Jeff Vander Stoep | 74e4f93 | 2016-02-08 15:27:10 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com> |
| 2 | # |
| 3 | # Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat |
| 4 | # see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information |
| 5 | # |
| 6 | # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| 7 | # modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as |
| 8 | # published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2 only |
| 9 | # |
| 10 | # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| 11 | # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 12 | # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| 13 | # GNU General Public License for more details. |
| 14 | # |
| 15 | # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
| 16 | # along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
| 17 | # Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
| 18 | # |
| 19 | |
| 20 | import re |
| 21 | import sys |
| 22 | |
| 23 | from . import refpolicy |
| 24 | from . import access |
| 25 | from . import util |
| 26 | # Convenience functions |
| 27 | |
| 28 | def get_audit_boot_msgs(): |
| 29 | """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from the audit |
| 30 | log. This function uses ausearch and requires that the current |
| 31 | process have sufficient rights to run ausearch. |
| 32 | |
| 33 | Returns: |
| 34 | string contain all of the audit messages returned by ausearch. |
| 35 | """ |
| 36 | import subprocess |
| 37 | import time |
| 38 | fd=open("/proc/uptime", "r") |
| 39 | off=float(fd.read().split()[0]) |
| 40 | fd.close |
| 41 | s = time.localtime(time.time() - off) |
| 42 | bootdate = time.strftime("%x", s) |
| 43 | boottime = time.strftime("%X", s) |
| 44 | output = subprocess.Popen(["/sbin/ausearch", "-m", "AVC,USER_AVC,MAC_POLICY_LOAD,DAEMON_START,SELINUX_ERR", "-ts", bootdate, boottime], |
| 45 | stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0] |
| 46 | if util.PY3: |
| 47 | output = util.decode_input(output) |
| 48 | return output |
| 49 | |
| 50 | def get_audit_msgs(): |
| 51 | """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from the audit |
| 52 | log. This function uses ausearch and requires that the current |
| 53 | process have sufficient rights to run ausearch. |
| 54 | |
| 55 | Returns: |
| 56 | string contain all of the audit messages returned by ausearch. |
| 57 | """ |
| 58 | import subprocess |
| 59 | output = subprocess.Popen(["/sbin/ausearch", "-m", "AVC,USER_AVC,MAC_POLICY_LOAD,DAEMON_START,SELINUX_ERR"], |
| 60 | stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0] |
| 61 | if util.PY3: |
| 62 | output = util.decode_input(output) |
| 63 | return output |
| 64 | |
| 65 | def get_dmesg_msgs(): |
| 66 | """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from /bin/dmesg. |
| 67 | |
| 68 | Returns: |
| 69 | string contain all of the audit messages returned by dmesg. |
| 70 | """ |
| 71 | import subprocess |
| 72 | output = subprocess.Popen(["/bin/dmesg"], |
| 73 | stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0] |
| 74 | if util.PY3: |
| 75 | output = util.decode_input(output) |
| 76 | return output |
| 77 | |
| 78 | # Classes representing audit messages |
| 79 | |
| 80 | class AuditMessage: |
| 81 | """Base class for all objects representing audit messages. |
| 82 | |
| 83 | AuditMessage is a base class for all audit messages and only |
| 84 | provides storage for the raw message (as a string) and a |
| 85 | parsing function that does nothing. |
| 86 | """ |
| 87 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 88 | self.message = message |
| 89 | self.header = "" |
| 90 | |
| 91 | def from_split_string(self, recs): |
| 92 | """Parse a string that has been split into records by space into |
| 93 | an audit message. |
| 94 | |
| 95 | This method should be overridden by subclasses. Error reporting |
