Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | // This file was extracted from the TCG Published |
| 2 | // Trusted Platform Module Library |
| 3 | // Part 4: Supporting Routines |
| 4 | // Family "2.0" |
| 5 | // Level 00 Revision 01.16 |
| 6 | // October 30, 2014 |
| 7 | |
Vadim Bendebury | 42c3ea1 | 2015-05-29 22:46:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 8 | #include <string.h> |
| 9 | |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 10 | #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h" |
| 11 | #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA |
| 12 | // |
| 13 | // |
| 14 | // Local Functions |
| 15 | // |
| 16 | // RsaPrivateExponent() |
| 17 | // |
| 18 | // This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus |
| 19 | // and one of the primes. |
| 20 | // The results are returned in the key->private structure. The size of that structure is expanded to hold the |
| 21 | // private exponent. If the computed value is smaller than the public modulus, the private exponent is de- |
| 22 | // normalized. |
| 23 | // |
| 24 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 25 | // |
| 26 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent computed |
| 27 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER prime is not half the size of the modulus, or the modulus is not evenly |
| 28 | // divisible by the prime, or no private exponent could be computed |
| 29 | // from the input parameters |
| 30 | // |
Vadim Bendebury | 42c3ea1 | 2015-05-29 22:46:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 31 | CRYPT_RESULT |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 32 | RsaPrivateExponent( |
| 33 | RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to augment with the private |
| 34 | // exponent |
| 35 | ) |
| 36 | { |
| 37 | BN_CTX *context; |
| 38 | BIGNUM *bnD; |
| 39 | BIGNUM *bnN; |
| 40 | BIGNUM *bnP; |
| 41 | BIGNUM *bnE; |
| 42 | BIGNUM *bnPhi; |
| 43 | BIGNUM *bnQ; |
| 44 | BIGNUM *bnQr; |
| 45 | UINT32 fill; |
| 46 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success |
| 47 | pAssert(key != NULL && key->privateKey != NULL && key->publicKey != NULL); |
| 48 | context = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 49 | if(context == NULL) |
| 50 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION); |
| 51 | BN_CTX_start(context); |
| 52 | bnE = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 53 | bnD = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 54 | bnN = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 55 | bnP = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 56 | bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 57 | bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 58 | bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 59 | if(bnQr == NULL) |
| 60 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION); |
| 61 | // Assume the size of the public key value is within range |
| 62 | pAssert(key->publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES); |
| 63 | if( BN_bin2bn(key->publicKey->buffer, key->publicKey->size, bnN) == NULL |
| 64 | || BN_bin2bn(key->privateKey->buffer, key->privateKey->size, bnP) == NULL) |
| 65 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 66 | // If P size is not 1/2 of n size, then this is not a valid value for this |
| 67 | // implementation. This will also catch the case were P is input as zero. |
| 68 | // This generates a return rather than an assert because the key being loaded |
| 69 | // might be SW generated and wrong. |
| 70 | if(BN_num_bits(bnP) < BN_num_bits(bnN)/2) |
| 71 | { |
| 72 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 73 | goto Cleanup; |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | // Get q = n/p; |
| 76 | if (BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1) |
| 77 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 78 | // If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n |
| 79 | if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP)) |
| 80 | { |
| 81 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable |
| 82 | goto Cleanup; |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | // Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1 |
| 85 | if( BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN) == NULL |
| 86 | || !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP) |
| 87 | || !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ) |
| 88 | || !BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1)) |
| 89 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 90 | // Compute the multiplicative inverse |
| 91 | BN_set_word(bnE, key->exponent); |
| 92 | if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL) |
| 93 | { |
| 94 | // Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad |
| 95 | // set of parameters. Specifically, an exponent that is |
| 96 | // not compatible with the primes. In an implementation that |
| 97 | // has better visibility to the error codes, this might be |
| 98 | // refined so that failures in the library would return |
| 99 | // a more informative value. Should not assume here that |
| 100 | // the error codes will remain unchanged. |
| 101 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 102 | goto Cleanup; |
| 103 | } |
| 104 | fill = key->publicKey->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD); |
| 105 | BN_bn2bin(bnD, &key->privateKey->buffer[fill]); |
| 106 | memset(key->privateKey->buffer, 0, fill); |
| 107 | // Change the size of the private key so that it is known to contain |
| 108 | // a private exponent rather than a prime. |
| 109 | key->privateKey->size = key->publicKey->size; |
| 110 | Cleanup: |
| 111 | BN_CTX_end(context); |
| 112 | BN_CTX_free(context); |
| 113 | return retVal; |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | // |
| 116 | // |
| 117 | // _cpri__TestKeyRSA() |
| 118 | // |
| 119 | // This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus |
| 120 | // and one of the primes or two primes. |
| 121 | // If both primes are provided, the public modulus is computed. If only one prime is provided, the second |
| 122 | // prime is computed. In either case, a private exponent is produced and placed in d. |
| 123 | // If no modular inverse exists, then CRYPT_PARAMETER is returned. |
| 124 | // |
| 125 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 126 | // |
| 127 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent (d) was generated |
| 128 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER one or more parameters are invalid |
| 129 | // |
| 130 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 131 | _cpri__TestKeyRSA( |
| 132 | TPM2B *d, // OUT: the address to receive the private |
| 133 | // exponent |
| 134 | UINT32 exponent, // IN: the public modulu |
| 135 | TPM2B *publicKey, // IN/OUT: an input if only one prime is |
| 136 | // provided. an output if both primes are |
| 137 | // provided |
| 138 | TPM2B *prime1, // IN: a first prime |
| 139 | TPM2B *prime2 // IN: an optional second prime |
| 140 | ) |
| 141 | { |
| 142 | BN_CTX *context; |
| 143 | BIGNUM *bnD; |
| 144 | BIGNUM *bnN; |
| 145 | BIGNUM *bnP; |
| 146 | BIGNUM *bnE; |
| 147 | BIGNUM *bnPhi; |
| 148 | BIGNUM *bnQ; |
| 149 | BIGNUM *bnQr; |
| 150 | UINT32 fill; |
| 151 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success |
| 152 | pAssert(publicKey != NULL && prime1 != NULL); |
| 153 | // Make sure that the sizes are within range |
| 154 | pAssert( prime1->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2 |
| 155 | && publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES); |
| 156 | pAssert( prime2 == NULL || prime2->size < MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2); |
| 157 | if(publicKey->size/2 != prime1->size) |
| 158 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 159 | context = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 160 | if(context == NULL) |
| 161 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION); |
| 162 | BN_CTX_start(context); |
| 163 | bnE = BN_CTX_get(context); // public exponent (e) |
| 164 | bnD = BN_CTX_get(context); // private exponent (d) |
| 165 | bnN = BN_CTX_get(context); // public modulus (n) |
| 166 | bnP = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime1 (p) |
