| :mod:`ssl` --- TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects |
| ================================================= |
| |
| .. module:: ssl |
| :synopsis: TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects |
| |
| .. moduleauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com> |
| .. sectionauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com> |
| |
| |
| .. index:: single: OpenSSL; (use in module ssl) |
| |
| .. index:: TLS, SSL, Transport Layer Security, Secure Sockets Layer |
| |
| **Source code:** :source:`Lib/ssl.py` |
| |
| -------------- |
| |
| This module provides access to Transport Layer Security (often known as "Secure |
| Sockets Layer") encryption and peer authentication facilities for network |
| sockets, both client-side and server-side. This module uses the OpenSSL |
| library. It is available on all modern Unix systems, Windows, Mac OS X, and |
| probably additional platforms, as long as OpenSSL is installed on that platform. |
| |
| .. note:: |
| |
| Some behavior may be platform dependent, since calls are made to the |
| operating system socket APIs. The installed version of OpenSSL may also |
| cause variations in behavior. |
| |
| This section documents the objects and functions in the ``ssl`` module; for more |
| general information about TLS, SSL, and certificates, the reader is referred to |
| the documents in the "See Also" section at the bottom. |
| |
| This module provides a class, :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, which is derived from the |
| :class:`socket.socket` type, and provides a socket-like wrapper that also |
| encrypts and decrypts the data going over the socket with SSL. It supports |
| additional methods such as :meth:`getpeercert`, which retrieves the |
| certificate of the other side of the connection, and :meth:`cipher`,which |
| retrieves the cipher being used for the secure connection. |
| |
| For more sophisticated applications, the :class:`ssl.SSLContext` class |
| helps manage settings and certificates, which can then be inherited |
| by SSL sockets created through the :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` method. |
| |
| |
| Functions, Constants, and Exceptions |
| ------------------------------------ |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLError |
| |
| Raised to signal an error from the underlying SSL implementation |
| (currently provided by the OpenSSL library). This signifies some |
| problem in the higher-level encryption and authentication layer that's |
| superimposed on the underlying network connection. This error |
| is a subtype of :exc:`OSError`. The error code and message of |
| :exc:`SSLError` instances are provided by the OpenSSL library. |
| |
| .. versionchanged:: 3.3 |
| :exc:`SSLError` used to be a subtype of :exc:`socket.error`. |
| |
| .. attribute:: library |
| |
| A string mnemonic designating the OpenSSL submodule in which the error |
| occurred, such as ``SSL``, ``PEM`` or ``X509``. The range of possible |
| values depends on the OpenSSL version. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. attribute:: reason |
| |
| A string mnemonic designating the reason this error occurred, for |
| example ``CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED``. The range of possible |
| values depends on the OpenSSL version. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLZeroReturnError |
| |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when trying to read or write and |
| the SSL connection has been closed cleanly. Note that this doesn't |
| mean that the underlying transport (read TCP) has been closed. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLWantReadError |
| |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket |
| <ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs |
| to be received on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be |
| fulfilled. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLWantWriteError |
| |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket |
| <ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs |
| to be sent on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be |
| fulfilled. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLSyscallError |
| |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when a system error was encountered |
| while trying to fulfill an operation on a SSL socket. Unfortunately, |
| there is no easy way to inspect the original errno number. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: SSLEOFError |
| |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when the SSL connection has been |
| terminated abruptly. Generally, you shouldn't try to reuse the underlying |
| transport when this error is encountered. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. exception:: CertificateError |
| |
| Raised to signal an error with a certificate (such as mismatching |
| hostname). Certificate errors detected by OpenSSL, though, raise |
| an :exc:`SSLError`. |
| |
| |
| Socket creation |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The following function allows for standalone socket creation. Starting from |
| Python 3.2, it can be more flexible to use :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` |
| instead. |
| |
| .. function:: wrap_socket(sock, keyfile=None, certfile=None, server_side=False, cert_reqs=CERT_NONE, ssl_version={see docs}, ca_certs=None, do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, ciphers=None) |
| |
| Takes an instance ``sock`` of :class:`socket.socket`, and returns an instance |
| of :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, a subtype of :class:`socket.socket`, which wraps |
| the underlying socket in an SSL context. For client-side sockets, the |
| context construction is lazy; if the underlying socket isn't connected yet, |
| the context construction will be performed after :meth:`connect` is called on |
| the socket. For server-side sockets, if the socket has no remote peer, it is |
| assumed to be a listening socket, and the server-side SSL wrapping is |
| automatically performed on client connections accepted via the :meth:`accept` |
| method. :func:`wrap_socket` may raise :exc:`SSLError`. |
| |
| The ``keyfile`` and ``certfile`` parameters specify optional files which |
| contain a certificate to be used to identify the local side of the |
| connection. See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more |
| information on how the certificate is stored in the ``certfile``. |
| |
| The parameter ``server_side`` is a boolean which identifies whether |
| server-side or client-side behavior is desired from this socket. |
| |
| The parameter ``cert_reqs`` specifies whether a certificate is required from |
| the other side of the connection, and whether it will be validated if |
| provided. It must be one of the three values :const:`CERT_NONE` |
| (certificates ignored), :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` (not required, but validated |
| if provided), or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` (required and validated). If the |
| value of this parameter is not :const:`CERT_NONE`, then the ``ca_certs`` |