| 96 | should be done by raise ValueError exceptions. |
| 97 | """ |
| 98 | for msg in recs: |
| 99 | fields = msg.split("=") |
| 100 | if len(fields) != 2: |
| 101 | if msg[:6] == "audit(": |
| 102 | self.header = msg |
| 103 | return |
| 104 | else: |
| 105 | continue |
| 106 | |
| 107 | if fields[0] == "msg": |
| 108 | self.header = fields[1] |
| 109 | return |
| 110 | |
| 111 | |
| 112 | class InvalidMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 113 | """Class representing invalid audit messages. This is used to differentiate |
| 114 | between audit messages that aren't recognized (that should return None from |
| 115 | the audit message parser) and a message that is recognized but is malformed |
| 116 | in some way. |
| 117 | """ |
| 118 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 119 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 120 | |
| 121 | class PathMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 122 | """Class representing a path message""" |
| 123 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 124 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 125 | self.path = "" |
| 126 | |
| 127 | def from_split_string(self, recs): |
| 128 | AuditMessage.from_split_string(self, recs) |
| 129 | |
| 130 | for msg in recs: |
| 131 | fields = msg.split("=") |
| 132 | if len(fields) != 2: |
| 133 | continue |
| 134 | if fields[0] == "path": |
| 135 | self.path = fields[1][1:-1] |
| 136 | return |
| 137 | import selinux.audit2why as audit2why |
| 138 | |
| 139 | avcdict = {} |
| 140 | |
| 141 | class AVCMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 142 | """AVC message representing an access denial or granted message. |
| 143 | |
| 144 | This is a very basic class and does not represent all possible fields |
| 145 | in an avc message. Currently the fields are: |
| 146 | scontext - context for the source (process) that generated the message |
| 147 | tcontext - context for the target |
| 148 | tclass - object class for the target (only one) |
| 149 | comm - the process name |
| 150 | exe - the on-disc binary |
| 151 | path - the path of the target |
| 152 | access - list of accesses that were allowed or denied |
| 153 | denial - boolean indicating whether this was a denial (True) or granted |
| 154 | (False) message. |
| 155 | |
| 156 | An example audit message generated from the audit daemon looks like (line breaks |
| 157 | added): |
| 158 | 'type=AVC msg=audit(1155568085.407:10877): avc: denied { search } for |
| 159 | pid=677 comm="python" name="modules" dev=dm-0 ino=13716388 |
| 160 | scontext=user_u:system_r:setroubleshootd_t:s0 |
| 161 | tcontext=system_u:object_r:modules_object_t:s0 tclass=dir' |
| 162 | |
| 163 | An example audit message stored in syslog (not processed by the audit daemon - line |
| 164 | breaks added): |
| 165 | 'Sep 12 08:26:43 dhcp83-5 kernel: audit(1158064002.046:4): avc: denied { read } |
| 166 | for pid=2 496 comm="bluez-pin" name=".gdm1K3IFT" dev=dm-0 ino=3601333 |
| 167 | scontext=user_u:system_r:bluetooth_helper_t:s0-s0:c0 |
| 168 | tcontext=system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t:s0 tclass=file |
| 169 | """ |
| 170 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 171 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 172 | self.scontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext() |
| 173 | self.tcontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext() |
| 174 | self.tclass = "" |
| 175 | self.comm = "" |
| 176 | self.exe = "" |
| 177 | self.path = "" |
| 178 | self.name = "" |
| 179 | self.accesses = [] |
| 180 | self.denial = True |
| 181 | self.type = audit2why.TERULE |
| 182 | |
| 183 | def __parse_access(self, recs, start): |
| 184 | # This is kind of sucky - the access that is in a space separated |
| 185 | # list like '{ read write }'. This doesn't fit particularly well with splitting |