| 167 | bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context); // (p-1)(q-1) |
| 168 | bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime2 (q) |
| 169 | bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context); // n mod p |
| 170 | if(bnQr == NULL) |
| 171 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION); |
| 172 | if(BN_bin2bn(prime1->buffer, prime1->size, bnP) == NULL) |
| 173 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 174 | // If prime2 is provided, then compute n |
| 175 | if(prime2 != NULL) |
| 176 | { |
| 177 | // Two primes provided so use them to compute n |
| 178 | if(BN_bin2bn(prime2->buffer, prime2->size, bnQ) == NULL) |
| 179 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 180 | // Make sure that the sizes of the primes are compatible |
| 181 | if(BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP)) |
| 182 | { |
| 183 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 184 | goto Cleanup; |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | // Multiply the primes to get the public modulus |
| 187 | if(BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context) != 1) |
| 188 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 189 | // if the space provided for the public modulus is large enough, |
| 190 | // save the created value |
| 191 | if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != (publicKey->size * 8)) |
| 192 | { |
| 193 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 194 | goto Cleanup; |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | BN_bn2bin(bnN, publicKey->buffer); |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | else |
| 199 | { |
nagendra modadugu | 1b333df | 2016-09-08 14:33:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 200 | if (BN_is_zero(bnP)) |
| 201 | { |
| 202 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 203 | goto Cleanup; |
| 204 | } |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 205 | // One prime provided so find the second prime by division |
| 206 | BN_bin2bn(publicKey->buffer, publicKey->size, bnN); |
| 207 | // Get q = n/p; |
| 208 | if(BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1) |
| 209 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 210 | // If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n |
| 211 | if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP)) |
| 212 | { |
| 213 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable |
| 214 | goto Cleanup; |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | } |
| 217 | // Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1 |
| 218 | BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN); |
| 219 | BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP); |
| 220 | BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ); |
| 221 | BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1); |
| 222 | // Compute the multiplicative inverse |
| 223 | BN_set_word(bnE, exponent); |
| 224 | if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL) |
| 225 | { |
| 226 | // Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad set of parameters. |
| 227 | // Specifically, an exponent that is not compatible with the primes. |
| 228 | // In an implementation that has better visibility to the error codes, |
| 229 | // this might be refined so that failures in the library would return |
| 230 | // a more informative value. |
| 231 | // Do not assume that the error codes will remain unchanged. |
| 232 | retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 233 | goto Cleanup; |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | // Return the private exponent. |
| 236 | // Make sure it is normalized to have the correct size. |
| 237 | d->size = publicKey->size; |
| 238 | fill = d->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD); |
| 239 | BN_bn2bin(bnD, &d->buffer[fill]); |
| 240 | memset(d->buffer, 0, fill); |
| 241 | Cleanup: |
| 242 | BN_CTX_end(context); |
| 243 | BN_CTX_free(context); |
| 244 | return retVal; |
| 245 | } |
| 246 | // |
| 247 | // |
| 248 | // RSAEP() |
| 249 | // |
| 250 | // This function performs the RSAEP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value |
| 251 | // (m) with the public exponent (e), modulo the public (n). |
| 252 | // |
| 253 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 254 | // |
| 255 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete |
| 256 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER number to exponentiate is larger than the modulus |
| 257 | // |
| 258 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 259 | RSAEP ( |
| 260 | UINT32 dInOutSize, // OUT size of the encrypted block |
| 261 | BYTE *dInOut, // OUT: the encrypted data |
| 262 | RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to use |
| 263 | ) |
| 264 | { |
| 265 | UINT32 e; |
| 266 | BYTE exponent[4]; |
| 267 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 268 | e = key->exponent; |
| 269 | if(e == 0) |
| 270 | e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; |
| 271 | UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, exponent); |
| 272 | //!!! Can put check for test of RSA here |
| 273 | retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut, 4, exponent, |
| 274 | key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer); |
| 275 | // Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible. |
| 276 | pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW); |
| 277 | return retVal; |
| 278 | } |
| 279 | // |
| 280 | // |
| 281 | // RSADP() |
| 282 | // |
| 283 | // This function performs the RSADP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value (c) |
| 284 | // with the private exponent (d), modulo the public modulus (n). The decryption is in place. |
| 285 | // |
| 286 | // This function also checks the size of the private key. If the size indicates that only a prime value is |
| 287 | // present, the key is converted to being a private exponent. |
| 288 | // |
| 289 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 290 | // |
| 291 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS decryption succeeded |
| 292 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decrypt is larger than the modulus |
| 293 | // |
| 294 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 295 | RSADP ( |
| 296 | UINT32 dInOutSize, // IN/OUT: size of decrypted data |
| 297 | BYTE *dInOut, // IN/OUT: the decrypted data |
| 298 | RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key |
| 299 | ) |
| 300 | { |
| 301 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 302 | //!!! Can put check for RSA tested here |
| 303 | // Make sure that the pointers are provided and that the private key is present |
| 304 | // If the private key is present it is assumed to have been created by |
| 305 | // so is presumed good _cpri__PrivateExponent |
| 306 | pAssert(key != NULL && dInOut != NULL && |
| 307 | key->publicKey->size == key->publicKey->size); |
| 308 | // make sure that the value to be decrypted is smaller than the modulus |
| 309 | // note: this check is redundant as is also performed by _math__ModExp() |
| 310 | // which is optimized for use in RSA operations |
| 311 | if(_math__uComp(key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer, |
| 312 | dInOutSize, dInOut) <= 0) |
| 313 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 314 | // _math__ModExp can return CRYPT_PARAMTER or CRYPT_UNDERFLOW but actual |
| 315 | // underflow is not possible because everything is in the same buffer. |
| 316 | retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut, |
| 317 | key->privateKey->size, key->privateKey->buffer, |
| 318 | key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer); |
| 319 | // Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible. |
| 320 | pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW); |
| 321 | return retVal; |
| 322 | } |
| 323 | // |
| 324 | // |
| 325 | // OaepEncode() |
| 326 | // |
| 327 | // This function performs OAEP padding. The size of the buffer to receive the OAEP padded data must |
| 328 | // equal the size of the modulus |
| 329 | // |
| 330 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 331 | // |
| 332 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful |
| 333 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not valid |
| 334 | // CRYPT_FAIL message size is too large |
