| .. hazmat:: |
| |
| Key Derivation Functions |
| ======================== |
| |
| .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf |
| |
| Key derivation functions derive bytes suitable for cryptographic operations |
| from passwords or other data sources using a pseudo-random function (PRF). |
| Different KDFs are suitable for different tasks such as: |
| |
| * Cryptographic key derivation |
| |
| Deriving a key suitable for use as input to an encryption algorithm. |
| Typically this means taking a password and running it through an algorithm |
| such as :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2.PBKDF2HMAC` or HKDF. |
| This process is typically known as `key stretching`_. |
| |
| * Password storage |
| |
| When storing passwords you want to use an algorithm that is computationally |
| intensive. Legitimate users will only need to compute it once (for example, |
| taking the user's password, running it through the KDF, then comparing it |
| to the stored value), while attackers will need to do it billions of times. |
| Ideal password storage KDFs will be demanding on both computational and |
| memory resources. |
| |
| .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 |
| |
| .. class:: PBKDF2HMAC(algorithm, length, salt, iterations, backend) |
| |
| .. versionadded:: 0.2 |
| |
| `PBKDF2`_ (Password Based Key Derivation Function 2) is typically used for |
| deriving a cryptographic key from a password. It may also be used for |
| key storage, but an alternate key storage KDF such as `scrypt`_ is generally |
| considered a better solution. |
| |
| This class conforms to the |
| :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.interfaces.KeyDerivationFunction` |
| interface. |
| |
| .. doctest:: |
| |
| >>> import os |
| >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes |
| >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC |
| >>> from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend |
| >>> backend = default_backend() |
| >>> salt = os.urandom(16) |
| >>> # derive |
| >>> kdf = PBKDF2HMAC( |
| ... algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), |
| ... length=32, |
| ... salt=salt, |
| ... iterations=100000, |
| ... backend=backend |
| ... ) |
| >>> key = kdf.derive(b"my great password") |
| >>> # verify |
| >>> kdf = PBKDF2HMAC( |
| ... algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), |
| ... length=32, |
| ... salt=salt, |
| ... iterations=100000, |
| ... backend=backend |
| ... ) |
| >>> kdf.verify(b"my great password", key) |
| |
| :param algorithm: An instance of a |
| :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.interfaces.HashAlgorithm` |
| provider. |
| :param int length: The desired length of the derived key. Maximum is |
| (2\ :sup:`32` - 1) * ``algorithm.digest_size``. |
| :param bytes salt: A salt. `NIST SP 800-132`_ recommends 128-bits or |
| longer. |
| :param int iterations: The number of iterations to perform of the hash |
| function. This can be used to control the length of time the operation |
| takes. Higher numbers help mitigate brute force attacks against derived |
| keys. See OWASP's `Password Storage Cheat Sheet`_ for more |
| detailed recommendations if you intend to use this for password storage. |
| :param backend: A |
| :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.PBKDF2HMACBackend` |
| provider. |
| |
| .. method:: derive(key_material) |
| |
| :param key_material bytes: The input key material. For PBKDF2 this |
| should be a password. |
| :return bytes: the derived key. |
| :raises cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized: This is raised when |
| :meth:`derive` or |
| :meth:`verify` is |
| called more than |
| once. |
| |
| This generates and returns a new key from the supplied password. |
| |
| .. method:: verify(key_material, expected_key) |
| |
| :param key_material bytes: The input key material. This is the same as |
| ``key_material`` in :meth:`derive`. |
| :param expected_key bytes: The expected result of deriving a new key, |
| this is the same as the return value of |
| :meth:`derive`. |
| :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidKey: This is raised when the |
| derived key does not match |
| the expected key. |
| :raises cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized: This is raised when |
| :meth:`derive` or |
| :meth:`verify` is |
| called more than |
| once. |
| |
| This checks whether deriving a new key from the supplied |
| ``key_material`` generates the same key as the ``expected_key``, and |
| raises an exception if they do not match. This can be used for |
| checking whether the password a user provides matches the stored derived |
| key. |
| |
| .. _`NIST SP 800-132`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf |
| .. _`Password Storage Cheat Sheet`: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet |
| .. _`PBKDF2`: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2 |
| .. _`scrypt`: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt |
| .. _`key stretching`: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_stretching |