| 186 | # the string on spaces. This function takes the list of recs and a starting |
| 187 | # position one beyond the open brace. It then adds the accesses until it finds |
| 188 | # the close brace or the end of the list (which is an error if reached without |
| 189 | # seeing a close brace). |
| 190 | found_close = False |
| 191 | i = start |
| 192 | if i == (len(recs) - 1): |
| 193 | raise ValueError("AVC message in invalid format [%s]\n" % self.message) |
| 194 | while i < len(recs): |
| 195 | if recs[i] == "}": |
| 196 | found_close = True |
| 197 | break |
| 198 | self.accesses.append(recs[i]) |
| 199 | i = i + 1 |
| 200 | if not found_close: |
| 201 | raise ValueError("AVC message in invalid format [%s]\n" % self.message) |
| 202 | return i + 1 |
| 203 | |
| 204 | |
| 205 | def from_split_string(self, recs): |
| 206 | AuditMessage.from_split_string(self, recs) |
| 207 | # FUTURE - fully parse avc messages and store all possible fields |
| 208 | # Required fields |
| 209 | found_src = False |
| 210 | found_tgt = False |
| 211 | found_class = False |
| 212 | found_access = False |
| 213 | |
| 214 | for i in range(len(recs)): |
| 215 | if recs[i] == "{": |
| 216 | i = self.__parse_access(recs, i + 1) |
| 217 | found_access = True |
| 218 | continue |
| 219 | elif recs[i] == "granted": |
| 220 | self.denial = False |
| 221 | |
| 222 | fields = recs[i].split("=") |
| 223 | if len(fields) != 2: |
| 224 | continue |
| 225 | if fields[0] == "scontext": |
| 226 | self.scontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext(fields[1]) |
| 227 | found_src = True |
| 228 | elif fields[0] == "tcontext": |
| 229 | self.tcontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext(fields[1]) |
| 230 | found_tgt = True |
| 231 | elif fields[0] == "tclass": |
| 232 | self.tclass = fields[1] |
| 233 | found_class = True |
| 234 | elif fields[0] == "comm": |
| 235 | self.comm = fields[1][1:-1] |
| 236 | elif fields[0] == "exe": |
| 237 | self.exe = fields[1][1:-1] |
| 238 | elif fields[0] == "name": |
| 239 | self.name = fields[1][1:-1] |
| 240 | |
| 241 | if not found_src or not found_tgt or not found_class or not found_access: |
| 242 | raise ValueError("AVC message in invalid format [%s]\n" % self.message) |
| 243 | self.analyze() |
| 244 | |
| 245 | def analyze(self): |
| 246 | tcontext = self.tcontext.to_string() |
| 247 | scontext = self.scontext.to_string() |
| 248 | access_tuple = tuple( self.accesses) |
| 249 | self.data = [] |
| 250 | |
| 251 | if (scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple) in avcdict.keys(): |
| 252 | self.type, self.data = avcdict[(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple)] |
| 253 | else: |
| 254 | self.type, self.data = audit2why.analyze(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, self.accesses); |
| 255 | if self.type == audit2why.NOPOLICY: |
| 256 | self.type = audit2why.TERULE |
| 257 | if self.type == audit2why.BADTCON: |
| 258 | raise ValueError("Invalid Target Context %s\n" % tcontext) |
| 259 | if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON: |
| 260 | raise ValueError("Invalid Source Context %s\n" % scontext) |
| 261 | if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON: |
| 262 | raise ValueError("Invalid Type Class %s\n" % self.tclass) |
| 263 | if self.type == audit2why.BADPERM: |
| 264 | raise ValueError("Invalid permission %s\n" % " ".join(self.accesses)) |
| 265 | if self.type == audit2why.BADCOMPUTE: |
| 266 | raise ValueError("Error during access vector computation") |
| 267 | |
| 268 | if self.type == audit2why.CONSTRAINT: |
| 269 | self.data = [ self.data ] |
| 270 | if self.scontext.user != self.tcontext.user: |
| 271 | self.data.append(("user (%s)" % self.scontext.user, 'user (%s)' % self.tcontext.user)) |
| 272 | if self.scontext.role != self.tcontext.role and self.tcontext.role != "object_r": |