| 335 | // |
| 336 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 337 | OaepEncode( |
| 338 | UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size |
| 339 | BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data |
| 340 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding |
| 341 | const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL) |
| 342 | UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size |
| 343 | BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded |
| 344 | #ifdef TEST_RSA // |
| 345 | , BYTE *testSeed // IN: optional seed used for testing. |
| 346 | #endif // TEST_RSA // |
| 347 | ) |
| 348 | { |
| 349 | UINT32 padLen; |
| 350 | UINT32 dbSize; |
| 351 | UINT32 i; |
| 352 | BYTE mySeed[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
| 353 | BYTE *seed = mySeed; |
| 354 | INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 355 | BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES]; |
| 356 | BYTE *pp; |
| 357 | BYTE *pm; |
| 358 | UINT32 lSize = 0; |
| 359 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 360 | pAssert(padded != NULL && message != NULL); |
| 361 | // A value of zero is not allowed because the KDF can't produce a result |
| 362 | // if the digest size is zero. |
| 363 | if(hLen <= 0) |
| 364 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 365 | // If a label is provided, get the length of the string, including the |
| 366 | // terminator |
| 367 | if(label != NULL) |
| 368 | lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1; |
| 369 | // Basic size check |
| 370 | // messageSize <= k 2hLen 2 |
| 371 | if(messageSize > paddedSize - 2 * hLen - 2) |
| 372 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 373 | // Hash L even if it is null |
| 374 | // Offset into padded leaving room for masked seed and byte of zero |
| 375 | pp = &padded[hLen + 1]; |
| 376 | retVal = _cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize, (BYTE *)label, hLen, pp); |
| 377 | // concatenate PS of k mLen 2hLen 2 |
| 378 | padLen = paddedSize - messageSize - (2 * hLen) - 2; |
| 379 | memset(&pp[hLen], 0, padLen); |
| 380 | pp[hLen+padLen] = 0x01; |
| 381 | padLen += 1; |
| 382 | memcpy(&pp[hLen+padLen], message, messageSize); |
| 383 | // The total size of db = hLen + pad + mSize; |
| 384 | dbSize = hLen+padLen+messageSize; |
| 385 | // If testing, then use the provided seed. Otherwise, use values |
| 386 | // from the RNG |
| 387 | #ifdef TEST_RSA |
| 388 | if(testSeed != NULL) |
| 389 | seed = testSeed; |
| 390 | else |
| 391 | #endif // TEST_RSA |
| 392 | _cpri__GenerateRandom(hLen, mySeed); |
| 393 | // mask = MGF1 (seed, nSize hLen 1) |
| 394 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(dbSize, mask, hashAlg, hLen, seed)) < 0) |
| 395 | return retVal; // Don't expect an error because hash size is not zero |
| 396 | // was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above. |
| 397 | // Create the masked db |
| 398 | pm = mask; |
| 399 | for(i = dbSize; i > 0; i--) |
| 400 | *pp++ ^= *pm++; |
| 401 | pp = &padded[hLen + 1]; |
| 402 | // Run the masked data through MGF1 |
| 403 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, &padded[1], hashAlg, dbSize, pp)) < 0) |
| 404 | return retVal; // Don't expect zero here as the only case for zero |
| 405 | // was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above. |
| 406 | // Now XOR the seed to create masked seed |
| 407 | pp = &padded[1]; |
| 408 | pm = seed; |
| 409 | for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--) |
| 410 | *pp++ ^= *pm++; |
| 411 | // Set the first byte to zero |
| 412 | *padded = 0x00; |
| 413 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | // |
| 416 | // |
| 417 | // OaepDecode() |
| 418 | // |
| 419 | // This function performs OAEP padding checking. The size of the buffer to receive the recovered data. If |
| 420 | // the padding is not valid, the dSize size is set to zero and the function returns CRYPT_NO_RESULTS. |
| 421 | // The dSize parameter is used as an input to indicate the size available in the buffer. If insufficient space is |
| 422 | // available, the size is not changed and the return code is CRYPT_FAIL. |
| 423 | // |
| 424 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 425 | // |
| 426 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS decode complete |
| 427 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decode was larger than the modulus |
| 428 | // CRYPT_FAIL the padding is wrong or the buffer to receive the results is too small |
| 429 | // |
| 430 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 431 | OaepDecode( |
| 432 | UINT32 *dataOutSize, // IN/OUT: the recovered data size |
| 433 | BYTE *dataOut, // OUT: the recovered data |
| 434 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding |
| 435 | const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL) |
| 436 | UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: the size of the padded data |
| 437 | BYTE *padded // IN: the padded data |
| 438 | ) |
| 439 | { |
| 440 | UINT32 dSizeSave; |
| 441 | UINT32 i; |
| 442 | BYTE seedMask[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
| 443 | INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 444 | BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES]; |
| 445 | BYTE *pp; |
| 446 | BYTE *pm; |
| 447 | UINT32 lSize = 0; |
| 448 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 449 | // Unknown hash |
| 450 | pAssert(hLen > 0 && dataOutSize != NULL && dataOut != NULL && padded != NULL); |
| 451 | // If there is a label, get its size including the terminating 0x00 |
| 452 | if(label != NULL) |
| 453 | lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1; |
| 454 | // Set the return size to zero so that it doesn't have to be done on each |
| 455 | // failure |
| 456 | dSizeSave = *dataOutSize; |
| 457 | *dataOutSize = 0; |
| 458 | // Strange size (anything smaller can't be an OAEP padded block) |
| 459 | // Also check for no leading 0 |
| 460 | if(paddedSize < (unsigned)((2 * hLen) + 2) || *padded != 0) |
| 461 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 462 | // Use the hash size to determine what to put through MGF1 in order |
| 463 | // to recover the seedMask |
| 464 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, seedMask, hashAlg, |
| 465 | paddedSize-hLen-1, &padded[hLen+1])) < 0) |
| 466 | return retVal; |
| 467 | // Recover the seed into seedMask |
| 468 | pp = &padded[1]; |
| 469 | pm = seedMask; |
| 470 | for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--) |
| 471 | *pm++ ^= *pp++; |
| 472 | // Use the seed to generate the data mask |
| 473 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(paddedSize-hLen-1, mask, hashAlg, |
| 474 | hLen, seedMask)) < 0) |
| 475 | return retVal; |
| 476 | // Use the mask generated from seed to recover the padded data |
| 477 | pp = &padded[hLen+1]; |
| 478 | pm = mask; |
| 479 | for(i = paddedSize-hLen-1; i > 0; i--) |
| 480 | *pm++ ^= *pp++; |
| 481 | // Make sure that the recovered data has the hash of the label |
| 482 | // Put trial value in the seed mask |
| 483 | if((retVal=_cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize,(BYTE *)label, hLen, seedMask)) < 0) |
| 484 | return retVal; |
| 485 | if(memcmp(seedMask, mask, hLen) != 0) |
| 486 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 487 | // find the start of the data |
| 488 | pm = &mask[hLen]; |
| 489 | for(i = paddedSize-(2*hLen)-1; i > 0; i--) |
| 490 | { |
| 491 | if(*pm++ != 0) |
| 492 | break; |
| 493 | } |
Vadim Bendebury | 23bffc6 | 2015-10-27 11:14:04 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 494 | |
| 495 | // Magic value in the end of the fill area must be 1, anything else must be |
| 496 | // rejected. |
| 497 | if (pm[-1] != 1) |
| 498 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 499 | |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 500 | if(i == 0) |
| 501 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 502 | // pm should be pointing at the first part of the data |
| 503 | // and i is one greater than the number of bytes to move |
| 504 | i--; |
| 505 | if(i > dSizeSave) |
| 506 | { |
| 507 | // Restore dSize |
| 508 | *dataOutSize = dSizeSave; |
| 509 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | memcpy(dataOut, pm, i); |