| parameter must point to a file of CA certificates. |
| |
| The ``ca_certs`` file contains a set of concatenated "certification |
| authority" certificates, which are used to validate certificates passed from |
| the other end of the connection. See the discussion of |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the |
| certificates in this file. |
| |
| The parameter ``ssl_version`` specifies which version of the SSL protocol to |
| use. Typically, the server chooses a particular protocol version, and the |
| client must adapt to the server's choice. Most of the versions are not |
| interoperable with the other versions. If not specified, the default is |
| :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`; it provides the most compatibility with other |
| versions. |
| |
| Here's a table showing which versions in a client (down the side) can connect |
| to which versions in a server (along the top): |
| |
| .. table:: |
| |
| ======================== ========= ========= ========== ========= |
| *client* / **server** **SSLv2** **SSLv3** **SSLv23** **TLSv1** |
| ------------------------ --------- --------- ---------- --------- |
| *SSLv2* yes no yes no |
| *SSLv3* no yes yes no |
| *SSLv23* yes no yes no |
| *TLSv1* no no yes yes |
| ======================== ========= ========= ========== ========= |
| |
| .. note:: |
| |
| Which connections succeed will vary depending on the version of |
| OpenSSL. For instance, in some older versions of OpenSSL (such |
| as 0.9.7l on OS X 10.4), an SSLv2 client could not connect to an |
| SSLv23 server. Another example: beginning with OpenSSL 1.0.0, |
| an SSLv23 client will not actually attempt SSLv2 connections |
| unless you explicitly enable SSLv2 ciphers; for example, you |
| might specify ``"ALL"`` or ``"SSLv2"`` as the *ciphers* parameter |
| to enable them. |
| |
| The *ciphers* parameter sets the available ciphers for this SSL object. |
| It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format |
| <http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_. |
| |
| The parameter ``do_handshake_on_connect`` specifies whether to do the SSL |
| handshake automatically after doing a :meth:`socket.connect`, or whether the |
| application program will call it explicitly, by invoking the |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method. Calling |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` explicitly gives the program control over the |
| blocking behavior of the socket I/O involved in the handshake. |
| |
| The parameter ``suppress_ragged_eofs`` specifies how the |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.recv` method should signal unexpected EOF from the other end |
| of the connection. If specified as :const:`True` (the default), it returns a |
| normal EOF (an empty bytes object) in response to unexpected EOF errors |
| raised from the underlying socket; if :const:`False`, it will raise the |
| exceptions back to the caller. |
| |
| .. versionchanged:: 3.2 |
| New optional argument *ciphers*. |
| |
| Random generation |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| .. function:: RAND_bytes(num) |
| |
| Returns *num* cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes. Raises an |
| :class:`SSLError` if the PRNG has not been seeded with enough data or if the |
| operation is not supported by the current RAND method. :func:`RAND_status` |
| can be used to check the status of the PRNG and :func:`RAND_add` can be used |
| to seed the PRNG. |
| |
| Read the Wikipedia article, `Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number |
| generator (CSPRNG) |
| <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator>`_, |
| to get the requirements of a cryptographically generator. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. function:: RAND_pseudo_bytes(num) |
| |
| Returns (bytes, is_cryptographic): bytes are *num* pseudo-random bytes, |
| is_cryptographic is True if the bytes generated are cryptographically |
| strong. Raises an :class:`SSLError` if the operation is not supported by the |
| current RAND method. |
| |
| Generated pseudo-random byte sequences will be unique if they are of |
| sufficient length, but are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used |
| for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic |
| protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. function:: RAND_status() |
| |
| Returns True if the SSL pseudo-random number generator has been seeded with |
| 'enough' randomness, and False otherwise. You can use :func:`ssl.RAND_egd` |
| and :func:`ssl.RAND_add` to increase the randomness of the pseudo-random |
| number generator. |
| |
| .. function:: RAND_egd(path) |
| |
| If you are running an entropy-gathering daemon (EGD) somewhere, and *path* |
| is the pathname of a socket connection open to it, this will read 256 bytes |
| of randomness from the socket, and add it to the SSL pseudo-random number |
| generator to increase the security of generated secret keys. This is |
| typically only necessary on systems without better sources of randomness. |
| |
| See http://egd.sourceforge.net/ or http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ for sources |
| of entropy-gathering daemons. |
| |
| .. function:: RAND_add(bytes, entropy) |
| |
| Mixes the given *bytes* into the SSL pseudo-random number generator. The |
| parameter *entropy* (a float) is a lower bound on the entropy contained in |
| string (so you can always use :const:`0.0`). See :rfc:`1750` for more |
| information on sources of entropy. |
| |
| Certificate handling |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| .. function:: match_hostname(cert, hostname) |
| |
| Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`) matches the given *hostname*. The rules |
| applied are those for checking the identity of HTTPS servers as outlined |
| in :rfc:`2818`, except that IP addresses are not currently supported. |
| In addition to HTTPS, this function should be suitable for checking the |
| identity of servers in various SSL-based protocols such as FTPS, IMAPS, |
| POPS and others. |
| |
| :exc:`CertificateError` is raised on failure. On success, the function |
| returns nothing:: |
| |
| >>> cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'example.com'),),)} |
| >>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.com") |
| >>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.org") |
| Traceback (most recent call last): |
| File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module> |
| File "/home/py3k/Lib/ssl.py", line 130, in match_hostname |
| ssl.CertificateError: hostname 'example.org' doesn't match 'example.com' |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. function:: cert_time_to_seconds(timestring) |
| |
| Returns a floating-point value containing a normal seconds-after-the-epoch |
| time value, given the time-string representing the "notBefore" or "notAfter" |
| date from a certificate. |
| |
| Here's an example:: |
| |
| >>> import ssl |
| >>> ssl.cert_time_to_seconds("May 9 00:00:00 2007 GMT") |
| 1178694000.0 |
| >>> import time |
| >>> time.ctime(ssl.cert_time_to_seconds("May 9 00:00:00 2007 GMT")) |
| 'Wed May 9 00:00:00 2007' |
| |