| 273 | self.data.append(("role (%s)" % self.scontext.role, 'role (%s)' % self.tcontext.role)) |
| 274 | if self.scontext.level != self.tcontext.level: |
| 275 | self.data.append(("level (%s)" % self.scontext.level, 'level (%s)' % self.tcontext.level)) |
| 276 | |
| 277 | avcdict[(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple)] = (self.type, self.data) |
| 278 | |
| 279 | class PolicyLoadMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 280 | """Audit message indicating that the policy was reloaded.""" |
| 281 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 282 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 283 | |
| 284 | class DaemonStartMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 285 | """Audit message indicating that a daemon was started.""" |
| 286 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 287 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 288 | self.auditd = False |
| 289 | |
| 290 | def from_split_string(self, recs): |
| 291 | AuditMessage.from_split_string(self, recs) |
| 292 | if "auditd" in recs: |
| 293 | self.auditd = True |
| 294 | |
| 295 | |
| 296 | class ComputeSidMessage(AuditMessage): |
| 297 | """Audit message indicating that a sid was not valid. |
| 298 | |
| 299 | Compute sid messages are generated on attempting to create a security |
| 300 | context that is not valid. Security contexts are invalid if the role is |
| 301 | not authorized for the user or the type is not authorized for the role. |
| 302 | |
| 303 | This class does not store all of the fields from the compute sid message - |
| 304 | just the type and role. |
| 305 | """ |
| 306 | def __init__(self, message): |
| 307 | AuditMessage.__init__(self, message) |
| 308 | self.invalid_context = refpolicy.SecurityContext() |
| 309 | self.scontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext() |
| 310 | self.tcontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext() |
| 311 | self.tclass = "" |
| 312 | |
| 313 | def from_split_string(self, recs): |
| 314 | AuditMessage.from_split_string(self, recs) |
| 315 | if len(recs) < 10: |
| 316 | raise ValueError("Split string does not represent a valid compute sid message") |
| 317 | |
| 318 | try: |
| 319 | self.invalid_context = refpolicy.SecurityContext(recs[5]) |
| 320 | self.scontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext(recs[7].split("=")[1]) |
| 321 | self.tcontext = refpolicy.SecurityContext(recs[8].split("=")[1]) |
| 322 | self.tclass = recs[9].split("=")[1] |
| 323 | except: |
| 324 | raise ValueError("Split string does not represent a valid compute sid message") |
| 325 | def output(self): |
| 326 | return "role %s types %s;\n" % (self.role, self.type) |
| 327 | |
| 328 | # Parser for audit messages |
| 329 | |
| 330 | class AuditParser: |
| 331 | """Parser for audit messages. |
| 332 | |
| 333 | This class parses audit messages and stores them according to their message |
| 334 | type. This is not a general purpose audit message parser - it only extracts |
| 335 | selinux related messages. |
| 336 | |
| 337 | Each audit messages are stored in one of four lists: |
| 338 | avc_msgs - avc denial or granted messages. Messages are stored in |
| 339 | AVCMessage objects. |
| 340 | comput_sid_messages - invalid sid messages. Messages are stored in |
| 341 | ComputSidMessage objects. |
| 342 | invalid_msgs - selinux related messages that are not valid. Messages |
| 343 | are stored in InvalidMessageObjects. |
| 344 | policy_load_messages - policy load messages. Messages are stored in |
| 345 | PolicyLoadMessage objects. |
| 346 | |
| 347 | These lists will be reset when a policy load message is seen if |
| 348 | AuditParser.last_load_only is set to true. It is assumed that messages |
| 349 | are fed to the parser in chronological order - time stamps are not |
| 350 | parsed. |
| 351 | """ |
| 352 | def __init__(self, last_load_only=False): |
| 353 | self.__initialize() |
| 354 | self.last_load_only = last_load_only |
| 355 | |
| 356 | def __initialize(self): |
| 357 | self.avc_msgs = [] |
| 358 | self.compute_sid_msgs = [] |
| 359 | self.invalid_msgs = [] |
| 360 | self.policy_load_msgs = [] |
| 361 | self.path_msgs = [] |
| 362 | self.by_header = { } |
| 363 | self.check_input_file = False |
| 364 | |
| 365 | # Low-level parsing function - tries to determine if this audit |
| 366 | # message is an SELinux related message and then parses it into |
| 367 | # the appropriate AuditMessage subclass. This function deliberately |
| 368 | # does not impose policy (e.g., on policy load message) or store |
| 369 | # messages to make as simple and reusable as possible. |
| 370 | # |
| 371 | # Return values: |
| 372 | # None - no recognized audit message found in this line |
| 373 | # |
| 374 | # InvalidMessage - a recognized but invalid message was found. |
| 375 | # |
| 376 | # AuditMessage (or subclass) - object representing a parsed |
| 377 | # and valid audit message. |
| 378 | def __parse_line(self, line): |
| 379 | rec = line.split() |
| 380 | for i in rec: |
| 381 | found = False |
| 382 | if i == "avc:" or i == "message=avc:" or i == "msg='avc:": |
| 383 | msg = AVCMessage(line) |
| 384 | found = True |
| 385 | elif i == "security_compute_sid:": |
| 386 | msg = ComputeSidMessage(line) |
| 387 | found = True |
| 388 | elif i == "type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD" or i == "type=1403": |
| 389 | msg = PolicyLoadMessage(line) |
| 390 | found = True |
| 391 | elif i == "type=AVC_PATH": |
| 392 | msg = PathMessage(line) |
| 393 | found = True |
| 394 | elif i == "type=DAEMON_START": |
| 395 | msg = DaemonStartMessage(list) |
| 396 | found = True |
| 397 | |
| 398 | if found: |
| 399 | self.check_input_file = True |
| 400 | try: |
| 401 | msg.from_split_string(rec) |
| 402 | except ValueError: |
| 403 | msg = InvalidMessage(line) |
| 404 | return msg |
| 405 | return None |
| 406 | |
| 407 | # Higher-level parse function - take a line, parse it into an |
| 408 | # AuditMessage object, and store it in the appropriate list. |
| 409 | # This function will optionally reset all of the lists when |
| 410 | # it sees a load policy message depending on the value of |
| 411 | # self.last_load_only. |
| 412 | def __parse(self, line): |
| 413 | msg = self.__parse_line(line) |
| 414 | if msg is None: |
| 415 | return |
| 416 | |
| 417 | # Append to the correct list |
| 418 | if isinstance(msg, PolicyLoadMessage): |
| 419 | if self.last_load_only: |
| 420 | self.__initialize() |
| 421 | elif isinstance(msg, DaemonStartMessage): |
| 422 | # We initialize every time the auditd is started. This |
| 423 | # is less than ideal, but unfortunately it is the only |
| 424 | # way to catch reboots since the initial policy load |
| 425 | # by init is not stored in the audit log. |
| 426 | if msg.auditd and self.last_load_only: |
| 427 | self.__initialize() |
| 428 | self.policy_load_msgs.append(msg) |
| 429 | elif isinstance(msg, AVCMessage): |
| 430 | self.avc_msgs.append(msg) |
| 431 | elif isinstance(msg, ComputeSidMessage): |
| 432 | self.compute_sid_msgs.append(msg) |
| 433 | elif isinstance(msg, InvalidMessage): |
| 434 | self.invalid_msgs.append(msg) |
| 435 | elif isinstance(msg, PathMessage): |
| 436 | self.path_msgs.append(msg) |
| 437 | |
| 438 | # Group by audit header |
| 439 | if msg.header != "": |
| 440 | if msg.header in self.by_header: |
| 441 | self.by_header[msg.header].append(msg) |
| 442 | else: |
| 443 | self.by_header[msg.header] = [msg] |
| 444 | |
| 445 | |
| 446 | # Post processing will add additional information from AVC messages |
| 447 | # from related messages - only works on messages generated by |
| 448 | # the audit system. |
| 449 | def __post_process(self): |
| 450 | for value in self.by_header.values(): |