| 512 | *dataOutSize = i; |
| 513 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 514 | } |
| 515 | // |
| 516 | // |
| 517 | // PKSC1v1_5Encode() |
| 518 | // |
| 519 | // This function performs the encoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1 |
| 520 | // |
| 521 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 522 | // |
| 523 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS data encoded |
| 524 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER message size is too large |
| 525 | // |
| 526 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 527 | RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode( |
| 528 | UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size |
| 529 | BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data |
| 530 | UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size |
| 531 | BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded |
| 532 | ) |
| 533 | { |
| 534 | UINT32 ps = paddedSize - messageSize - 3; |
| 535 | if(messageSize > paddedSize - 11) |
| 536 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 537 | // move the message to the end of the buffer |
| 538 | memcpy(&padded[paddedSize - messageSize], message, messageSize); |
| 539 | // Set the first byte to 0x00 and the second to 0x02 |
| 540 | *padded = 0; |
| 541 | padded[1] = 2; |
| 542 | // Fill with random bytes |
| 543 | _cpri__GenerateRandom(ps, &padded[2]); |
| 544 | // Set the delimiter for the random field to 0 |
| 545 | padded[2+ps] = 0; |
| 546 | // Now, the only messy part. Make sure that all the ps bytes are non-zero |
| 547 | // In this implementation, use the value of the current index |
| 548 | for(ps++; ps > 1; ps--) |
| 549 | { |
| 550 | if(padded[ps] == 0) |
| 551 | padded[ps] = 0x55; // In the < 0.5% of the cases that the random |
| 552 | // value is 0, just pick a value to put into |
| 553 | // the spot. |
| 554 | } |
| 555 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | // |
| 558 | // |
| 559 | // RSAES_Decode() |
| 560 | // |
| 561 | // This function performs the decoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1 |
| 562 | // |
| 563 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 564 | // |
| 565 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful |
| 566 | // CRYPT_FAIL decoding error or results would no fit into provided buffer |
| 567 | // |
| 568 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 569 | RSAES_Decode( |
| 570 | UINT32 *messageSize, // IN/OUT: recovered message size |
| 571 | BYTE *message, // OUT: the recovered message |
| 572 | UINT32 codedSize, // IN: the encoded message size |
| 573 | BYTE *coded // IN: the encoded message |
| 574 | ) |
| 575 | { |
| 576 | BOOL fail = FALSE; |
| 577 | UINT32 ps; |
| 578 | fail = (codedSize < 11); |
| 579 | fail |= (coded[0] != 0x00) || (coded[1] != 0x02); |
| 580 | for(ps = 2; ps < codedSize; ps++) |
| 581 | { |
| 582 | if(coded[ps] == 0) |
| 583 | break; |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | ps++; |
| 586 | // Make sure that ps has not gone over the end and that there are at least 8 |
| 587 | // bytes of pad data. |
| 588 | fail |= ((ps >= codedSize) || ((ps-2) < 8)); |
| 589 | if((*messageSize < codedSize - ps) || fail) |
| 590 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 591 | *messageSize = codedSize - ps; |
| 592 | memcpy(message, &coded[ps], codedSize - ps); |
| 593 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | // |
| 596 | // |
| 597 | // PssEncode() |
| 598 | // |
| 599 | // This function creates an encoded block of data that is the size of modulus. The function uses the |
| 600 | // maximum salt size that will fit in the encoded block. |
| 601 | // |
| 602 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 603 | // |
| 604 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful |
| 605 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm |
| 606 | // |
| 607 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 608 | PssEncode ( |
| 609 | UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: size of the encode data buffer |
| 610 | BYTE *eOut, // OUT: encoded data buffer |
| 611 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding |
| 612 | UINT32 hashInSize, // IN: size of digest to encode |
| 613 | BYTE *hashIn // IN: the digest |
| 614 | #ifdef TEST_RSA // |
| 615 | , BYTE *saltIn // IN: optional parameter for testing |
| 616 | #endif // TEST_RSA // |
| 617 | ) |
| 618 | { |
| 619 | INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 620 | BYTE salt[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES - 1]; |
| 621 | UINT16 saltSize; |
| 622 | BYTE *ps = salt; |
| 623 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 624 | UINT16 mLen; |
| 625 | CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState; |
| 626 | // These are fatal errors indicating bad TPM firmware |
| 627 | pAssert(eOut != NULL && hLen > 0 && hashIn != NULL ); |
| 628 | // Get the size of the mask |
| 629 | mLen = (UINT16)(eOutSize - hLen - 1); |
| 630 | // Maximum possible salt size is mask length - 1 |
| 631 | saltSize = mLen - 1; |
| 632 | // Use the maximum salt size allowed by FIPS 186-4 |
| 633 | if(saltSize > hLen) |
| 634 | saltSize = (UINT16)hLen; |
| 635 | //using eOut for scratch space |
| 636 | // Set the first 8 bytes to zero |
| 637 | memset(eOut, 0, 8); |
| 638 | // Get set the salt |
| 639 | #ifdef TEST_RSA |
| 640 | if(saltIn != NULL) |
| 641 | { |
| 642 | saltSize = hLen; |
| 643 | memcpy(salt, saltIn, hLen); |
| 644 | } |
| 645 | else |
| 646 | #endif // TEST_RSA |
| 647 | _cpri__GenerateRandom(saltSize, salt); |
| 648 | // Create the hash of the pad || input hash || salt |
| 649 | _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState); |
| 650 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, eOut); |
| 651 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, hashInSize, hashIn); |
| 652 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, saltSize, salt); |
| 653 | _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, hLen, &eOut[eOutSize - hLen - 1]); |
| 654 | // Create a mask |
| 655 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, eOut, hashAlg, hLen, &eOut[mLen])) < 0) |
| 656 | { |
| 657 | // Currently _cpri__MGF1 is not expected to return a CRYPT_RESULT error. |
| 658 | pAssert(0); |
| 659 | } |
| 660 | // Since this implementation uses key sizes that are all even multiples of |
| 661 | // 8, just need to make sure that the most significant bit is CLEAR |
| 662 | eOut[0] &= 0x7f; |
| 663 | // Before we mess up the eOut value, set the last byte to 0xbc |
| 664 | eOut[eOutSize - 1] = 0xbc; |
| 665 | // XOR a byte of 0x01 at the position just before where the salt will be XOR'ed |
| 666 | eOut = &eOut[mLen - saltSize - 1]; |
| 667 | *eOut++ ^= 0x01; |
| 668 | // XOR the salt data into the buffer |
| 669 | for(; saltSize > 0; saltSize--) |
| 670 | *eOut++ ^= *ps++; |
| 671 | // and we are done |
| 672 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | // |
| 675 | // |
| 676 | // PssDecode() |
| 677 | // |
| 678 | // This function checks that the PSS encoded block was built from the provided digest. If the check is |
| 679 | // successful, CRYPT_SUCCESS is returned. Any other value indicates an error. |
| 680 | // This implementation of PSS decoding is intended for the reference TPM implementation and is not at all |
| 681 | // generalized. It is used to check signatures over hashes and assumptions are made about the sizes of |
| 682 | // values. Those assumptions are enforce by this implementation. This implementation does allow for a |
| 683 | // variable size salt value to have been used by the creator of the signature. |
| 684 | // |
| 685 | // |
| 686 | // |
| 687 | // |
| 688 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 689 | // |
| 690 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful |
| 691 | // CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm |
| 692 | // CRYPT_FAIL decode operation failed |
| 693 | // |
| 694 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 695 | PssDecode( |
| 696 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding |
| 697 | UINT32 dInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare |
| 698 | BYTE *dIn, // In: the digest to compare |
| 699 | UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data |
