Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | .. hazmat:: |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Key Derivation Functions |
| 4 | ======================== |
| 5 | |
| 6 | .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf |
| 7 | |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 8 | Key derivation functions derive bytes suitable for cryptographic operations |
| 9 | from passwords or other data sources using a pseudo-random function (PRF). |
| 10 | Different KDFs are suitable for different tasks such as: |
Paul Kehrer | 1cab104 | 2014-01-29 14:30:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 11 | |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 12 | * Cryptographic key derivation |
Paul Kehrer | 1cab104 | 2014-01-29 14:30:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 13 | |
| 14 | Deriving a key suitable for use as input to an encryption algorithm. |
| 15 | Typically this means taking a password and running it through an algorithm |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 16 | such as :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2.PBKDF2HMAC` or |
| 17 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf.HKDF`. |
Paul Kehrer | 1cab104 | 2014-01-29 14:30:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 18 | This process is typically known as `key stretching`_. |
| 19 | |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 20 | * Password storage |
Paul Kehrer | 1cab104 | 2014-01-29 14:30:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 21 | |
| 22 | When storing passwords you want to use an algorithm that is computationally |
| 23 | intensive. Legitimate users will only need to compute it once (for example, |
| 24 | taking the user's password, running it through the KDF, then comparing it |
| 25 | to the stored value), while attackers will need to do it billions of times. |
| 26 | Ideal password storage KDFs will be demanding on both computational and |
| 27 | memory resources. |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 28 | |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 29 | .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 |
| 30 | |
| 31 | .. class:: PBKDF2HMAC(algorithm, length, salt, iterations, backend) |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 32 | |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 33 | .. versionadded:: 0.2 |
| 34 | |
Paul Kehrer | 298e533 | 2014-01-29 11:16:22 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 35 | `PBKDF2`_ (Password Based Key Derivation Function 2) is typically used for |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 36 | deriving a cryptographic key from a password. It may also be used for |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 37 | key storage, but an alternate key storage KDF such as `scrypt`_ is generally |
Paul Kehrer | 1cab104 | 2014-01-29 14:30:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 38 | considered a better solution. |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 39 | |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 40 | This class conforms to the |
| 41 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.interfaces.KeyDerivationFunction` |
| 42 | interface. |
| 43 | |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 44 | .. doctest:: |
| 45 | |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 46 | >>> import os |
| 47 | >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 48 | >>> from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2 import PBKDF2HMAC |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 49 | >>> from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend |
| 50 | >>> backend = default_backend() |
| 51 | >>> salt = os.urandom(16) |
| 52 | >>> # derive |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 53 | >>> kdf = PBKDF2HMAC( |
| 54 | ... algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), |
| 55 | ... length=32, |
| 56 | ... salt=salt, |
Paul Kehrer | 1277bc7 | 2014-01-28 17:09:59 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 57 | ... iterations=100000, |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 58 | ... backend=backend |
| 59 | ... ) |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 60 | >>> key = kdf.derive(b"my great password") |
| 61 | >>> # verify |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 62 | >>> kdf = PBKDF2HMAC( |
| 63 | ... algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), |
| 64 | ... length=32, |
| 65 | ... salt=salt, |
Paul Kehrer | 1277bc7 | 2014-01-28 17:09:59 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 66 | ... iterations=100000, |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 67 | ... backend=backend |
| 68 | ... ) |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 69 | >>> kdf.verify(b"my great password", key) |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 70 | |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | :param algorithm: An instance of a |
| 72 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.interfaces.HashAlgorithm` |
| 73 | provider. |
| 74 | :param int length: The desired length of the derived key. Maximum is |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 75 | (2\ :sup:`32` - 1) * ``algorithm.digest_size``. |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 76 | :param bytes salt: A salt. `NIST SP 800-132`_ recommends 128-bits or |
| 77 | longer. |
| 78 | :param int iterations: The number of iterations to perform of the hash |
Paul Kehrer | c58b478 | 2014-01-29 13:56:25 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 79 | function. This can be used to control the length of time the operation |
| 80 | takes. Higher numbers help mitigate brute force attacks against derived |
| 81 | keys. See OWASP's `Password Storage Cheat Sheet`_ for more |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 82 | detailed recommendations if you intend to use this for password storage. |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 83 | :param backend: A |
Paul Kehrer | 15a86a0 | 2014-01-29 17:44:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 84 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.PBKDF2HMACBackend` |
Paul Kehrer | 5d1af21 | 2014-01-28 12:19:32 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 85 | provider. |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 86 | |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 87 | .. method:: derive(key_material) |
| 88 | |
Alex Gaynor | a8e125f | 2014-01-29 19:21:03 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 89 | :param bytes key_material: The input key material. For PBKDF2 this |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 90 | should be a password. |
Paul Kehrer | 0b18118 | 2014-01-29 16:34:47 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 91 | :return bytes: the derived key. |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 92 | :raises cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized: This is raised when |
