| * reusable and have it close as fast as possible |
| * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on |
| * close. |
| */ |
| setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, |
| (void *) &on, sizeof(on)); |
| linger.l_onoff = 1; |
| linger.l_linger = 5; |
| setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, |
| (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
| |
| debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); |
| |
| /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ |
| if ((bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) && |
| (!ai->ai_next)) { |
| error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", |
| strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); |
| close(listen_sock); |
| continue; |
| } |
| listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; |
| num_listen_socks++; |
| |
| /* Start listening on the port. */ |
| log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); |
| if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) |
| fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| |
| } |
| freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); |
| |
| if (!num_listen_socks) |
| fatal("Cannot bind any address."); |
| |
| if (!debug_flag) { |
| /* |
| * Record our pid in /etc/sshd_pid to make it easier |
| * to kill the correct sshd. We don\'t want to do |
| * this before the bind above because the bind will |
| * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will |
| * overwrite any old pid in the file. |
| */ |
| f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); |
| if (f) { |
| fprintf(f, "%u\n", (unsigned int) getpid()); |
| fclose(f); |
| } |
| } |
| if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { |
| public_key = RSA_new(); |
| sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new(); |
| |
| log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits); |
| rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key, |
| options.server_key_bits); |
| arc4random_stir(); |
| log("RSA key generation complete."); |
| |
| /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ |
| signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); |
| alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); |
| } |
| |
| /* Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs listen_sock. */ |
| signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); |
| |
| signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); |
| signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); |
| |
| /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ |
| signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); |
| |
| /* setup fd set for listen */ |
| fdset = NULL; |
| maxfd = 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) |
| if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) |
| maxfd = listen_socks[i]; |
| /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ |
| startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); |
| for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) |
| startup_pipes[i] = -1; |
| |
| /* |
| * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or |
| * the daemon is killed with a signal. |
| */ |
| for (;;) { |
| if (received_sighup) |
| sighup_restart(); |
| if (fdset != NULL) |
| xfree(fdset); |
| fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); |
| fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); |
| memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) |
| FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); |
| for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) |
| if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) |
| FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); |
| |
| /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ |
| if (select(maxfd + 1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0) { |
| if (errno != EINTR) |
| error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| continue; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) |
| if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && |
| FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { |
| /* |
| * the read end of the pipe is ready |
| * if the child has closed the pipe |
| * after successfull authentication |
| * or if the child has died |
| */ |
| close(startup_pipes[i]); |
| startup_pipes[i] = -1; |
| startups--; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { |
| if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) |
| continue; |
| fromlen = sizeof(from); |
| newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, |
| &fromlen); |
| if (newsock < 0) { |
| if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) |
| error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { |
| error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { |
| debug("drop connection #%d", startups); |
| close(newsock); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { |
| close(newsock); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) |
| if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { |
| startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; |
| if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) |
| maxfd = startup_p[0]; |
| startups++; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless |
| * we are in debugging mode. |
| */ |
| if (debug_flag) { |
| /* |
| * In debugging mode. Close the listening |
| * socket, and start processing the |
| * connection without forking. |
| */ |
| debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); |
| close_listen_socks(); |
| sock_in = newsock; |
| sock_out = newsock; |
| startup_pipe = -1; |
| pid = getpid(); |
| break; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have |
| * the child process the connection. The |
| * parent continues listening. |
| */ |
| if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Child. Close the listening and max_startup |
| * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. |
| * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has |
| * changed). We break out of the loop to handle |
| * the connection. |
| */ |
| startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; |
| for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) |
| if (startup_pipes[j] != -1) |
| close(startup_pipes[j]); |
| close_listen_socks(); |
| sock_in = newsock; |
| sock_out = newsock; |
| log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ |
| if (pid < 0) |
| error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| else |
| debug("Forked child %d.", pid); |
| |
| close(startup_p[1]); |
| |
| /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ |
| key_used = 1; |
| |
| arc4random_stir(); |
| |
| /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */ |
| close(newsock); |
| } |
| /* child process check (or debug mode) */ |
| if (num_listen_socks < 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the |
| * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We |
| * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. |
| */ |
| alarm(0); |
| signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); |
| signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); |
| signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); |
| signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to |
| * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the |
| * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. |
| */ |
| /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ |
| linger.l_onoff = 1; |
| linger.l_linger = 5; |
| setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do |
| * not have a key. |
| */ |
| packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); |