| 700 | BYTE *eIn, // IN: the encoded data |
| 701 | UINT32 saltSize // IN: the expected size of the salt |
| 702 | ) |
| 703 | { |
| 704 | INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 705 | BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES]; |
| 706 | BYTE *pm = mask; |
| 707 | BYTE pad[8] = {0}; |
| 708 | UINT32 i; |
| 709 | UINT32 mLen; |
| 710 | BOOL fail = FALSE; |
| 711 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 712 | CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState; |
| 713 | // These errors are indicative of failures due to programmer error |
| 714 | pAssert(dIn != NULL && eIn != NULL); |
| 715 | // check the hash scheme |
| 716 | if(hLen == 0) |
| 717 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 718 | // most significant bit must be zero |
| 719 | fail = ((eIn[0] & 0x80) != 0); |
| 720 | // last byte must be 0xbc |
| 721 | fail |= (eIn[eInSize - 1] != 0xbc); |
| 722 | // Use the hLen bytes at the end of the buffer to generate a mask |
| 723 | // Doesn't start at the end which is a flag byte |
| 724 | mLen = eInSize - hLen - 1; |
| 725 | if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, mask, hashAlg, hLen, &eIn[mLen])) < 0) |
| 726 | return retVal; |
| 727 | if(retVal == 0) |
| 728 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 729 | // Clear the MSO of the mask to make it consistent with the encoding. |
| 730 | mask[0] &= 0x7F; |
| 731 | // XOR the data into the mask to recover the salt. This sequence |
| 732 | // advances eIn so that it will end up pointing to the seed data |
| 733 | // which is the hash of the signature data |
| 734 | for(i = mLen; i > 0; i--) |
| 735 | *pm++ ^= *eIn++; |
| 736 | // Find the first byte of 0x01 after a string of all 0x00 |
| 737 | for(pm = mask, i = mLen; i > 0; i--) |
| 738 | { |
| 739 | if(*pm == 0x01) |
| 740 | break; |
| 741 | else |
| 742 | fail |= (*pm++ != 0); |
| 743 | } |
| 744 | fail |= (i == 0); |
| 745 | // if we have failed, will continue using the entire mask as the salt value so |
| 746 | // that the timing attacks will not disclose anything (I don't think that this |
| 747 | // is a problem for TPM applications but, usually, we don't fail so this |
| 748 | // doesn't cost anything). |
| 749 | if(fail) |
| 750 | { |
| 751 | i = mLen; |
| 752 | pm = mask; |
| 753 | } |
| 754 | else |
| 755 | { |
| 756 | pm++; |
| 757 | i--; |
| 758 | } |
| 759 | // If the salt size was provided, then the recovered size must match |
| 760 | fail |= (saltSize != 0 && i != saltSize); |
| 761 | // i contains the salt size and pm points to the salt. Going to use the input |
| 762 | // hash and the seed to recreate the hash in the lower portion of eIn. |
| 763 | _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState); |
| 764 | // add the pad of 8 zeros |
| 765 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, pad); |
| 766 | // add the provided digest value |
| 767 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, dInSize, dIn); |
| 768 | // and the salt |
| 769 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, i, pm); |
| 770 | // get the result |
| 771 | retVal = _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, mask); |
| 772 | // retVal will be the size of the digest or zero. If not equal to the indicated |
| 773 | // digest size, then the signature doesn't match |
| 774 | fail |= (retVal != hLen); |
| 775 | fail |= (memcmp(mask, eIn, hLen) != 0); |
| 776 | if(fail) |
| 777 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 778 | else |
| 779 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 780 | } |
| 781 | // |
| 782 | // |
| 783 | // PKSC1v1_5SignEncode() |
| 784 | // |
| 785 | // Encode a message using PKCS1v1().5 method. |
| 786 | // |
| 787 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 788 | // |
| 789 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS encode complete |
| 790 | // CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm |
| 791 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER eOutSize is not large enough or hInSize does not match the digest |
| 792 | // size of hashAlg |
| 793 | // |
| 794 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 795 | RSASSA_Encode( |
| 796 | UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: the size of the resulting block |
| 797 | BYTE *eOut, // OUT: the encoded block |
| 798 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5 |
| 799 | UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of hash to be signed |
| 800 | BYTE *hIn // IN: hash buffer |
| 801 | ) |
| 802 | { |
Vadim Bendebury | 42c3ea1 | 2015-05-29 22:46:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 803 | const BYTE *der; |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 804 | INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der); |
| 805 | INT32 fillSize; |
| 806 | pAssert(eOut != NULL && hIn != NULL); |
| 807 | // Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string defined. |
Andrey Pronin | 569c3c5 | 2016-12-15 14:19:49 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 808 | if( |
| 809 | #if defined(SUPPORT_PADDING_ONLY_RSASSA) && SUPPORT_PADDING_ONLY_RSASSA == YES |
| 810 | hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL && |
| 811 | #endif |
| 812 | derSize == 0) |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 813 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 814 | // If the digest size of 'hashAl' doesn't match the input digest size, then |
| 815 | // the DER will misidentify the digest so return an error |
Andrey Pronin | 569c3c5 | 2016-12-15 14:19:49 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 816 | if( |
| 817 | #if defined(SUPPORT_PADDING_ONLY_RSASSA) && SUPPORT_PADDING_ONLY_RSASSA == YES |
| 818 | hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL && |
| 819 | #endif |
| 820 | (unsigned)_cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg) != hInSize) |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 821 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 822 | fillSize = eOutSize - derSize - hInSize - 3; |
| 823 | // Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space |
| 824 | if(fillSize < 8) |
| 825 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 826 | // Start filling |
| 827 | *eOut++ = 0; // initial byte of zero |
| 828 | *eOut++ = 1; // byte of 0x01 |
| 829 | for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--) |
| 830 | *eOut++ = 0xff; // bunch of 0xff |
| 831 | *eOut++ = 0; // another 0 |
| 832 | for(; derSize > 0; derSize--) |
| 833 | *eOut++ = *der++; // copy the DER |
| 834 | for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--) |
| 835 | *eOut++ = *hIn++; // copy the hash |
| 836 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 837 | } |
| 838 | // |
| 839 | // |
| 840 | // RSASSA_Decode() |
| 841 | // |
| 842 | // This function performs the RSASSA decoding of a signature. |
| 843 | // |
| 844 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 845 | // |
| 846 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful |
| 847 | // CRYPT_FAIL decode unsuccessful |
| 848 | // CRYPT_SCHEME haslAlg is not supported |
| 849 | // |
| 850 | static CRYPT_RESULT |
| 851 | RSASSA_Decode( |
| 852 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding |
| 853 | UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare |
| 854 | BYTE *hIn, // In: the digest to compare |
| 855 | UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data |
| 856 | BYTE *eIn // IN: the encoded data |
| 857 | ) |
| 858 | { |
| 859 | BOOL fail = FALSE; |
Vadim Bendebury | 42c3ea1 | 2015-05-29 22:46:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 860 | const BYTE *der; |
Vadim Bendebury | 5679752 | 2015-05-20 10:32:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 861 | INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der); |
| 862 | INT32 hashSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 863 | INT32 fillSize; |
| 864 | pAssert(hIn != NULL && eIn != NULL); |
| 865 | // Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string |
| 866 | // defined or if the provided hash isn't the right size |
| 867 | if(derSize == 0 || (unsigned)hashSize != hInSize) |
| 868 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 869 | // Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space |
| 870 | // Since no data movement takes place, can just walk though this |