| .. function:: get_server_certificate(addr, ssl_version=PROTOCOL_SSLv3, ca_certs=None) |
| |
| Given the address ``addr`` of an SSL-protected server, as a (*hostname*, |
| *port-number*) pair, fetches the server's certificate, and returns it as a |
| PEM-encoded string. If ``ssl_version`` is specified, uses that version of |
| the SSL protocol to attempt to connect to the server. If ``ca_certs`` is |
| specified, it should be a file containing a list of root certificates, the |
| same format as used for the same parameter in :func:`wrap_socket`. The call |
| will attempt to validate the server certificate against that set of root |
| certificates, and will fail if the validation attempt fails. |
| |
| .. versionchanged:: 3.3 |
| This function is now IPv6-compatible. |
| |
| .. function:: DER_cert_to_PEM_cert(DER_cert_bytes) |
| |
| Given a certificate as a DER-encoded blob of bytes, returns a PEM-encoded |
| string version of the same certificate. |
| |
| .. function:: PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(PEM_cert_string) |
| |
| Given a certificate as an ASCII PEM string, returns a DER-encoded sequence of |
| bytes for that same certificate. |
| |
| Constants |
| ^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| .. data:: CERT_NONE |
| |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode (the default), no |
| certificates will be required from the other side of the socket connection. |
| If a certificate is received from the other end, no attempt to validate it |
| is made. |
| |
| See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below. |
| |
| .. data:: CERT_OPTIONAL |
| |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode no certificates will be |
| required from the other side of the socket connection; but if they |
| are provided, validation will be attempted and an :class:`SSLError` |
| will be raised on failure. |
| |
| Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to |
| be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a |
| value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. |
| |
| .. data:: CERT_REQUIRED |
| |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode, certificates are |
| required from the other side of the socket connection; an :class:`SSLError` |
| will be raised if no certificate is provided, or if its validation fails. |
| |
| Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to |
| be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a |
| value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. |
| |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv2 |
| |
| Selects SSL version 2 as the channel encryption protocol. |
| |
| This protocol is not available if OpenSSL is compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 |
| flag. |
| |
| .. warning:: |
| |
| SSL version 2 is insecure. Its use is highly discouraged. |
| |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv23 |
| |
| Selects SSL version 2 or 3 as the channel encryption protocol. This is a |
| setting to use with servers for maximum compatibility with the other end of |
| an SSL connection, but it may cause the specific ciphers chosen for the |
| encryption to be of fairly low quality. |
| |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv3 |
| |
| Selects SSL version 3 as the channel encryption protocol. For clients, this |
| is the maximally compatible SSL variant. |
| |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_TLSv1 |
| |
| Selects TLS version 1 as the channel encryption protocol. This is the most |
| modern version, and probably the best choice for maximum protection, if both |
| sides can speak it. |
| |
| .. data:: OP_ALL |
| |
| Enables workarounds for various bugs present in other SSL implementations. |
| This option is set by default. It does not necessarily set the same |
| flags as OpenSSL's ``SSL_OP_ALL`` constant. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_NO_SSLv2 |
| |
| Prevents an SSLv2 connection. This option is only applicable in |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from |
| choosing SSLv2 as the protocol version. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_NO_SSLv3 |
| |
| Prevents an SSLv3 connection. This option is only applicable in |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from |
| choosing SSLv3 as the protocol version. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_NO_TLSv1 |
| |
| Prevents a TLSv1 connection. This option is only applicable in |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from |
| choosing TLSv1 as the protocol version. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE |
| |
| Use the server's cipher ordering preference, rather than the client's. |
| This option has no effect on client sockets and SSLv2 server sockets. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_SINGLE_DH_USE |
| |
| Prevents re-use of the same DH key for distinct SSL sessions. This |
| improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources. |
| This option only applies to server sockets. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE |
| |
| Prevents re-use of the same ECDH key for distinct SSL sessions. This |
| improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources. |
| This option only applies to server sockets. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: OP_NO_COMPRESSION |
| |
| Disable compression on the SSL channel. This is useful if the application |
| protocol supports its own compression scheme. |
| |
| This option is only available with OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: HAS_ECDH |
| |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for Elliptic Curve-based |
| Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This should be true unless the feature was |
| explicitly disabled by the distributor. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: HAS_SNI |
| |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for the *Server Name |
| Indication* extension to the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocols (as defined in |
| :rfc:`4366`). When true, you can use the *server_hostname* argument to |
| :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: HAS_NPN |
| |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for *Next Protocol |
| Negotiation* as described in the `NPN draft specification |
| <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. When true, |
| you can use the :meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` method to advertise |
| which protocols you want to support. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES |
| |
| List of supported TLS channel binding types. Strings in this list |
| can be used as arguments to :meth:`SSLSocket.get_channel_binding`. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION |
| |
| The version string of the OpenSSL library loaded by the interpreter:: |
| |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION |
| 'OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009' |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO |
| |
| A tuple of five integers representing version information about the |
| OpenSSL library:: |
| |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO |
| (0, 9, 8, 11, 15) |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER |
| |
| The raw version number of the OpenSSL library, as a single integer:: |
| |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER |
| 9470143 |
| >>> hex(ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) |
| '0x9080bf' |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| |
| SSL Sockets |
| ----------- |
| |
| SSL sockets provide the following methods of :ref:`socket-objects`: |
| |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.accept()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.bind()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.close()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.connect()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.detach()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.fileno()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.getpeername()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockname()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockopt()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.setsockopt()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.gettimeout()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.settimeout()`, |
| :meth:`~socket.socket.setblocking()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.listen()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.makefile()` |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.recv()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.recv_into()` |
| (but passing a non-zero ``flags`` argument is not allowed) |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.send()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.sendall()` (with |
| the same limitation) |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.shutdown()` |
| |
| However, since the SSL (and TLS) protocol has its own framing atop |
| of TCP, the SSL sockets abstraction can, in certain respects, diverge from |
| the specification of normal, OS-level sockets. See especially the |
| :ref:`notes on non-blocking sockets <ssl-nonblocking>`. |
| |
| SSL sockets also have the following additional methods and attributes: |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.do_handshake() |
| |
| Perform the SSL setup handshake. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.getpeercert(binary_form=False) |
| |
| If there is no certificate for the peer on the other end of the connection, |
| returns ``None``. |
| |
| If the parameter ``binary_form`` is :const:`False`, and a certificate was |
| received from the peer, this method returns a :class:`dict` instance. If the |
| certificate was not validated, the dict is empty. If the certificate was |
| validated, it returns a dict with several keys, amongst them ``subject`` |
| (the principal for which the certificate was issued) and ``issuer`` |
| (the principal issuing the certificate). If a certificate contains an |
| instance of the *Subject Alternative Name* extension (see :rfc:`3280`), |
| there will also be a ``subjectAltName`` key in the dictionary. |
| |
| The ``subject`` and ``issuer`` fields are tuples containing the sequence |
| of relative distinguished names (RDNs) given in the certificate's data |
| structure for the respective fields, and each RDN is a sequence of |
| name-value pairs. Here is a real-world example:: |
| |
| {'issuer': ((('countryName', 'IL'),), |
| (('organizationName', 'StartCom Ltd.'),), |
| (('organizationalUnitName', |
| 'Secure Digital Certificate Signing'),), |
| (('commonName', |
| 'StartCom Class 2 Primary Intermediate Server CA'),)), |
| 'notAfter': 'Nov 22 08:15:19 2013 GMT', |
| 'notBefore': 'Nov 21 03:09:52 2011 GMT', |
| 'serialNumber': '95F0', |
| 'subject': ((('description', '571208-SLe257oHY9fVQ07Z'),), |
| (('countryName', 'US'),), |
| (('stateOrProvinceName', 'California'),), |
| (('localityName', 'San Francisco'),), |
| (('organizationName', 'Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.'),), |
| (('commonName', '*.eff.org'),), |
| (('emailAddress', 'hostmaster@eff.org'),)), |
| 'subjectAltName': (('DNS', '*.eff.org'), ('DNS', 'eff.org')), |
| 'version': 3} |
| |
| .. note:: |
| To validate a certificate for a particular service, you can use the |
| :func:`match_hostname` function. |
| |
| If the ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`True`, and a certificate was |
| provided, this method returns the DER-encoded form of the entire certificate |
| as a sequence of bytes, or :const:`None` if the peer did not provide a |
| certificate. This return value is independent of validation; if validation |
| was required (:const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`), it will have |
| been validated, but if :const:`CERT_NONE` was used to establish the |
| connection, the certificate, if present, will not have been validated. |
| |
| .. versionchanged:: 3.2 |
| The returned dictionary includes additional items such as ``issuer`` |
| and ``notBefore``. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.cipher() |
| |
| Returns a three-value tuple containing the name of the cipher being used, the |
| version of the SSL protocol that defines its use, and the number of secret |
| bits being used. If no connection has been established, returns ``None``. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.compression() |
| |
| Return the compression algorithm being used as a string, or ``None`` |
| if the connection isn't compressed. |
| |
| If the higher-level protocol supports its own compression mechanism, |
| you can use :data:`OP_NO_COMPRESSION` to disable SSL-level compression. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.get_channel_binding(cb_type="tls-unique") |
| |
| Get channel binding data for current connection, as a bytes object. Returns |
| ``None`` if not connected or the handshake has not been completed. |
| |
| The *cb_type* parameter allow selection of the desired channel binding |
| type. Valid channel binding types are listed in the |
| :data:`CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES` list. Currently only the 'tls-unique' channel |
| binding, defined by :rfc:`5929`, is supported. :exc:`ValueError` will be |
| raised if an unsupported channel binding type is requested. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol() |
| |
| Returns the protocol that was selected during the TLS/SSL handshake. If |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` was not called, or if the other party |
| does not support NPN, or if the handshake has not yet happened, this will |
| return ``None``. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.unwrap() |
| |
| Performs the SSL shutdown handshake, which removes the TLS layer from the |
| underlying socket, and returns the underlying socket object. This can be |
| used to go from encrypted operation over a connection to unencrypted. The |
| returned socket should always be used for further communication with the |
| other side of the connection, rather than the original socket. |
| |
| .. attribute:: SSLSocket.context |
| |
| The :class:`SSLContext` object this SSL socket is tied to. If the SSL |
| socket was created using the top-level :func:`wrap_socket` function |
| (rather than :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`), this is a custom context |
| object created for this SSL socket. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| |
| SSL Contexts |
| ------------ |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.2 |
| |
| An SSL context holds various data longer-lived than single SSL connections, |
| such as SSL configuration options, certificate(s) and private key(s). |
| It also manages a cache of SSL sessions for server-side sockets, in order |
| to speed up repeated connections from the same clients. |
| |
| .. class:: SSLContext(protocol) |
| |
| Create a new SSL context. You must pass *protocol* which must be one |
| of the ``PROTOCOL_*`` constants defined in this module. |
| :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` is recommended for maximum interoperability. |
| |
| |
| :class:`SSLContext` objects have the following methods and attributes: |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile=None, password=None) |
| |
| Load a private key and the corresponding certificate. The *certfile* |
| string must be the path to a single file in PEM format containing the |
| certificate as well as any number of CA certificates needed to establish |
| the certificate's authenticity. The *keyfile* string, if present, must |
| point to a file containing the private key in. Otherwise the private |
| key will be taken from *certfile* as well. See the discussion of |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information on how the certificate |
| is stored in the *certfile*. |
| |
| The *password* argument may be a function to call to get the password for |
| decrypting the private key. It will only be called if the private key is |
| encrypted and a password is necessary. It will be called with no arguments, |
| and it should return a string, bytes, or bytearray. If the return value is |
| a string it will be encoded as UTF-8 before using it to decrypt the key. |
| Alternatively a string, bytes, or bytearray value may be supplied directly |
| as the *password* argument. It will be ignored if the private key is not |
| encrypted and no password is needed. |
| |
| If the *password* argument is not specified and a password is required, |
| OpenSSL's built-in password prompting mechanism will be used to |
| interactively prompt the user for a password. |
| |
| An :class:`SSLError` is raised if the private key doesn't |
| match with the certificate. |
| |
| .. versionchanged:: 3.3 |
| New optional argument *password*. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_verify_locations(cafile=None, capath=None) |
| |
| Load a set of "certification authority" (CA) certificates used to validate |
| other peers' certificates when :data:`verify_mode` is other than |
| :data:`CERT_NONE`. At least one of *cafile* or *capath* must be specified. |
| |
| The *cafile* string, if present, is the path to a file of concatenated |
| CA certificates in PEM format. See the discussion of |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the |
| certificates in this file. |
| |
| The *capath* string, if present, is |
| the path to a directory containing several CA certificates in PEM format, |
| following an `OpenSSL specific layout |
| <http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.html>`_. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_default_verify_paths() |
| |
| Load a set of default "certification authority" (CA) certificates from |
| a filesystem path defined when building the OpenSSL library. Unfortunately, |
| there's no easy way to know whether this method succeeds: no error is |
| returned if no certificates are to be found. When the OpenSSL library is |
| provided as part of the operating system, though, it is likely to be |
| configured properly. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_ciphers(ciphers) |
| |
| Set the available ciphers for sockets created with this context. |
| It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format |
| <http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_. |
| If no cipher can be selected (because compile-time options or other |
| configuration forbids use of all the specified ciphers), an |
| :class:`SSLError` will be raised. |
| |
| .. note:: |
| when connected, the :meth:`SSLSocket.cipher` method of SSL sockets will |
| give the currently selected cipher. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_npn_protocols(protocols) |
| |
| Specify which protocols the socket should avertise during the SSL/TLS |
| handshake. It should be a list of strings, like ``['http/1.1', 'spdy/2']``, |
| ordered by preference. The selection of a protocol will happen during the |
| handshake, and will play out according to the `NPN draft specification |
| <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. After a |
| successful handshake, the :meth:`SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol` method will |
| return the agreed-upon protocol. |
| |
| This method will raise :exc:`NotImplementedError` if :data:`HAS_NPN` is |
| False. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_dh_params(dhfile) |
| |
| Load the key generation parameters for Diffie-Helman (DH) key exchange. |
| Using DH key exchange improves forward secrecy at the expense of |
| computational resources (both on the server and on the client). |
| The *dhfile* parameter should be the path to a file containing DH |
| parameters in PEM format. |
| |
| This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the |
| :data:`OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` option to further improve security. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_ecdh_curve(curve_name) |
| |
| Set the curve name for Elliptic Curve-based Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key |
| exchange. ECDH is significantly faster than regular DH while arguably |
| as secure. The *curve_name* parameter should be a string describing |
| a well-known elliptic curve, for example ``prime256v1`` for a widely |
| supported curve. |
| |
| This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the |
| :data:`OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE` option to further improve security. |
| |
| This method is not available if :data:`HAS_ECDH` is False. |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 3.3 |
| |
| .. seealso:: |
| `SSL/TLS & Perfect Forward Secrecy <http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-secrecy.html>`_ |
| Vincent Bernat. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=False, \ |
| do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, \ |
| server_hostname=None) |
| |
| Wrap an existing Python socket *sock* and return an :class:`SSLSocket` |
| object. The SSL socket is tied to the context, its settings and |
| certificates. The parameters *server_side*, *do_handshake_on_connect* |
| and *suppress_ragged_eofs* have the same meaning as in the top-level |
| :func:`wrap_socket` function. |
| |
| On client connections, the optional parameter *server_hostname* specifies |
| the hostname of the service which we are connecting to. This allows a |
| single server to host multiple SSL-based services with distinct certificates, |