| 451 | avc = [] |
| 452 | path = None |
| 453 | for msg in value: |
| 454 | if isinstance(msg, PathMessage): |
| 455 | path = msg |
| 456 | elif isinstance(msg, AVCMessage): |
| 457 | avc.append(msg) |
| 458 | if len(avc) > 0 and path: |
| 459 | for a in avc: |
| 460 | a.path = path.path |
| 461 | |
| 462 | def parse_file(self, input): |
| 463 | """Parse the contents of a file object. This method can be called |
| 464 | multiple times (along with parse_string).""" |
| 465 | line = input.readline() |
| 466 | while line: |
| 467 | self.__parse(line) |
| 468 | line = input.readline() |
| 469 | if not self.check_input_file: |
| 470 | sys.stderr.write("Nothing to do\n") |
| 471 | sys.exit(0) |
| 472 | self.__post_process() |
| 473 | |
| 474 | def parse_string(self, input): |
| 475 | """Parse a string containing audit messages - messages should |
| 476 | be separated by new lines. This method can be called multiple |
| 477 | times (along with parse_file).""" |
| 478 | lines = input.split('\n') |
| 479 | for l in lines: |
| 480 | self.__parse(l) |
| 481 | self.__post_process() |
| 482 | |
| 483 | def to_role(self, role_filter=None): |
| 484 | """Return RoleAllowSet statements matching the specified filter |
| 485 | |
| 486 | Filter out types that match the filer, or all roles |
| 487 | |
| 488 | Params: |
| 489 | role_filter - [optional] Filter object used to filter the |
| 490 | output. |
| 491 | Returns: |
| 492 | Access vector set representing the denied access in the |
| 493 | audit logs parsed by this object. |
| 494 | """ |
| 495 | role_types = access.RoleTypeSet() |
| 496 | for cs in self.compute_sid_msgs: |
| 497 | if not role_filter or role_filter.filter(cs): |
| 498 | role_types.add(cs.invalid_context.role, cs.invalid_context.type) |
| 499 | |
| 500 | return role_types |
| 501 | |
| 502 | def to_access(self, avc_filter=None, only_denials=True): |
| 503 | """Convert the audit logs access into a an access vector set. |
| 504 | |
| 505 | Convert the audit logs into an access vector set, optionally |
| 506 | filtering the restults with the passed in filter object. |
| 507 | |
| 508 | Filter objects are object instances with a .filter method |
| 509 | that takes and access vector and returns True if the message |
| 510 | should be included in the final output and False otherwise. |
| 511 | |
| 512 | Params: |
| 513 | avc_filter - [optional] Filter object used to filter the |
| 514 | output. |
| 515 | Returns: |
| 516 | Access vector set representing the denied access in the |
| 517 | audit logs parsed by this object. |
| 518 | """ |
| 519 | av_set = access.AccessVectorSet() |
| 520 | for avc in self.avc_msgs: |
| 521 | if avc.denial != True and only_denials: |
| 522 | continue |
| 523 | if avc_filter: |
| 524 | if avc_filter.filter(avc): |
| 525 | av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass, |
| 526 | avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, data=avc.data) |
| 527 | else: |
| 528 | av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass, |
| 529 | avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, data=avc.data) |
| 530 | return av_set |
| 531 | |
| 532 | class AVCTypeFilter: |
| 533 | def __init__(self, regex): |
| 534 | self.regex = re.compile(regex) |
| 535 | |
| 536 | def filter(self, avc): |
| 537 | if self.regex.match(avc.scontext.type): |
| 538 | return True |
| 539 | if self.regex.match(avc.tcontext.type): |
| 540 | return True |
| 541 | return False |
| 542 | |
| 543 | class ComputeSidTypeFilter: |
| 544 | def __init__(self, regex): |
| 545 | self.regex = re.compile(regex) |
| 546 | |
| 547 | def filter(self, avc): |
| 548 | if self.regex.match(avc.invalid_context.type): |
| 549 | return True |
| 550 | if self.regex.match(avc.scontext.type): |
| 551 | return True |
| 552 | if self.regex.match(avc.tcontext.type): |
| 553 | return True |
| 554 | return False |
| 555 | |
| 556 | |