| Security | 
 | ======== | 
 |  | 
 | We take the security of ``cryptography`` seriously. The following are a set of | 
 | policies we have adopted to ensure that security issues are addressed in a | 
 | timely fashion. | 
 |  | 
 | Reporting a security issue | 
 | -------------------------- | 
 |  | 
 | We ask that you do not report security issues to our normal GitHub issue | 
 | tracker. | 
 |  | 
 | If you believe you've identified a security issue with ``cryptography``, please | 
 | report it to ``alex.gaynor@gmail.com``. Messages may be optionally encrypted | 
 | with PGP using key fingerprint | 
 | ``E27D 4AA0 1651 72CB C5D2  AF2B 125F 5C67 DFE9 4084`` (this public key is | 
 | available from most commonly-used key servers). | 
 |  | 
 | Once you've submitted an issue via email, you should receive an acknowledgment | 
 | within 48 hours, and depending on the action to be taken, you may receive | 
 | further follow-up emails. | 
 |  | 
 | Supported Versions | 
 | ------------------ | 
 |  | 
 | At any given time, we will provide security support for the `master`_ branch | 
 | as well as the 2 most recent releases. | 
 |  | 
 | New releases for OpenSSL updates | 
 | -------------------------------- | 
 |  | 
 | As of version 0.5, ``cryptography`` statically links OpenSSL on Windows to ease | 
 | installation. Due to this, ``cryptography`` will release a new version whenever | 
 | OpenSSL has a security or bug fix release to avoid shipping insecure software. | 
 |  | 
 | Like all our other releases, this will be announced on the mailing list and we | 
 | strongly recommend that you upgrade as soon as possible. | 
 |  | 
 | Disclosure Process | 
 | ------------------ | 
 |  | 
 | Our process for taking a security issue from private discussion to public | 
 | disclosure involves multiple steps. | 
 |  | 
 | Approximately one week before full public disclosure, we will send advance | 
 | notification of the issue to a list of people and organizations, primarily | 
 | composed of operating-system vendors and other distributors of | 
 | ``cryptography``.  This notification will consist of an email message | 
 | containing: | 
 |  | 
 | * A full description of the issue and the affected versions of | 
 |   ``cryptography``. | 
 | * The steps we will be taking to remedy the issue. | 
 | * The patches, if any, that will be applied to ``cryptography``. | 
 | * The date on which the ``cryptography`` team will apply these patches, issue | 
 |   new releases, and publicly disclose the issue. | 
 |  | 
 | Simultaneously, the reporter of the issue will receive notification of the date | 
 | on which we plan to take the issue public. | 
 |  | 
 | On the day of disclosure, we will take the following steps: | 
 |  | 
 | * Apply the relevant patches to the ``cryptography`` repository. The commit | 
 |   messages for these patches will indicate that they are for security issues, | 
 |   but will not describe the issue in any detail; instead, they will warn of | 
 |   upcoming disclosure. | 
 | * Issue the relevant releases. | 
 | * Post a notice to the cryptography mailing list that describes the issue in | 
 |   detail, point to the new release and crediting the reporter of the issue. | 
 |  | 
 | If a reported issue is believed to be particularly time-sensitive – due to a | 
 | known exploit in the wild, for example – the time between advance notification | 
 | and public disclosure may be shortened considerably. | 
 |  | 
 | The list of people and organizations who receives advanced notification of | 
 | security issues is not and will not be made public. This list generally | 
 | consists of high profile downstream distributors and is entirely at the | 
 | discretion of the ``cryptography`` team. | 
 |  | 
 | .. _`master`: https://github.com/pyca/cryptography |