| 871 | // and accept nearly random values. This can only be called from |
| 872 | // _cpri__ValidateSignature() so eInSize is known to be in range. |
| 873 | fillSize = eInSize - derSize - hashSize - 3; |
| 874 | // Start checking |
| 875 | fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // initial byte of zero |
| 876 | fail |= (*eIn++ != 1); // byte of 0x01 |
| 877 | for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--) |
| 878 | fail |= (*eIn++ != 0xff); // bunch of 0xff |
| 879 | fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // another 0 |
| 880 | for(; derSize > 0; derSize--) |
| 881 | fail |= (*eIn++ != *der++); // match the DER |
| 882 | for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--) |
| 883 | fail |= (*eIn++ != *hIn++); // match the hash |
| 884 | if(fail) |
| 885 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 886 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 887 | } |
| 888 | // |
| 889 | // |
| 890 | // Externally Accessible Functions |
| 891 | // |
| 892 | // _cpri__RsaStartup() |
| 893 | // |
| 894 | // Function that is called to initialize the hash service. In this implementation, this function does nothing but |
| 895 | // it is called by the CryptUtilStartup() function and must be present. |
| 896 | // |
| 897 | LIB_EXPORT BOOL |
| 898 | _cpri__RsaStartup( |
| 899 | void |
| 900 | ) |
| 901 | { |
| 902 | return TRUE; |
| 903 | } |
| 904 | // |
| 905 | // |
| 906 | // _cpri__EncryptRSA() |
| 907 | // |
| 908 | // This is the entry point for encryption using RSA. Encryption is use of the public exponent. The padding |
| 909 | // parameter determines what padding will be used. |
| 910 | // The cOutSize parameter must be at least as large as the size of the key. |
| 911 | // If the padding is RSA_PAD_NONE, dIn is treaded as a number. It must be lower in value than the key |
| 912 | // modulus. |
| 913 | // |
| 914 | // |
| 915 | // |
| 916 | // NOTE: If dIn has fewer bytes than cOut, then we don't add low-order zeros to dIn to make it the size of the RSA key for |
| 917 | // the call to RSAEP. This is because the high order bytes of dIn might have a numeric value that is greater than |
| 918 | // the value of the key modulus. If this had low-order zeros added, it would have a numeric value larger than the |
| 919 | // modulus even though it started out with a lower numeric value. |
| 920 | // |
| 921 | // |
| 922 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 923 | // |
| 924 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete |
| 925 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER cOutSize is too small (must be the size of the modulus) |
| 926 | // CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not a supported scheme |
| 927 | // |
| 928 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 929 | _cpri__EncryptRSA( |
| 930 | UINT32 *cOutSize, // OUT: the size of the encrypted data |
| 931 | BYTE *cOut, // OUT: the encrypted data |
| 932 | RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for encryption |
| 933 | TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding |
| 934 | UINT32 dInSize, // IN: the amount of data to encrypt |
| 935 | BYTE *dIn, // IN: the data to encrypt |
| 936 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed |
| 937 | const char *label // IN: in case it is needed |
| 938 | ) |
| 939 | { |
| 940 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 941 | pAssert(cOutSize != NULL); |
| 942 | // All encryption schemes return the same size of data |
| 943 | if(*cOutSize < key->publicKey->size) |
| 944 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 945 | *cOutSize = key->publicKey->size; |
| 946 | switch (padType) |
| 947 | { |
| 948 | case TPM_ALG_NULL: // 'raw' encryption |
| 949 | { |
| 950 | // dIn can have more bytes than cOut as long as the extra bytes |
| 951 | // are zero |
| 952 | for(; dInSize > *cOutSize; dInSize--) |
| 953 | { |
| 954 | if(*dIn++ != 0) |
| 955 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 956 | } |
| 957 | // If dIn is smaller than cOut, fill cOut with zeros |
| 958 | if(dInSize < *cOutSize) |
| 959 | memset(cOut, 0, *cOutSize - dInSize); |
| 960 | // Copy the rest of the value |
| 961 | memcpy(&cOut[*cOutSize-dInSize], dIn, dInSize); |
| 962 | // If the size of dIn is the same as cOut dIn could be larger than |
| 963 | // the modulus. If it is, then RSAEP() will catch it. |
| 964 | } |
| 965 | break; |
| 966 | case TPM_ALG_RSAES: |
| 967 | retVal = RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode(*cOutSize, cOut, dInSize, dIn); |
| 968 | break; |
| 969 | case TPM_ALG_OAEP: |
| 970 | retVal = OaepEncode(*cOutSize, cOut, hashAlg, label, dInSize, dIn |
| 971 | #ifdef TEST_RSA |
| 972 | ,NULL |
| 973 | #endif |
| 974 | ); |
| 975 | break; |
| 976 | default: |
| 977 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 978 | } |
| 979 | // All the schemes that do padding will come here for the encryption step |
| 980 | // Check that the Encoding worked |
| 981 | if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS) |
| 982 | return retVal; |
| 983 | // Padding OK so do the encryption |
| 984 | return RSAEP(*cOutSize, cOut, key); |
| 985 | } |
| 986 | // |
| 987 | // |
| 988 | // _cpri__DecryptRSA() |
| 989 | // |
| 990 | // This is the entry point for decryption using RSA. Decryption is use of the private exponent. The padType |
| 991 | // parameter determines what padding was used. |
| 992 | // |
| 993 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 994 | // |
| 995 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS successful completion |
| 996 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER cInSize is not the same as the size of the public modulus of key; or |
| 997 | // numeric value of the encrypted data is greater than the modulus |
| 998 | // CRYPT_FAIL dOutSize is not large enough for the result |
| 999 | // CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not supported |
| 1000 | // |
| 1001 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 1002 | _cpri__DecryptRSA( |
| 1003 | UINT32 *dOutSize, // OUT: the size of the decrypted data |
| 1004 | BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data |
| 1005 | RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for decryption |
| 1006 | TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding |
| 1007 | UINT32 cInSize, // IN: the amount of data to decrypt |
| 1008 | BYTE *cIn, // IN: the data to decrypt |
| 1009 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed for the scheme |
| 1010 | const char *label // IN: in case it is needed for the scheme |
| 1011 | ) |
| 1012 | { |
| 1013 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 1014 | // Make sure that the necessary parameters are provided |
| 1015 | pAssert(cIn != NULL && dOut != NULL && dOutSize != NULL && key != NULL); |
| 1016 | // Size is checked to make sure that the decryption works properly |
| 1017 | if(cInSize != key->publicKey->size) |
| 1018 | return CRYPT_PARAMETER; |
| 1019 | // For others that do padding, do the decryption in place and then |
| 1020 | // go handle the decoding. |
| 1021 | if((retVal = RSADP(cInSize, cIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS) |
| 1022 | return retVal; // Decryption failed |
| 1023 | // Remove padding |
| 1024 | switch (padType) |
| 1025 | { |
| 1026 | case TPM_ALG_NULL: |
| 1027 | if(*dOutSize < key->publicKey->size) |
| 1028 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 1029 | *dOutSize = key->publicKey->size; |
| 1030 | memcpy(dOut, cIn, *dOutSize); |
| 1031 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 1032 | case TPM_ALG_RSAES: |
| 1033 | return RSAES_Decode(dOutSize, dOut, cInSize, cIn); |
| 1034 | break; |
| 1035 | case TPM_ALG_OAEP: |
| 1036 | return OaepDecode(dOutSize, dOut, hashAlg, label, cInSize, cIn); |
| 1037 | break; |
| 1038 | default: |
| 1039 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 1040 | break; |
| 1041 | } |
| 1042 | } |
| 1043 | // |
| 1044 | // |
| 1045 | // _cpri__SignRSA() |
| 1046 | // |
| 1047 | // This function is used to generate an RSA signature of the type indicated in scheme. |
| 1048 | // |
| 1049 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 1050 | // |
| 1051 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS sign operation completed normally |