| quite similarly to HTTP virtual hosts. Specifying *server_hostname* |
| will raise a :exc:`ValueError` if the OpenSSL library doesn't have support |
| for it (that is, if :data:`HAS_SNI` is :const:`False`). Specifying |
| *server_hostname* will also raise a :exc:`ValueError` if *server_side* |
| is true. |
| |
| .. method:: SSLContext.session_stats() |
| |
| Get statistics about the SSL sessions created or managed by this context. |
| A dictionary is returned which maps the names of each `piece of information |
| <http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.html>`_ to their |
| numeric values. For example, here is the total number of hits and misses |
| in the session cache since the context was created:: |
| |
| >>> stats = context.session_stats() |
| >>> stats['hits'], stats['misses'] |
| (0, 0) |
| |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.options |
| |
| An integer representing the set of SSL options enabled on this context. |
| The default value is :data:`OP_ALL`, but you can specify other options |
| such as :data:`OP_NO_SSLv2` by ORing them together. |
| |
| .. note:: |
| With versions of OpenSSL older than 0.9.8m, it is only possible |
| to set options, not to clear them. Attempting to clear an option |
| (by resetting the corresponding bits) will raise a ``ValueError``. |
| |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.protocol |
| |
| The protocol version chosen when constructing the context. This attribute |
| is read-only. |
| |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.verify_mode |
| |
| Whether to try to verify other peers' certificates and how to behave |
| if verification fails. This attribute must be one of |
| :data:`CERT_NONE`, :data:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :data:`CERT_REQUIRED`. |
| |
| |
| .. index:: single: certificates |
| |
| .. index:: single: X509 certificate |
| |
| .. _ssl-certificates: |
| |
| Certificates |
| ------------ |
| |
| Certificates in general are part of a public-key / private-key system. In this |
| system, each *principal*, (which may be a machine, or a person, or an |
| organization) is assigned a unique two-part encryption key. One part of the key |
| is public, and is called the *public key*; the other part is kept secret, and is |
| called the *private key*. The two parts are related, in that if you encrypt a |
| message with one of the parts, you can decrypt it with the other part, and |
| **only** with the other part. |
| |
| A certificate contains information about two principals. It contains the name |
| of a *subject*, and the subject's public key. It also contains a statement by a |
| second principal, the *issuer*, that the subject is who he claims to be, and |
| that this is indeed the subject's public key. The issuer's statement is signed |
| with the issuer's private key, which only the issuer knows. However, anyone can |
| verify the issuer's statement by finding the issuer's public key, decrypting the |
| statement with it, and comparing it to the other information in the certificate. |
| The certificate also contains information about the time period over which it is |
| valid. This is expressed as two fields, called "notBefore" and "notAfter". |
| |
| In the Python use of certificates, a client or server can use a certificate to |
| prove who they are. The other side of a network connection can also be required |
| to produce a certificate, and that certificate can be validated to the |
| satisfaction of the client or server that requires such validation. The |
| connection attempt can be set to raise an exception if the validation fails. |
| Validation is done automatically, by the underlying OpenSSL framework; the |
| application need not concern itself with its mechanics. But the application |
| does usually need to provide sets of certificates to allow this process to take |
| place. |
| |
| Python uses files to contain certificates. They should be formatted as "PEM" |
| (see :rfc:`1422`), which is a base-64 encoded form wrapped with a header line |
| and a footer line:: |
| |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- |
| ... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ... |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| |
| Certificate chains |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| The Python files which contain certificates can contain a sequence of |
| certificates, sometimes called a *certificate chain*. This chain should start |
| with the specific certificate for the principal who "is" the client or server, |
| and then the certificate for the issuer of that certificate, and then the |
| certificate for the issuer of *that* certificate, and so on up the chain till |
| you get to a certificate which is *self-signed*, that is, a certificate which |
| has the same subject and issuer, sometimes called a *root certificate*. The |
| certificates should just be concatenated together in the certificate file. For |
| example, suppose we had a three certificate chain, from our server certificate |
| to the certificate of the certification authority that signed our server |
| certificate, to the root certificate of the agency which issued the |
| certification authority's certificate:: |
| |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- |
| ... (certificate for your server)... |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- |
| ... (the certificate for the CA)... |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- |
| ... (the root certificate for the CA's issuer)... |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| |
| CA certificates |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| If you are going to require validation of the other side of the connection's |
| certificate, you need to provide a "CA certs" file, filled with the certificate |
| chains for each issuer you are willing to trust. Again, this file just contains |
| these chains concatenated together. For validation, Python will use the first |
| chain it finds in the file which matches. Some "standard" root certificates are |
| available from various certification authorities: `CACert.org |
| <http://www.cacert.org/index.php?id=3>`_, `Thawte |
| <http://www.thawte.com/roots/>`_, `Verisign |
| <http://www.verisign.com/support/roots.html>`_, `Positive SSL |
| <http://www.PositiveSSL.com/ssl-certificate-support/cert_installation/UTN-USERFirst-Hardware.crt>`_ |
| (used by python.org), `Equifax and GeoTrust |
| <http://www.geotrust.com/resources/root_certificates/index.asp>`_. |
| |
| In general, if you are using SSL3 or TLS1, you don't need to put the full chain |
| in your "CA certs" file; you only need the root certificates, and the remote |
| peer is supposed to furnish the other certificates necessary to chain from its |
| certificate to a root certificate. See :rfc:`4158` for more discussion of the |
| way in which certification chains can be built. |
| |
| Combined key and certificate |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| Often the private key is stored in the same file as the certificate; in this |
| case, only the ``certfile`` parameter to :meth:`SSLContext.load_cert_chain` |
| and :func:`wrap_socket` needs to be passed. If the private key is stored |
| with the certificate, it should come before the first certificate in |
| the certificate chain:: |
| |
| -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- |
| ... (private key in base64 encoding) ... |
| -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- |
| ... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ... |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| |
| Self-signed certificates |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| If you are going to create a server that provides SSL-encrypted connection |
| services, you will need to acquire a certificate for that service. There are |
| many ways of acquiring appropriate certificates, such as buying one from a |
| certification authority. Another common practice is to generate a self-signed |
| certificate. The simplest way to do this is with the OpenSSL package, using |
| something like the following:: |
| |
| % openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -nodes -out cert.pem -keyout cert.pem |
| Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key |
| .......++++++ |
| .............................++++++ |
| writing new private key to 'cert.pem' |
| ----- |
| You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated |
| into your certificate request. |
| What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. |
| There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank |
| For some fields there will be a default value, |
| If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. |
| ----- |
| Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:US |
| State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:MyState |
| Locality Name (eg, city) []:Some City |
| Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:My Organization, Inc. |
| Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:My Group |
| Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com |
| Email Address []:ops@myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com |
| % |
| |
| The disadvantage of a self-signed certificate is that it is its own root |
| certificate, and no one else will have it in their cache of known (and trusted) |
| root certificates. |
| |
| |
| Examples |
| -------- |
| |
| Testing for SSL support |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| To test for the presence of SSL support in a Python installation, user code |
| should use the following idiom:: |
| |
| try: |
| import ssl |
| except ImportError: |
| pass |
| else: |
| ... # do something that requires SSL support |
| |
| Client-side operation |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| This example connects to an SSL server and prints the server's certificate:: |
| |
| import socket, ssl, pprint |
| |
| s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) |
| # require a certificate from the server |
| ssl_sock = ssl.wrap_socket(s, |
| ca_certs="/etc/ca_certs_file", |
| cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_REQUIRED) |
| ssl_sock.connect(('www.verisign.com', 443)) |
| |
| pprint.pprint(ssl_sock.getpeercert()) |
| # note that closing the SSLSocket will also close the underlying socket |
| ssl_sock.close() |
| |
| As of January 6, 2012, the certificate printed by this program looks like |
| this:: |
| |
| {'issuer': ((('countryName', 'US'),), |
| (('organizationName', 'VeriSign, Inc.'),), |
| (('organizationalUnitName', 'VeriSign Trust Network'),), |
| (('organizationalUnitName', |
| 'Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)06'),), |
| (('commonName', |
| 'VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL SGC CA'),)), |
| 'notAfter': 'May 25 23:59:59 2012 GMT', |
| 'notBefore': 'May 26 00:00:00 2010 GMT', |
| 'serialNumber': '53D2BEF924A7245E83CA01E46CAA2477', |
| 'subject': ((('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3', 'US'),), |
| (('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2', 'Delaware'),), |
| (('businessCategory', 'V1.0, Clause 5.(b)'),), |
| (('serialNumber', '2497886'),), |
| (('countryName', 'US'),), |
| (('postalCode', '94043'),), |
| (('stateOrProvinceName', 'California'),), |
| (('localityName', 'Mountain View'),), |
| (('streetAddress', '487 East Middlefield Road'),), |
| (('organizationName', 'VeriSign, Inc.'),), |
| (('organizationalUnitName', ' Production Security Services'),), |
| (('commonName', 'www.verisign.com'),)), |
| 'subjectAltName': (('DNS', 'www.verisign.com'), |
| ('DNS', 'verisign.com'), |
| ('DNS', 'www.verisign.net'), |
| ('DNS', 'verisign.net'), |
| ('DNS', 'www.verisign.mobi'), |
| ('DNS', 'verisign.mobi'), |
| ('DNS', 'www.verisign.eu'), |
| ('DNS', 'verisign.eu')), |
| 'version': 3} |
| |
| This other example first creates an SSL context, instructs it to verify |
| certificates sent by peers, and feeds it a set of recognized certificate |
| authorities (CA):: |
| |
| >>> context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23) |
| >>> context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED |
| >>> context.load_verify_locations("/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt") |
| |
| (it is assumed your operating system places a bundle of all CA certificates |
| in ``/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt``; if not, you'll get an error and have |
| to adjust the location) |
| |
| When you use the context to connect to a server, :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` |
| validates the server certificate: it ensures that the server certificate |
| was signed with one of the CA certificates, and checks the signature for |
| correctness:: |
| |
| >>> conn = context.wrap_socket(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET)) |
| >>> conn.connect(("linuxfr.org", 443)) |
| |
| You should then fetch the certificate and check its fields for conformity:: |
| |
| >>> cert = conn.getpeercert() |
| >>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "linuxfr.org") |
| |
| Visual inspection shows that the certificate does identify the desired service |
| (that is, the HTTPS host ``linuxfr.org``):: |
| |
| >>> pprint.pprint(cert) |
| {'issuer': ((('organizationName', 'CAcert Inc.'),), |
| (('organizationalUnitName', 'http://www.CAcert.org'),), |
| (('commonName', 'CAcert Class 3 Root'),)), |
| 'notAfter': 'Jun 7 21:02:24 2013 GMT', |
| 'notBefore': 'Jun 8 21:02:24 2011 GMT', |
| 'serialNumber': 'D3E9', |
| 'subject': ((('commonName', 'linuxfr.org'),),), |
| 'subjectAltName': (('DNS', 'linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>'), |
| ('DNS', 'linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>'), |
| ('DNS', 'dev.linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>'), |
| ('DNS', 'prod.linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>'), |
| ('DNS', 'alpha.linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>'), |
| ('DNS', '*.linuxfr.org'), |
| ('othername', '<unsupported>')), |
| 'version': 3} |
| |
| Now that you are assured of its authenticity, you can proceed to talk with |
| the server:: |
| |
| >>> conn.sendall(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: linuxfr.org\r\n\r\n") |
| >>> pprint.pprint(conn.recv(1024).split(b"\r\n")) |
| [b'HTTP/1.1 302 Found', |
| b'Date: Sun, 16 May 2010 13:43:28 GMT', |
| b'Server: Apache/2.2', |
| b'Location: https://linuxfr.org/pub/', |
| b'Vary: Accept-Encoding', |
| b'Connection: close', |
| b'Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1', |
| b'', |
| b''] |
| |
| See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below. |
| |
| |
| Server-side operation |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| For server operation, typically you'll need to have a server certificate, and |
| private key, each in a file. You'll first create a context holding the key |
| and the certificate, so that clients can check your authenticity. Then |
| you'll open a socket, bind it to a port, call :meth:`listen` on it, and start |
| waiting for clients to connect:: |
| |
| import socket, ssl |
| |
| context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1) |
| context.load_cert_chain(certfile="mycertfile", keyfile="mykeyfile") |
| |
| bindsocket = socket.socket() |
| bindsocket.bind(('myaddr.mydomain.com', 10023)) |
| bindsocket.listen(5) |
| |
| When a client connects, you'll call :meth:`accept` on the socket to get the |
| new socket from the other end, and use the context's :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` |
| method to create a server-side SSL socket for the connection:: |
| |
| while True: |
| newsocket, fromaddr = bindsocket.accept() |
| connstream = context.wrap_socket(newsocket, server_side=True) |
| try: |
| deal_with_client(connstream) |
| finally: |
| connstream.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR) |
| connstream.close() |
| |
| Then you'll read data from the ``connstream`` and do something with it till you |
| are finished with the client (or the client is finished with you):: |
| |
| def deal_with_client(connstream): |
| data = connstream.recv(1024) |
| # empty data means the client is finished with us |
| while data: |
| if not do_something(connstream, data): |
| # we'll assume do_something returns False |
| # when we're finished with client |
| break |
| data = connstream.recv(1024) |
| # finished with client |
| |
| And go back to listening for new client connections (of course, a real server |
| would probably handle each client connection in a separate thread, or put |
| the sockets in non-blocking mode and use an event loop). |
| |
| |
| .. _ssl-nonblocking: |
| |
| Notes on non-blocking sockets |
| ----------------------------- |
| |
| When working with non-blocking sockets, there are several things you need |
| to be aware of: |
| |
| - Calling :func:`~select.select` tells you that the OS-level socket can be |
| read from (or written to), but it does not imply that there is sufficient |
| data at the upper SSL layer. For example, only part of an SSL frame might |
| have arrived. Therefore, you must be ready to handle :meth:`SSLSocket.recv` |
| and :meth:`SSLSocket.send` failures, and retry after another call to |
| :func:`~select.select`. |
| |
| (of course, similar provisions apply when using other primitives such as |
| :func:`~select.poll`) |
| |
| - The SSL handshake itself will be non-blocking: the |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method has to be retried until it returns |
| successfully. Here is a synopsis using :func:`~select.select` to wait for |
| the socket's readiness:: |
| |
| while True: |
| try: |
| sock.do_handshake() |
| break |
| except ssl.SSLWantReadError: |
| select.select([sock], [], []) |
| except ssl.SSLWantWriteError: |
| select.select([], [sock], []) |
| |
| |
| .. _ssl-security: |
| |
| Security considerations |
| ----------------------- |
| |
| Verifying certificates |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| :const:`CERT_NONE` is the default. Since it does not authenticate the other |
| peer, it can be insecure, especially in client mode where most of time you |
| would like to ensure the authenticity of the server you're talking to. |
| Therefore, when in client mode, it is highly recommended to use |
| :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`. However, it is in itself not sufficient; you also |
| have to check that the server certificate, which can be obtained by calling |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`, matches the desired service. For many |
| protocols and applications, the service can be identified by the hostname; |
| in this case, the :func:`match_hostname` function can be used. |
| |
| In server mode, if you want to authenticate your clients using the SSL layer |
| (rather than using a higher-level authentication mechanism), you'll also have |
| to specify :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` and similarly check the client certificate. |
| |
| .. note:: |
| |
| In client mode, :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` and :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` are |
| equivalent unless anonymous ciphers are enabled (they are disabled |
| by default). |
| |
| Protocol versions |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| SSL version 2 is considered insecure and is therefore dangerous to use. If |
| you want maximum compatibility between clients and servers, it is recommended |
| to use :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` as the protocol version and then disable |
| SSLv2 explicitly using the :data:`SSLContext.options` attribute:: |
| |
| context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23) |
| context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2 |
| |
| The SSL context created above will allow SSLv3 and TLSv1 connections, but |
| not SSLv2. |
| |
| Cipher selection |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| |
| If you have advanced security requirements, fine-tuning of the ciphers |
| enabled when negotiating a SSL session is possible through the |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_ciphers` method. Starting from Python 3.2.3, the |
| ssl module disables certain weak ciphers by default, but you may want |
| to further restrict the cipher choice. For example:: |
| |
| context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1) |
| context.set_ciphers('HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL') |
| |
| The ``!aNULL:!eNULL`` part of the cipher spec is necessary to disable ciphers |
| which don't provide both encryption and authentication. Be sure to read |
| OpenSSL's documentation about the `cipher list |
| format <http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_LIST_FORMAT>`_. |
| If you want to check which ciphers are enabled by a given cipher list, |
| use the ``openssl ciphers`` command on your system. |
| |
| |
| .. seealso:: |
| |
| Class :class:`socket.socket` |
| Documentation of underlying :mod:`socket` class |
| |
| `TLS (Transport Layer Security) and SSL (Secure Socket Layer) <http://www3.rad.com/networks/applications/secure/tls.htm>`_ |
| Debby Koren |
| |
| `RFC 1422: Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1422>`_ |
| Steve Kent |
| |
| `RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750>`_ |
| D. Eastlake et. al. |
| |
| `RFC 3280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280>`_ |
| Housley et. al. |
| |
| `RFC 4366: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4366>`_ |
| Blake-Wilson et. al. |