| 93 | :meth:`derive` or |
| 94 | :meth:`verify` is |
| 95 | called more than |
| 96 | once. |
| 97 | |
| 98 | This generates and returns a new key from the supplied password. |
| 99 | |
| 100 | .. method:: verify(key_material, expected_key) |
| 101 | |
Alex Gaynor | a8e125f | 2014-01-29 19:21:03 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 102 | :param bytes key_material: The input key material. This is the same as |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 103 | ``key_material`` in :meth:`derive`. |
Alex Gaynor | a8e125f | 2014-01-29 19:21:03 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 104 | :param bytes expected_key: The expected result of deriving a new key, |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 105 | this is the same as the return value of |
| 106 | :meth:`derive`. |
| 107 | :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidKey: This is raised when the |
| 108 | derived key does not match |
| 109 | the expected key. |
| 110 | :raises cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized: This is raised when |
| 111 | :meth:`derive` or |
| 112 | :meth:`verify` is |
| 113 | called more than |
| 114 | once. |
| 115 | |
| 116 | This checks whether deriving a new key from the supplied |
| 117 | ``key_material`` generates the same key as the ``expected_key``, and |
| 118 | raises an exception if they do not match. This can be used for |
Paul Kehrer | 99d5190 | 2014-01-28 20:16:20 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 119 | checking whether the password a user provides matches the stored derived |
Paul Kehrer | 3d8c66f | 2014-01-28 17:36:50 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 120 | key. |
| 121 | |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 122 | |
| 123 | .. currentmodule:: cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf |
| 124 | |
| 125 | .. class:: HKDF(algorithm, length, salt, info, backend) |
| 126 | |
| 127 | .. versionadded:: 0.2 |
| 128 | |
David Reid | 2ad94ab | 2014-02-03 10:01:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 129 | `HKDF`_ (HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function) is suitable |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 130 | for deriving keys of a fixed size used for other cryptographic operations. |
| 131 | |
| 132 | It consists of two distinct phases "Extract" and "Expand". The "Extract" |
| 133 | stage takes a low-entropy key and extracts from it a fixed size |
David Reid | 34ed26f | 2014-02-03 10:03:58 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 134 | pseudorandom key. The "Expand" stage derives a large key of a user |
| 135 | determined size from the pseudorandom key. |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 136 | |
| 137 | :param algorithm: An instance of a |
| 138 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.interfaces.HashAlgorithm` |
| 139 | provider. |
| 140 | |
| 141 | :param int length: The desired length of the derived key. Maximum is |
David Reid | b89f34c | 2014-02-03 10:01:42 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 142 | ``255 * (algorithm.digest_size // 8)``. |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 143 | |
David Reid | 2ad94ab | 2014-02-03 10:01:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 144 | :param bytes salt: A salt. Randomizes the KDF's output. Optional, but |
| 145 | highly recommended. Ideally as many bits of entropy as the security |
| 146 | level of the hash: often that means cryptographically random and as |
| 147 | long as the hash output. Worse (shorter, less entropy) salt values can |
| 148 | still meaningfully contribute to security. May be reused. Does not have |
| 149 | to be secret, but may cause stronger security guarantees if secret; see |
| 150 | `RFC 5869`_ and the `HKDF paper`_ for more details. If ``None`` is |
| 151 | explicitly passed a default salt of ``algorithm.digest_size // 8`` null |
| 152 | bytes will be used. |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 153 | |
| 154 | :param bytes info: Application specific context information. If ``None`` |
| 155 | is explicitly passed an empty byte string will be used. |
| 156 | |
| 157 | :params backend: A |
| 158 | :class:`~cryptography.hazmat.backends.interfaces.HMACBackend` |
| 159 | provider. |
| 160 | |
| 161 | .. method:: derive(key_material) |
| 162 | |
| 163 | :param bytes key_material: The input key material. |
| 164 | :retunr bytes: The derived key. |
| 165 | |
| 166 | Derives a new key from the input key material by performing both the |
| 167 | extract and expand operations. |
| 168 | |
| 169 | .. method:: verify(key_material, expected_key) |
| 170 | |
| 171 | :param key_material bytes: The input key material. This is the same as |
| 172 | ``key_material`` in :meth:`derive`. |
| 173 | :param expected_key bytes: The expected result of deriving a new key, |
| 174 | this is the same as the return value of |
| 175 | :meth:`derive`. |
| 176 | :raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidKey: This is raised when the |
| 177 | derived key does not match |
| 178 | the expected key. |
| 179 | :raises cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized: This is raised when |
| 180 | :meth:`derive` or |
| 181 | :meth:`verify` is |
| 182 | called more than |
| 183 | once. |
| 184 | |
| 185 | This checks whether deriving a new key from the supplied |
| 186 | ``key_material`` generates the same key as the ``expected_key``, and |
David Reid | b9fa771 | 2014-02-03 10:45:11 -0800 | [diff] [blame^] | 187 | raises an exception if they do not match. |
David Reid | c0248b9 | 2014-01-30 15:23:33 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 188 | |
Paul Kehrer | b6d764c | 2014-01-27 22:32:11 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 189 | .. _`NIST SP 800-132`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf |
Paul Kehrer | b3f763f | 2014-01-28 16:42:15 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 190 | .. _`Password Storage Cheat Sheet`: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet |
David Reid | b80deea | 2014-02-03 10:33:16 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 191 | .. _`PBKDF2`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2 |
| 192 | .. _`scrypt`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt |
| 193 | .. _`key stretching`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_stretching |
David Reid | 2ad94ab | 2014-02-03 10:01:15 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 194 | .. _`HKDF`: |
David Reid | b80deea | 2014-02-03 10:33:16 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 195 | .. _`RFC 5869`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869 |
| 196 | .. _`HKDF paper`: https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264 |