| 1052 | // CRYPT_SCHEME scheme or hashAlg are not supported |
| 1053 | // CRYPT_PARAMETER hInSize does not match hashAlg (for RSASSA) |
| 1054 | // |
| 1055 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 1056 | _cpri__SignRSA( |
| 1057 | UINT32 *sigOutSize, // OUT: size of signature |
| 1058 | BYTE *sigOut, // OUT: signature |
| 1059 | RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use |
| 1060 | TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use |
| 1061 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5 |
| 1062 | UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be signed |
| 1063 | BYTE *hIn // IN: digest buffer |
| 1064 | ) |
| 1065 | { |
| 1066 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 1067 | // Parameter checks |
| 1068 | pAssert(sigOutSize != NULL && sigOut != NULL && key != NULL && hIn != NULL); |
| 1069 | // For all signatures the size is the size of the key modulus |
| 1070 | *sigOutSize = key->publicKey->size; |
| 1071 | switch (scheme) |
| 1072 | { |
| 1073 | case TPM_ALG_NULL: |
| 1074 | *sigOutSize = 0; |
| 1075 | return CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 1076 | case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS: |
| 1077 | // PssEncode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER |
| 1078 | retVal = PssEncode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn |
| 1079 | #ifdef TEST_RSA |
| 1080 | , NULL |
| 1081 | #endif |
| 1082 | ); |
| 1083 | break; |
| 1084 | case TPM_ALG_RSASSA: |
| 1085 | // RSASSA_Encode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER or CRYPT_SCHEME |
| 1086 | retVal = RSASSA_Encode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn); |
| 1087 | break; |
| 1088 | default: |
| 1089 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 1090 | } |
| 1091 | if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS) |
| 1092 | return retVal; |
| 1093 | // Do the encryption using the private key |
| 1094 | // RSADP can return CRYPT_PARAMETR |
| 1095 | return RSADP(*sigOutSize,sigOut, key); |
| 1096 | } |
| 1097 | // |
| 1098 | // |
| 1099 | // _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA() |
| 1100 | // |
| 1101 | // This function is used to validate an RSA signature. If the signature is valid CRYPT_SUCCESS is |
| 1102 | // returned. If the signature is not valid, CRYPT_FAIL is returned. Other return codes indicate either |
| 1103 | // parameter problems or fatal errors. |
| 1104 | // |
| 1105 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 1106 | // |
| 1107 | // CRYPT_SUCCESS the signature checks |
| 1108 | // CRYPT_FAIL the signature does not check |
| 1109 | // CRYPT_SCHEME unsupported scheme or hash algorithm |
| 1110 | // |
| 1111 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 1112 | _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA( |
| 1113 | RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use |
| 1114 | TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use |
| 1115 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm |
| 1116 | UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be checked |
| 1117 | BYTE *hIn, // IN: digest buffer |
| 1118 | UINT32 sigInSize, // IN: size of signature |
| 1119 | BYTE *sigIn, // IN: signature |
| 1120 | UINT16 saltSize // IN: salt size for PSS |
| 1121 | ) |
| 1122 | { |
| 1123 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 1124 | // Fatal programming errors |
| 1125 | pAssert(key != NULL && sigIn != NULL && hIn != NULL); |
| 1126 | // Errors that might be caused by calling parameters |
| 1127 | if(sigInSize != key->publicKey->size) |
| 1128 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 1129 | // Decrypt the block |
| 1130 | if((retVal = RSAEP(sigInSize, sigIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS) |
| 1131 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 1132 | switch (scheme) |
| 1133 | { |
| 1134 | case TPM_ALG_NULL: |
| 1135 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 1136 | break; |
| 1137 | case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS: |
| 1138 | return PssDecode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn, saltSize); |
| 1139 | break; |
| 1140 | case TPM_ALG_RSASSA: |
| 1141 | return RSASSA_Decode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn); |
| 1142 | break; |
| 1143 | default: |
| 1144 | break; |
| 1145 | } |
| 1146 | return CRYPT_SCHEME; |
| 1147 | } |
| 1148 | #ifndef RSA_KEY_SIEVE |
| 1149 | // |
| 1150 | // |
| 1151 | // _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA() |
| 1152 | // |
| 1153 | // Generate an RSA key from a provided seed |
| 1154 | // |
| 1155 | // |
| 1156 | // |
| 1157 | // |
| 1158 | // Return Value Meaning |
| 1159 | // |
| 1160 | // CRYPT_FAIL exponent is not prime or is less than 3; or could not find a prime using |
| 1161 | // the provided parameters |
| 1162 | // CRYPT_CANCEL operation was canceled |
| 1163 | // |
| 1164 | LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT |
| 1165 | _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA( |
| 1166 | TPM2B *n, // OUT: The public modulu |
| 1167 | TPM2B *p, // OUT: One of the prime factors of n |
| 1168 | UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: Size of the public modulus in bit |
| 1169 | UINT32 e, // IN: The public exponent |
| 1170 | TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use in the key |
| 1171 | // generation proce |
| 1172 | TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed to use |
| 1173 | const char *label, // IN: A label for the generation process. |
| 1174 | TPM2B *extra, // IN: Party 1 data for the KDF |
| 1175 | UINT32 *counter // IN/OUT: Counter value to allow KFD iteration |
| 1176 | // to be propagated across multiple routine |
| 1177 | ) |
| 1178 | { |
| 1179 | UINT32 lLen; // length of the label |
| 1180 | // (counting the terminating 0); |
| 1181 | UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg); |
| 1182 | TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK oPadKey; |
| 1183 | UINT32 outer; |
| 1184 | UINT32 inner; |
| 1185 | BYTE swapped[4]; |
| 1186 | CRYPT_RESULT retVal; |
| 1187 | int i, fill; |
| 1188 | const static char defaultLabel[] = "RSA key"; |
| 1189 | BYTE *pb; |
| 1190 | CPRI_HASH_STATE h1; // contains the hash of the |
| 1191 | // HMAC key w/ iPad |
| 1192 | CPRI_HASH_STATE h2; // contains the hash of the |
| 1193 | // HMAC key w/ oPad |
| 1194 | CPRI_HASH_STATE h; // the working hash context |
| 1195 | BIGNUM *bnP; |
| 1196 | BIGNUM *bnQ; |
| 1197 | BIGNUM *bnT; |
| 1198 | BIGNUM *bnE; |
| 1199 | BIGNUM *bnN; |
| 1200 | BN_CTX *context; |
| 1201 | UINT32 rem; |
| 1202 | // Make sure that hashAlg is valid hash |
| 1203 | pAssert(digestSize != 0); |
| 1204 | // if present, use externally provided counter |
| 1205 | if(counter != NULL) |
| 1206 | outer = *counter; |
| 1207 | else |
| 1208 | outer = 1; |
| 1209 | // Validate exponent |
| 1210 | UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, swapped); |
| 1211 | // Need to check that the exponent is prime and not less than 3 |
| 1212 | if( e != 0 && (e < 3 || !_math__IsPrime(e))) |
| 1213 | return CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 1214 | // Get structures for the big number representations |
| 1215 | context = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 1216 | if(context == NULL) |
| 1217 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION); |
| 1218 | BN_CTX_start(context); |
| 1219 | bnP = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 1220 | bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 1221 | bnT = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 1222 | bnE = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 1223 | bnN = BN_CTX_get(context); |
| 1224 | if(bnN == NULL) |
| 1225 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 1226 | // Set Q to zero. This is used as a flag. The prime is computed in P. When a |
| 1227 | // new prime is found, Q is checked to see if it is zero. If so, P is copied |
| 1228 | // to Q and a new P is found. When both P and Q are non-zero, the modulus and |
| 1229 | // private exponent are computed and a trial encryption/decryption is |
| 1230 | // performed. If the encrypt/decrypt fails, assume that at least one of the |
| 1231 | // primes is composite. Since we don't know which one, set Q to zero and start |