| |
| remote_port = get_remote_port(); |
| remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); |
| |
| /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ |
| #ifdef LIBWRAP |
| /* XXX LIBWRAP noes not know about IPv6 */ |
| { |
| struct request_info req; |
| |
| request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, av0, RQ_FILE, sock_in, NULL); |
| fromhost(&req); |
| |
| if (!hosts_access(&req)) { |
| close(sock_in); |
| close(sock_out); |
| refuse(&req); |
| } |
| /*XXX IPv6 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", eval_client(&req), remote_port); */ |
| } |
| #endif /* LIBWRAP */ |
| /* Log the connection. */ |
| verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); |
| |
| /* |
| * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side |
| * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is |
| * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero |
| * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging |
| * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you |
| * are about to discover the bug. |
| */ |
| signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); |
| if (!debug_flag) |
| alarm(options.login_grace_time); |
| |
| sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); |
| /* |
| * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. Rhosts- |
| * and Rhosts-RSA-Authentication only make sense from priviledged |
| * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local |
| * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these |
| * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. |
| */ |
| if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || |
| remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) { |
| options.rhosts_authentication = 0; |
| options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; |
| } |
| #ifdef KRB4 |
| if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && |
| options.kerberos_authentication) { |
| debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); |
| options.kerberos_authentication = 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* KRB4 */ |
| |
| packet_set_nonblocking(); |
| |
| /* perform the key exchange */ |
| /* authenticate user and start session */ |
| if (compat20) { |
| do_ssh2_kex(); |
| do_authentication2(); |
| } else { |
| do_ssh1_kex(); |
| do_authentication(); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef KRB4 |
| /* Cleanup user's ticket cache file. */ |
| if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup) |
| (void) dest_tkt(); |
| #endif /* KRB4 */ |
| |
| /* The connection has been terminated. */ |
| verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); |
| |
| #ifdef USE_PAM |
| finish_pam(); |
| #endif /* USE_PAM */ |
| |
| packet_close(); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SSH1 key exchange |
| */ |
| void |
| do_ssh1_kex() |
| { |
| int i, len; |
| int plen, slen; |
| BIGNUM *session_key_int; |
| unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char cookie[8]; |
| unsigned int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; |
| u_int32_t rand = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user |
| * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip |
| * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody |
| * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local |
| * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random |
| * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one |
| * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { |
| if (i % 4 == 0) |
| rand = arc4random(); |
| cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; |
| rand >>= 8; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random |
| * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP |
| * spoofing. |
| */ |
| packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
| packet_put_char(cookie[i]); |
| |
| /* Store our public server RSA key. */ |
| packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(public_key->n)); |
| packet_put_bignum(public_key->e); |
| packet_put_bignum(public_key->n); |
| |
| /* Store our public host RSA key. */ |
| packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n)); |
| packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->e); |
| packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->n); |
| |
| /* Put protocol flags. */ |
| packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); |
| |
| /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ |
| packet_put_int(cipher_mask1()); |
| |
| /* Declare supported authentication types. */ |
| auth_mask = 0; |
| if (options.rhosts_authentication) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; |
| if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; |
| if (options.rsa_authentication) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; |
| #ifdef KRB4 |
| if (options.kerberos_authentication) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; |
| #endif |
| #ifdef AFS |
| if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; |
| if (options.afs_token_passing) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; |
| #endif |
| #ifdef SKEY |
| if (options.skey_authentication == 1) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; |
| #endif |
| if (options.password_authentication) |
| auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; |
| packet_put_int(auth_mask); |
| |
| /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ |
| packet_send(); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| |
| debug("Sent %d bit public key and %d bit host key.", |
| BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n)); |
| |
| /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ |
| packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); |
| |
| /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ |
| cipher_type = packet_get_char(); |
| |
| if (!(cipher_mask() & (1 << cipher_type))) |
| packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); |
| |
| /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we |
| sent earlier with the public key packet. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
| if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) |
| packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); |
| |
| debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); |
| |
| /* Get the encrypted integer. */ |
| session_key_int = BN_new(); |
| packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen); |
| |
| protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); |
| packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); |
| |
| packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); |
| |
| /* |
| * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key |
| * with larger modulus first). |
| */ |
| if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.private_key->n, sensitive_data.host_key->n) > 0) { |
| /* Private key has bigger modulus. */ |
| if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) < |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { |
| fatal("do_connection: %s: private_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", |
| get_remote_ipaddr(), |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n), |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n), |
| SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); |
| } |
| rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, |
| sensitive_data.private_key); |
| rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, |
| sensitive_data.host_key); |
| } else { |
| /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ |
| if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) < |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { |
| fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < private_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", |
| get_remote_ipaddr(), |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n), |
| BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n), |
| SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); |
| } |
| rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, |
| sensitive_data.host_key); |
| rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, |
| sensitive_data.private_key); |
| } |
| |
| compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, |
| sensitive_data.host_key->n, |
| sensitive_data.private_key->n); |
| |
| /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */ |
| destroy_sensitive_data(); |
| |
| /* |
| * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the |
| * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the |
| * key is in the highest bits. |
| */ |
| BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); |
| len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); |
| if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) |
| fatal("do_connection: bad len from %s: session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %d", |
| get_remote_ipaddr(), |
| len, sizeof(session_key)); |
| memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); |
| BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); |
| |
| /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ |
| BN_clear_free(session_key_int); |
| |
| /* Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the session id. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) |
| session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; |
| |
| /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ |
| packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); |
| |
| /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ |
| memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); |
| |
| debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); |
| |
| /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ |
| packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); |
| packet_send(); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 |
| */ |
| void |
| do_ssh2_kex() |
| { |
| Buffer *server_kexinit; |
| Buffer *client_kexinit; |
| int payload_len, dlen; |
| int slen; |
| unsigned int klen, kout; |
| unsigned char *signature = NULL; |
| unsigned char *server_host_key_blob = NULL; |
| unsigned int sbloblen; |
| DH *dh; |
| BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0; |
| BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0; |
| int i; |
| unsigned char *kbuf; |
| unsigned char *hash; |
| Kex *kex; |
| char *cprop[PROPOSAL_MAX]; |
| |
| /* KEXINIT */ |
| |
| if (options.ciphers != NULL) { |
| myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = |
| myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; |
| } |
| server_kexinit = kex_init(myproposal); |
| client_kexinit = xmalloc(sizeof(*client_kexinit)); |
| buffer_init(client_kexinit); |
| |
| /* algorithm negotiation */ |
| kex_exchange_kexinit(server_kexinit, client_kexinit, cprop); |
| kex = kex_choose_conf(cprop, myproposal, 1); |
| for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) |
| xfree(cprop[i]); |
| |
| /* KEXDH */ |
| |
| debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT."); |
| packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT); |
| |
| /* key, cert */ |
| dh_client_pub = BN_new(); |
| if (dh_client_pub == NULL) |
| fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); |
| packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen); |
| |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH |
| fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= "); |
| bignum_print(dh_client_pub); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\n"); |
| debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* generate DH key */ |
| dh = dh_new_group1(); /* XXX depends on 'kex' */ |
| |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH |
| fprintf(stderr, "\np= "); |
| bignum_print(dh->p); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\ng= "); |
| bignum_print(dh->g); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\npub= "); |
| bignum_print(dh->pub_key); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\n"); |
| #endif |
| if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) |
| packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); |
| |
| klen = DH_size(dh); |
| kbuf = xmalloc(klen); |
| kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); |
| |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH |
| debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout); |
| fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == "); |
| for (i = 0; i< kout; i++) |
| fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\n"); |
| #endif |
| shared_secret = BN_new(); |
| |
| BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret); |
| memset(kbuf, 0, klen); |
| xfree(kbuf); |
| |
| /* XXX precompute? */ |
| dsa_make_key_blob(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen); |
| |
| /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */ |
| hash = kex_hash( |
| client_version_string, |
| server_version_string, |
| buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit), |
| buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit), |
| (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, |
| dh_client_pub, |
| dh->pub_key, |
| shared_secret |
| ); |
| buffer_free(client_kexinit); |
| buffer_free(server_kexinit); |
| xfree(client_kexinit); |
| xfree(server_kexinit); |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH |
| fprintf(stderr, "hash == "); |
| for (i = 0; i< 20; i++) |
| fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff); |
| fprintf(stderr, "\n"); |
| #endif |
| /* save session id := H */ |
| /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ |
| session_id2_len = 20; |
| session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); |
| memcpy(session_id2, hash, session_id2_len); |
| |
| /* sign H */ |
| /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */ |
| dsa_sign(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20); |
| |
| destroy_sensitive_data(); |
| |
| /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ |
| packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY); |
| packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen); |
| packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */ |
| packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen); |
| packet_send(); |
| xfree(signature); |
| xfree(server_host_key_blob); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| |
| kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret); |
| packet_set_kex(kex); |
| |
| /* have keys, free DH */ |
| DH_free(dh); |
| |
| debug("send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS."); |
| packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); |
| packet_send(); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| debug("done: send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS."); |
| |
| debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS."); |
| packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); |
| debug("GOT SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS."); |
| |
| #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH |
| /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ |
| packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); |
| packet_put_cstring("markus"); |
| packet_send(); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| #endif |
| debug("done: KEX2."); |
| } |