| 1232 | // over and find a new pair of primes. |
| 1233 | BN_zero(bnQ); |
| 1234 | // Need to have some label |
| 1235 | if(label == NULL) |
| 1236 | label = (const char *)&defaultLabel; |
| 1237 | // Get the label size |
| 1238 | for(lLen = 0; label[lLen++] != 0;); |
| 1239 | // Start the hash using the seed and get the intermediate hash value |
| 1240 | _cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, FALSE, &h1, seed->size, seed->buffer, &oPadKey.b); |
| 1241 | _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &h2); |
| 1242 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h2, oPadKey.b.size, oPadKey.b.buffer); |
| 1243 | n->size = (keySizeInBits +7)/8; |
| 1244 | pAssert(n->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES); |
| 1245 | p->size = n->size / 2; |
| 1246 | if(e == 0) |
| 1247 | e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; |
| 1248 | BN_set_word(bnE, e); |
| 1249 | // The first test will increment the counter from zero. |
| 1250 | for(outer += 1; outer != 0; outer++) |
| 1251 | { |
| 1252 | if(_plat__IsCanceled()) |
| 1253 | { |
| 1254 | retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL; |
| 1255 | goto Cleanup; |
| 1256 | } |
| 1257 | // Need to fill in the candidate with the hash |
| 1258 | fill = digestSize; |
| 1259 | pb = p->buffer; |
| 1260 | // Reset the inner counter |
| 1261 | inner = 0; |
| 1262 | for(i = p->size; i > 0; i -= digestSize) |
| 1263 | { |
| 1264 | inner++; |
| 1265 | // Initialize the HMAC with saved state |
| 1266 | _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h1); |
| 1267 | // Hash the inner counter (the one that changes on each HMAC iteration) |
| 1268 | UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(inner, swapped); |
| 1269 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped); |
| 1270 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, lLen, (BYTE *)label); |
| 1271 | // Is there any party 1 data |
| 1272 | if(extra != NULL) |
| 1273 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, extra->size, extra->buffer); |
| 1274 | // Include the outer counter (the one that changes on each prime |
| 1275 | // prime candidate generation |
| 1276 | UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(outer, swapped); |
| 1277 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped); |
| 1278 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 2, (BYTE *)&keySizeInBits); |
| 1279 | if(i < fill) |
| 1280 | fill = i; |
| 1281 | _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb); |
| 1282 | // Restart the oPad hash |
| 1283 | _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h2); |
| 1284 | // Add the last hashed data |
| 1285 | _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, fill, pb); |
| 1286 | // gives a completed HMAC |
| 1287 | _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb); |
| 1288 | pb += fill; |
| 1289 | } |
| 1290 | // Set the Most significant 2 bits and the low bit of the candidate |
| 1291 | p->buffer[0] |= 0xC0; |
| 1292 | p->buffer[p->size - 1] |= 1; |
| 1293 | // Convert the candidate to a BN |
| 1294 | BN_bin2bn(p->buffer, p->size, bnP); |
| 1295 | // If this is the second prime, make sure that it differs from the |
| 1296 | // first prime by at least 2^100 |
| 1297 | if(!BN_is_zero(bnQ)) |
| 1298 | { |
| 1299 | // bnQ is non-zero if we already found it |
| 1300 | if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) < 0) |
| 1301 | BN_sub(bnT, bnQ, bnP); |
| 1302 | else |
| 1303 | BN_sub(bnT, bnP, bnQ); |
| 1304 | if(BN_num_bits(bnT) < 100) // Difference has to be at least 100 bits |
| 1305 | continue; |
| 1306 | } |
| 1307 | // Make sure that the prime candidate (p) is not divisible by the exponent |
| 1308 | // and that (p-1) is not divisible by the exponent |
| 1309 | // Get the remainder after dividing by the modulus |
| 1310 | rem = BN_mod_word(bnP, e); |
| 1311 | if(rem == 0) // evenly divisible so add two keeping the number odd and |
| 1312 | // making sure that 1 != p mod e |
| 1313 | BN_add_word(bnP, 2); |
| 1314 | else if(rem == 1) // leaves a remainder of 1 so subtract two keeping the |
| 1315 | // number odd and making (e-1) = p mod e |
| 1316 | BN_sub_word(bnP, 2); |
| 1317 | // Have a candidate, check for primality |
| 1318 | if((retVal = (CRYPT_RESULT)BN_is_prime_ex(bnP, |
| 1319 | BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL)) < 0) |
| 1320 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 1321 | if(retVal != 1) |
| 1322 | continue; |
| 1323 | // Found a prime, is this the first or second. |
| 1324 | if(BN_is_zero(bnQ)) |
| 1325 | { |
| 1326 | // copy p to q and compute another prime in p |
| 1327 | BN_copy(bnQ, bnP); |
| 1328 | continue; |
| 1329 | } |
| 1330 | //Form the public modulus |
| 1331 | BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context); |
| 1332 | if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != keySizeInBits) |
| 1333 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 1334 | // Save the public modulus |
| 1335 | BnTo2B(n, bnN, n->size); // Will pad the buffer to the correct size |
| 1336 | pAssert((n->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0); |
| 1337 | // And one prime |
| 1338 | BnTo2B(p, bnP, p->size); |
| 1339 | pAssert((p->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0); |
| 1340 | // Finish by making sure that we can form the modular inverse of PHI |
| 1341 | // with respect to the public exponent |
| 1342 | // Compute PHI = (p - 1)(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1 |
| 1343 | // Make sure that we can form the modular inverse |
| 1344 | BN_sub(bnT, bnN, bnP); |
| 1345 | BN_sub(bnT, bnT, bnQ); |
| 1346 | BN_add_word(bnT, 1); |
| 1347 | // find d such that (Phi * d) mod e ==1 |
| 1348 | // If there isn't then we are broken because we took the step |
| 1349 | // of making sure that the prime != 1 mod e so the modular inverse |
| 1350 | // must exist |
| 1351 | if(BN_mod_inverse(bnT, bnE, bnT, context) == NULL || BN_is_zero(bnT)) |
| 1352 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 1353 | // And, finally, do a trial encryption decryption |
| 1354 | { |
| 1355 | TPM2B_TYPE(RSA_KEY, MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES); |
| 1356 | TPM2B_RSA_KEY r; |
| 1357 | r.t.size = sizeof(n->size); |
| 1358 | // If we are using a seed, then results must be reproducible on each |
| 1359 | // call. Otherwise, just get a random number |
| 1360 | if(seed == NULL) |
| 1361 | _cpri__GenerateRandom(n->size, r.t.buffer); |
| 1362 | else |
| 1363 | { |
| 1364 | // this this version does not have a deterministic RNG, XOR the |
| 1365 | // public key and private exponent to get a deterministic value |
| 1366 | // for testing. |
| 1367 | int i; |
| 1368 | // Generate a random-ish number starting with the public modulus |
| 1369 | // XORed with the MSO of the seed |
| 1370 | for(i = 0; i < n->size; i++) |
| 1371 | r.t.buffer[i] = n->buffer[i] ^ seed->buffer[0]; |
| 1372 | } |
| 1373 | // Make sure that the number is smaller than the public modulus |
| 1374 | r.t.buffer[0] &= 0x7F; |
| 1375 | // Convert |
| 1376 | if( BN_bin2bn(r.t.buffer, r.t.size, bnP) == NULL |
| 1377 | // Encrypt with the public exponent |
| 1378 | || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnP, bnE, bnN, context) != 1 |
| 1379 | // Decrypt with the private exponent |
| 1380 | || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnQ, bnT, bnN, context) != 1) |
| 1381 | FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL); |
| 1382 | // If the starting and ending values are not the same, start over )-; |
| 1383 | if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) != 0) |
| 1384 | { |
| 1385 | BN_zero(bnQ); |
| 1386 | continue; |
| 1387 | } |
| 1388 | } |
| 1389 | retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; |
| 1390 | goto Cleanup; |
| 1391 | } |
| 1392 | retVal = CRYPT_FAIL; |
| 1393 | Cleanup: |
| 1394 | // Close out the hash sessions |
| 1395 | _cpri__CompleteHash(&h2, 0, NULL); |
| 1396 | _cpri__CompleteHash(&h1, 0, NULL); |
| 1397 | // Free up allocated BN values |
| 1398 | BN_CTX_end(context); |
| 1399 | BN_CTX_free(context); |
| 1400 | if(counter != NULL) |
| 1401 | *counter = outer; |
| 1402 | return retVal; |
| 1403 | } |
| 1404 | #endif // RSA_KEY_SIEVE |
| 1405 | #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA |