| /****************************************************************************** |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2003-2012 Broadcom Corporation |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at: |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| * |
| ******************************************************************************/ |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include "bt_target.h" |
| #include "bt_utils.h" |
| #include "btm_int.h" |
| #include "l2c_api.h" |
| #include "smp_int.h" |
| |
| #if SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE |
| const UINT8 smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = |
| { |
| /* initiator */ |
| {{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* Display Only */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* keyboard only */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},/* No Input No Output */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}}, /* keyboard display */ |
| /* responder */ |
| {{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* Display Only */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* keyboard only */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY},/* No Input No Output */ |
| {SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}} /* keyboard display */ |
| /* display only */ /*SMP_CAP_IO = 1 */ /* keyboard only */ /* No InputOutput */ /* keyboard display */ |
| }; |
| |
| #define SMP_KEY_DIST_TYPE_MAX 4 |
| const tSMP_ACT smp_distribute_act [] = |
| { |
| smp_generate_ltk, |
| smp_send_id_info, |
| smp_generate_csrk, |
| smp_set_derive_link_key |
| }; |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_update_key_mask |
| ** Description This function updates the key mask for sending or receiving. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| static void smp_update_key_mask (tSMP_CB *p_cb, UINT8 key_type, BOOLEAN recv) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s before update role=%d recv=%d local_i_key = %02x, local_r_key = %02x", |
| __func__, p_cb->role, recv, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| if (((p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) || |
| (p_cb->smp_over_br)) && |
| ((key_type == SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC) || (key_type == SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK))) |
| { |
| /* in LE SC mode LTK, CSRK and BR/EDR LK are derived locally instead of |
| ** being exchanged with the peer */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type; |
| } |
| else |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| if (recv) |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type; |
| else |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (recv) |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~key_type; |
| else |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~key_type; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("updated local_i_key = %02x, local_r_key = %02x", p_cb->local_i_key, |
| p_cb->local_r_key); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_app_cback |
| ** Description notifies application about the events the application is interested in |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tSMP_EVT_DATA cb_data; |
| tSMP_STATUS callback_rc; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->cb_evt=%d", __func__, p_cb->cb_evt); |
| if (p_cb->p_callback && p_cb->cb_evt != 0) |
| { |
| switch (p_cb->cb_evt) |
| { |
| case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT: |
| cb_data.io_req.auth_req = p_cb->peer_auth_req; |
| cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE; |
| cb_data.io_req.io_cap = SMP_DEFAULT_IO_CAPS; |
| cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
| cb_data.io_req.init_keys = p_cb->local_i_key ; |
| cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = p_cb->local_r_key ; |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "io_cap = %d",cb_data.io_req.io_cap); |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_NC_REQ_EVT: |
| cb_data.passkey = p_data->passkey; |
| break; |
| case SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT: |
| cb_data.req_oob_type = p_data->req_oob_type; |
| break; |
| case SMP_SC_LOC_OOB_DATA_UP_EVT: |
| cb_data.loc_oob_data = p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data; |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT: |
| cb_data.io_req.auth_req = 0; |
| cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE; |
| cb_data.io_req.io_cap = 0; |
| cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
| cb_data.io_req.init_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY; |
| cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY; |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| callback_rc = (*p_cb->p_callback)(p_cb->cb_evt, p_cb->pairing_bda, &cb_data); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("callback_rc=%d p_cb->cb_evt=%d",callback_rc, p_cb->cb_evt ); |
| |
| if (callback_rc == SMP_SUCCESS) |
| { |
| switch (p_cb->cb_evt) |
| { |
| case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT: |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req = cb_data.io_req.auth_req; |
| p_cb->local_io_capability = cb_data.io_req.io_cap; |
| p_cb->loc_oob_flag = cb_data.io_req.oob_data; |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size; |
| p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys; |
| |
| if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("Non bonding: No keys will be exchanged"); |
| p_cb->local_i_key = 0; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = 0; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "rcvd auth_req: 0x%02x, io_cap: %d \ |
| loc_oob_flag: %d loc_enc_size: %d," |
| "local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x", |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_io_capability, p_cb->loc_oob_flag, |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = |
| (btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? TRUE : FALSE; |
| |
| if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required) |
| { |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) |
| { |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req &= ~SMP_KP_SUPPORT_BIT; |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING("set auth_req: 0x%02x, local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x", |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_IO_RSP_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT: |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size; |
| p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys; |
| |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ( "for SMP over BR max_key_size: 0x%02x,\ |
| local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x", |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_KEYS_RSP_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!p_cb->cb_evt && p_cb->discard_sec_req) |
| { |
| p_cb->discard_sec_req = FALSE; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_DISCARD_SEC_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s return", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_pair_fail |
| ** Description pairing failure to peer device if needed. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| p_cb->failure = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status, p_cb->failure); |
| |
| if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC && p_cb->status != SMP_SUCCESS) |
| { |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED, p_cb); |
| p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_pair_req |
| ** Description actions related to sending pairing request |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_pair_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda); |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| /* erase all keys when master sends pairing req*/ |
| if (p_dev_rec) |
| btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec); |
| /* do not manipulate the key, let app decide, |
| leave out to BTM to mandate key distribution for bonding case */ |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_REQ, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_pair_rsp |
| ** Description actions related to sending pairing response |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_pair_rsp(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| |
| if (smp_send_cmd (SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_RSP, p_cb)) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB) |
| smp_use_oob_private_key(p_cb, NULL); |
| else |
| smp_decide_association_model(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_confirm |
| ** Description send confirmation to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_confirm(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_init |
| ** Description process pairing initializer to slave device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_INIT, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_rand |
| ** Description send pairing random to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_rand(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_RAND, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_pair_public_key |
| ** Description send pairing public key command to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_pair_public_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function SMP_SEND_COMMITMENT |
| ** Description send commitment command to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_dhkey_check |
| ** Description send DHKey Check command to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_keypress_notification |
| ** Description send Keypress Notification command to the peer |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| p_cb->local_keypress_notification = *(UINT8 *) p_data; |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_enc_info |
| ** Description send encryption information command. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_enc_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_LE_LENC_KEYS le_key; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->loc_enc_size = %d", __func__, p_cb->loc_enc_size); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE); |
| |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO, p_cb); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_MASTER_ID, p_cb); |
| |
| /* save the DIV and key size information when acting as slave device */ |
| memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| le_key.div = p_cb->div; |
| le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size; |
| le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; |
| |
| if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LENC, |
| (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("%s", __func__); |
| |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_id_info |
| ** Description send ID information command. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_id_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE le_key; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, FALSE); |
| |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO, p_cb); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR, p_cb); |
| |
| if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LID, |
| &le_key, TRUE); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("%s", __func__); |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_csrk_info |
| ** Description send CSRK command. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_csrk_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_LE_LCSRK_KEYS key; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK, FALSE); |
| |
| if (smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_SIGN_INFO, p_cb)) |
| { |
| key.div = p_cb->div; |
| key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; |
| key.counter = 0; /* initialize the local counter */ |
| memcpy (key.csrk, p_cb->csrk, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LCSRK, (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&key, TRUE); |
| } |
| |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_send_ltk_reply |
| ** Description send LTK reply |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_send_ltk_reply(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| /* send stk as LTK response */ |
| btm_ble_ltk_request_reply(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE, p_data->key.p_data); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_sec_req |
| ** Description process security request. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ *)p_data; |
| tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act; |
| UINT8 reason; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s auth_req=0x%x", __func__, auth_req); |
| |
| p_cb->cb_evt = 0; |
| |
| btm_ble_link_sec_check(p_cb->pairing_bda, auth_req, &sec_req_act); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s sec_req_act=0x%x", __func__, sec_req_act); |
| |
| switch (sec_req_act) |
| { |
| case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT: |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT", __func__); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| |
| case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_PAIR: |
| p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = |
| (btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? TRUE : FALSE; |
| |
| /* respond to non SC pairing request as failure in SC only mode */ |
| if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required && |
| (auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) == 0) |
| { |
| reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* initialize local i/r key to be default keys */ |
| p_cb->peer_auth_req = auth_req; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->local_i_key = SMP_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY ; |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SEC_REQUEST_EVT; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_DISCARD: |
| p_cb->discard_sec_req = TRUE; |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| /* do nothing */ |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_sec_grant |
| ** Description process security grant. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_sec_grant(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 res= *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (res != SMP_SUCCESS) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, p_data); |
| } |
| else /*otherwise, start pairing */ |
| { |
| /* send IO request callback */ |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_pair_fail |
| ** Description process pairing failure from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_pair_fail(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_pair_cmd |
| ** Description Process the SMP pairing request/response from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
| tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| /* erase all keys if it is slave proc pairing req*/ |
| if (p_dev_rec && (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)) |
| btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec); |
| |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR; |
| |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_enc_size, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_i_key, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_r_key, p); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| if (!(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)) |
| { |
| /* peer (master) started pairing sending Pairing Request */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SEC_REQUEST_EVT; |
| } |
| else /* update local i/r key according to pairing request */ |
| { |
| /* paring started with this side (slave) sending Security Request */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb); |
| |
| if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB) |
| { |
| if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| smp_send_pair_rsp(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| else /* Master receives pairing response */ |
| { |
| p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb); |
| |
| if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required && |
| (!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) || |
| (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS))) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Master requires secure connection only mode \ |
| but it can't be provided -> Master fails pairing"); |
| reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB) |
| { |
| if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| smp_decide_association_model(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_confirm |
| ** Description process pairing confirm from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_confirm(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != NULL) |
| { |
| /* save the SConfirm for comparison later */ |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rconfirm, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_init |
| ** Description process pairing initializer from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* save the SRand for comparison */ |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_rand |
| ** Description process pairing random (nonce) from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_rand(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* save the SRand for comparison */ |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_pairing_public_key |
| ** Description process pairing public key command from the peer device |
| ** - saves the peer public key; |
| ** - sets the flag indicating that the peer public key is received; |
| ** - calls smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(...). |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_pairing_public_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.y, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_PUBL_KEY; |
| |
| smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_pairing_commitment |
| ** Description process pairing commitment from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_pairing_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM; |
| |
| if (p != NULL) |
| { |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_commitment, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_dhkey_check |
| ** Description process DHKey Check from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_dhkey_check(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != NULL) |
| { |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_keypress_notification |
| ** Description process pairing keypress notification from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_keypress_notification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != NULL) |
| { |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| p_cb->peer_keypress_notification = BTM_SP_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE; |
| } |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PEER_KEYPR_NOT_EVT; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_process_pairing_command |
| ** Description Process the SMP pairing request/response from peer device via |
| ** BR/EDR transport. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_process_pairing_command(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
| tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda); |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| /* rejecting BR pairing request over non-SC BR link */ |
| if (!p_dev_rec->new_encryption_key_is_p256 && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| reason = SMP_XTRANS_DERIVE_NOT_ALLOW; |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* erase all keys if it is slave proc pairing req*/ |
| if (p_dev_rec && (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)) |
| btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec); |
| |
| p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR; |
| |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_enc_size, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_i_key, p); |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_r_key, p); |
| |
| if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) |
| { |
| reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* peer (master) started pairing sending Pairing Request */ |
| /* or being master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| p_dev_rec->new_encryption_key_is_p256 = FALSE; |
| /* shortcut to skip Security Grant step */ |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT; |
| } |
| else /* Master receives pairing response */ |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s master rcvs valid PAIRING RESPONSE." |
| " Supposed to move to key distribution phase. ", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| /* auth_req received via BR/EDR SM channel is set to 0, |
| but everything derived/exchanged has to be saved */ |
| p_cb->peer_auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_BOND; |
| p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_BOND; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_process_security_grant |
| ** Description process security grant in case of pairing over BR/EDR transport. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_process_security_grant(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 res= *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (res != SMP_SUCCESS) |
| { |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, p_data); |
| } |
| else /*otherwise, start pairing */ |
| { |
| /* send IO request callback */ |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_check_authorization_request |
| ** Description sets the SMP kes to be derived/distribute over BR/EDR transport |
| ** before starting the distribution/derivation |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_check_authorization_request(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " |
| "(i-initiator r-responder)", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->local_i_key, |
| p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| /* In LE SC mode LK field is ignored when BR/EDR transport is used */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| |
| /* In LE SC mode only IRK, IAI, CSRK are exchanged with the peer. |
| ** Set local_r_key on master to expect only these keys. */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= (SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID | SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK); |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " |
| "(i-initiator r-responder)", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->local_i_key, |
| p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) || |
| (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) &&*/ |
| (p_cb->local_i_key || p_cb->local_r_key)) |
| { |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_BOND_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| |
| /* if no peer key is expected, start master key distribution */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER && p_cb->local_r_key == 0) |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_select_next_key |
| ** Description selects the next key to derive/send when BR/EDR transport is |
| ** used. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_select_next_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s role=%d (0-master) r_keys=0x%x i_keys=0x%x", |
| __func__, p_cb->role, p_cb->local_r_key, p_cb->local_i_key); |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE|| |
| (!p_cb->local_r_key && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)) |
| { |
| smp_key_pick_key(p_cb, p_data); |
| } |
| |
| if (!p_cb->local_i_key && !p_cb->local_r_key) |
| { |
| /* state check to prevent re-entrance */ |
| if (smp_get_br_state() == SMP_BR_STATE_BOND_PENDING) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) |
| smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| else |
| p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_enc_info |
| ** Description process encryption information from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_master_id |
| ** Description process master ID from slave device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, TRUE); |
| |
| STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p); |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN ); |
| |
| /* store the encryption keys from peer device */ |
| memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; |
| le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size; |
| |
| if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, |
| BTM_LE_KEY_PENC, |
| (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE); |
| |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_enc_info |
| ** Description process identity information from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| STREAM_TO_ARRAY (p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */ |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_id_addr |
| ** Description process identity address from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_id_addr(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; |
| tBTM_LE_PID_KEYS pid_key; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, TRUE); |
| |
| STREAM_TO_UINT8(pid_key.addr_type, p); |
| STREAM_TO_BDADDR(pid_key.static_addr, p); |
| memcpy(pid_key.irk, p_cb->tk, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| |
| /* to use as BD_ADDR for lk derived from ltk */ |
| p_cb->id_addr_rcvd = TRUE; |
| p_cb->id_addr_type = pid_key.addr_type; |
| memcpy(p_cb->id_addr, pid_key.static_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN); |
| |
| /* store the ID key from peer device */ |
| if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PID, |
| (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&pid_key, TRUE); |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_srk_info |
| ** Description process security information from peer device |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_srk_info(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_LE_PCSRK_KEYS le_key; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK, TRUE); |
| |
| /* save CSRK to security record */ |
| le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; |
| memcpy (le_key.csrk, p_data, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* get peer CSRK */ |
| le_key.counter = 0; /* initialize the peer counter */ |
| |
| if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) |
| btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, |
| BTM_LE_KEY_PCSRK, |
| (tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE *)&le_key, TRUE); |
| smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_compare |
| ** Description process compare value |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_compare(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (!memcmp(p_cb->rconfirm, p_data->key.p_data, BT_OCTET16_LEN)) |
| { |
| /* compare the max encryption key size, and save the smaller one for the link */ |
| if ( p_cb->peer_enc_size < p_cb->loc_enc_size) |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size; |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_RAND_EVT, NULL); |
| else |
| { |
| /* master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_sl_key |
| ** Description process key ready events. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_sl_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 key_type = p_data->key.key_type; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK) |
| { |
| smp_generate_srand_mrand_confirm(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| else if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_CFM) |
| { |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_CONFIRM); |
| |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_CONFIRM_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_start_enc |
| ** Description start encryption |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_start_enc(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tBTM_STATUS cmd; |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_FAIL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (p_data != NULL) |
| cmd = btm_ble_start_encrypt(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE, p_data->key.p_data); |
| else |
| cmd = btm_ble_start_encrypt(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE, NULL); |
| |
| if (cmd != BTM_CMD_STARTED && cmd != BTM_BUSY) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_proc_discard |
| ** Description processing for discard security request |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_proc_discard(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (!(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD)) |
| smp_reset_control_value(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_enc_cmpl |
| ** Description encryption success |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_enc_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_check_auth_req |
| ** Description check authentication request |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data; |
| UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " |
| "(i-initiator r-responder)", |
| __func__, enc_enable, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| if (enc_enable == 1) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) |
| { |
| /* In LE SC mode LTK is used instead of STK and has to be always saved */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key |= SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC; |
| p_cb->local_r_key |= SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC; |
| |
| /* In LE SC mode LK is derived from LTK only if both sides request it */ |
| if (!(p_cb->local_i_key & SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK) || |
| !(p_cb->local_r_key & SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK)) |
| { |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| } |
| |
| /* In LE SC mode only IRK, IAI, CSRK are exchanged with the peer. |
| ** Set local_r_key on master to expect only these keys. |
| */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= (SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID | SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* in legacy mode derivation of BR/EDR LK is not supported */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK; |
| } |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " |
| "(i-initiator r-responder)", |
| __func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key); |
| |
| if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) || |
| (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) &&*/ |
| (p_cb->local_i_key || p_cb->local_r_key)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BOND_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| else |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| else if (enc_enable == 0) |
| { |
| /* if failed for encryption after pairing, send callback */ |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| /* if enc failed for old security information */ |
| /* if master device, clean up and abck to idle; slave device do nothing */ |
| else if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_key_pick_key |
| ** Description Pick a key distribution function based on the key mask. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_key_pick_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 key_to_dist = (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) ? p_cb->local_r_key : p_cb->local_i_key; |
| UINT8 i = 0; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s key_to_dist=0x%x", __func__, key_to_dist); |
| while (i < SMP_KEY_DIST_TYPE_MAX) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("key to send = %02x, i = %d", key_to_dist, i); |
| |
| if (key_to_dist & (1 << i)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("smp_distribute_act[%d]", i); |
| (* smp_distribute_act[i])(p_cb, p_data); |
| break; |
| } |
| i ++; |
| } |
| } |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_key_distribution |
| ** Description start key distribution if required. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_key_distribution(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s role=%d (0-master) r_keys=0x%x i_keys=0x%x", |
| __func__, p_cb->role, p_cb->local_r_key, p_cb->local_i_key); |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE || |
| (!p_cb->local_r_key && p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)) |
| { |
| smp_key_pick_key(p_cb, p_data); |
| } |
| |
| if (!p_cb->local_i_key && !p_cb->local_r_key) |
| { |
| /* state check to prevent re-entrant */ |
| if (smp_get_state() == SMP_STATE_BOND_PENDING) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->derive_lk) |
| { |
| smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key(p_cb, NULL); |
| p_cb->derive_lk = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| else |
| p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_decide_association_model |
| ** Description This function is called to select assoc model to be used for |
| ** STK generation and to start STK generation process. |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_decide_association_model(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 failure = SMP_UNKNOWN_IO_CAP; |
| UINT8 int_evt = 0; |
| tSMP_KEY key; |
| tSMP_INT_DATA *p = NULL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Association Model = %d", __func__, p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| |
| switch (p_cb->selected_association_model) |
| { |
| case SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY: /* TK = 0, go calculate Confirm */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER && |
| ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) != 0) && |
| ((p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) == 0)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("IO capability does not meet authentication requirement"); |
| failure = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL; |
| p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure; |
| int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE; |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE) ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| |
| key.key_type = SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK; |
| key.p_data = p_cb->tk; |
| p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&key; |
| |
| memset(p_cb->tk, 0, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| /* TK, ready */ |
| int_evt = SMP_KEY_READY_EVT; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY: |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED; |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT; |
| int_evt = SMP_TK_REQ_EVT; |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_MODEL_OOB: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = SMP_MODEL_OOB"); |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED; |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_OOB_REQ_EVT; |
| int_evt = SMP_TK_REQ_EVT; |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF: |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Need to generate Passkey"); |
| |
| /* generate passkey and notify application */ |
| smp_generate_passkey(p_cb, NULL); |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB: |
| int_evt = SMP_PUBL_KEY_EXCH_REQ_EVT; |
| break; |
| |
| case SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE (failed)"); |
| p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure; |
| int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT; |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = %d (SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH THE CODE)", |
| p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| p = (tSMP_INT_DATA *)&failure; |
| int_evt = SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("sec_level=%d ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| if (int_evt) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, int_evt, p); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_io_response |
| ** Description process IO response for a slave device. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_io_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| uint8_t reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) |
| { |
| /* pairing started by local (slave) Security Request */ |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_SEC_REQ_PENDING); |
| smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ, p_cb); |
| } |
| else /* plan to send pairing respond */ |
| { |
| /* pairing started by peer (master) Pairing Request */ |
| p_cb->selected_association_model = smp_select_association_model(p_cb); |
| |
| if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required && |
| (!(p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) || |
| (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS))) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Slave requires secure connection only mode \ |
| but it can't be provided -> Slave fails pairing"); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB) |
| { |
| if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return; |
| } |
| smp_send_pair_rsp(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_process_slave_keys_response |
| ** Description process application keys response for a slave device |
| ** (BR/EDR transport). |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_process_slave_keys_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| smp_br_send_pair_response(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_send_pair_response |
| ** Description actions related to sending pairing response over BR/EDR transport. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_send_pair_response(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| p_cb->local_i_key &= p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key &= p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| |
| smp_send_cmd (SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_RSP, p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_pairing_cmpl |
| ** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback |
| ** and remove the connection if needed. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) |
| { |
| /* update connection parameter to remote preferred */ |
| L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE); |
| /* process the pairing complete */ |
| smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_pair_terminate |
| ** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback |
| ** and remove the connection if needed. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_pair_terminate(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| p_cb->status = SMP_CONN_TOUT; |
| smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_idle_terminate |
| ** Description This function calledin idle state to determine to send authentication |
| ** complete or not. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_idle_terminate(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Pairing terminated at IDLE state."); |
| p_cb->status = SMP_FAIL; |
| smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_fast_conn_param |
| ** Description apply default connection parameter for pairing process |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| /* disable connection parameter update */ |
| L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_both_have_public_keys |
| ** Description The function is called when both local and peer public keys are |
| ** saved. |
| ** Actions: |
| ** - invokes DHKey computation; |
| ** - on slave side invokes sending local public key to the peer. |
| ** - invokes SC phase 1 process. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_both_have_public_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__); |
| |
| /* invokes DHKey computation */ |
| smp_compute_dhkey(p_cb); |
| |
| /* on slave side invokes sending local public key to the peer */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| smp_send_pair_public_key(p_cb, NULL); |
| |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_DHKEY_CMPLT_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_start_secure_connection_phase1 |
| ** Description The function starts Secure Connection phase1 i.e. invokes initialization of Secure Connection |
| ** phase 1 parameters and starts building/sending to the peer |
| ** messages appropriate for the role and association model. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_start_secure_connection_phase1(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS) |
| { |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE; |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_UNAUTHENTICATE) ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| p_cb->sec_level = SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED; |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("p_cb->sec_level =%d (SMP_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) ", p_cb->sec_level ); |
| } |
| |
| switch(p_cb->selected_association_model) |
| { |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP: |
| memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb); |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT: |
| /* user has to provide passkey */ |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_PASSKEY_REQ_EVT; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP: |
| /* passkey has to be provided to user */ |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("Need to generate SC Passkey"); |
| smp_generate_passkey(p_cb, NULL); |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB: |
| /* use the available OOB information */ |
| smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data(p_cb, NULL); |
| break; |
| default: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC", |
| p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_local_nonce |
| ** Description The function processes new local nonce. |
| ** |
| ** Note It is supposed to be called in SC phase1. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_local_nonce(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| switch(p_cb->selected_association_model) |
| { |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP: |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| /* slave calculates and sends local commitment */ |
| smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb); |
| smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL); |
| /* slave has to wait for peer nonce */ |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE); |
| } |
| else /* i.e. master */ |
| { |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM) |
| { |
| /* slave commitment is already received, send local nonce, wait for remote nonce*/ |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("master in assoc mode = %d \ |
| already rcvd slave commitment - race condition", |
| p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM; |
| smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL); |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE); |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP: |
| smp_calculate_local_commitment(p_cb); |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| else /* slave */ |
| { |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM) |
| { |
| /* master commitment is already received */ |
| smp_send_commitment(p_cb, NULL); |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE); |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB: |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE); |
| break; |
| default: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC", |
| p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_peer_nonce |
| ** Description The function processes newly received and saved in CB peer nonce. |
| ** The actions depend on the selected association model and the role. |
| ** |
| ** Note It is supposed to be called in SC phase1. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_peer_nonce(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s start ", __func__); |
| |
| switch(p_cb->selected_association_model) |
| { |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP: |
| /* in these models only master receives commitment */ |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
| { |
| if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb)) |
| { |
| reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* slave sends local nonce */ |
| smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| if(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS) |
| { |
| /* go directly to phase 2 */ |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| else /* numeric comparison */ |
| { |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_CALC_NC_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT: |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP: |
| if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb)) |
| { |
| reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| if (++p_cb->round < 20) |
| { |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_SEC_CONN_PHS1_START); |
| p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM; |
| smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB: |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL); |
| break; |
| default: |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC", |
| p_cb->selected_association_model); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s end ",__FUNCTION__); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_match_dhkey_checks |
| ** Description checks if the calculated peer DHKey Check value is the same as |
| ** received from the peer DHKey check value. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_match_dhkey_checks(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_DHKEY_CHK_FAIL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (memcmp(p_data->key.p_data, p_cb->remote_dhkey_check, BT_OCTET16_LEN)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_WARNING ("dhkey chcks do no match"); |
| p_cb->failure = reason; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("dhkey chcks match"); |
| |
| /* compare the max encryption key size, and save the smaller one for the link */ |
| if (p_cb->peer_enc_size < p_cb->loc_enc_size) |
| p_cb->loc_enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size; |
| |
| if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHCK_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* master device always use received i/r key as keys to distribute */ |
| p_cb->local_i_key = p_cb->peer_i_key; |
| p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->peer_r_key; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_move_to_secure_connections_phase2 |
| ** Description Signal State Machine to start SC phase 2 initialization (to |
| ** compute local DHKey Check value). |
| ** |
| ** Note SM is supposed to be in the state SMP_STATE_SEC_CONN_PHS2_START. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_move_to_secure_connections_phase2(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_phase_2_dhkey_checks_are_present |
| ** Description generates event if dhkey check from the peer is already received. |
| ** |
| ** Note It is supposed to be used on slave to prevent race condition. |
| ** It is supposed to be called after slave dhkey check is calculated. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_phase_2_dhkey_checks_are_present(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__); |
| |
| if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_DHK_CHK) |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_2_DHCK_CHKS_PRES_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_wait_for_both_public_keys |
| ** Description generates SMP_BOTH_PUBL_KEYS_RCVD_EVT event when both local and master |
| ** public keys are available. |
| ** |
| ** Note on the slave it is used to prevent race condition. |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__func__); |
| |
| if ((p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_PUBL_KEY) && |
| (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_LOCAL_PUBL_KEY)) |
| { |
| if ((p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) && |
| ((p_cb->req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_LOCAL) || (p_cb->req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_BOTH))) |
| { |
| smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_PUBLIC_KEY_EXCH); |
| } |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BOTH_PUBL_KEYS_RCVD_EVT, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_start_passkey_verification |
| ** Description Starts SC passkey entry verification. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_start_passkey_verification(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| UINT8 *p = NULL; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| p = p_cb->local_random; |
| UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, p_data->passkey); |
| |
| p = p_cb->peer_random; |
| UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, p_data->passkey); |
| |
| p_cb->round = 0; |
| smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data |
| ** Description Processes local/peer SC OOB data received from somewhere. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_secure_connection_oob_data(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| tSMP_SC_OOB_DATA *p_sc_oob_data = &p_cb->sc_oob_data; |
| if (p_sc_oob_data->loc_oob_data.present) |
| { |
| memcpy(p_cb->local_random, p_sc_oob_data->loc_oob_data.randomizer, |
| sizeof(p_cb->local_random)); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("local OOB randomizer is absent"); |
| memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->local_random)); |
| } |
| |
| if (!p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.present) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("peer OOB data is absent"); |
| memset(p_cb->peer_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->peer_random)); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| memcpy(p_cb->peer_random, p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.randomizer, |
| sizeof(p_cb->peer_random)); |
| memcpy(p_cb->remote_commitment, p_sc_oob_data->peer_oob_data.commitment, |
| sizeof(p_cb->remote_commitment)); |
| |
| UINT8 reason = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR; |
| /* check commitment */ |
| if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb)) |
| { |
| p_cb->failure = reason; |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag != SMP_OOB_PRESENT) |
| { |
| /* the peer doesn't have local randomiser */ |
| SMP_TRACE_EVENT ("peer didn't receive local OOB data, set local randomizer to 0"); |
| memset(p_cb->local_random, 0, sizeof (p_cb->local_random)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| print128(p_cb->local_random, (const UINT8 *)"local OOB randomizer"); |
| print128(p_cb->peer_random, (const UINT8 *)"peer OOB randomizer"); |
| smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_set_local_oob_keys |
| ** Description Saves calculated private/public keys in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data, |
| ** starts nonce generation |
| ** (to be saved in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer). |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_set_local_oob_keys(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| memcpy(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.private_key_used, p_cb->private_key, |
| BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used = p_cb->loc_publ_key; |
| smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_set_local_oob_random_commitment |
| ** Description Saves calculated randomizer and commitment in sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data, |
| ** passes sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data up for safekeeping. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_set_local_oob_random_commitment(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| memcpy(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer, p_cb->rand, |
| BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| |
| smp_calculate_f4(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x, |
| p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x, |
| p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer, 0, |
| p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.commitment); |
| |
| #if SMP_DEBUG == TRUE |
| UINT8 *p_print = NULL; |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("local SC OOB data set:"); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.addr_sent_to; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"addr_sent_to", |
| sizeof(tBLE_BD_ADDR)); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.private_key_used; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"private_key_used", |
| BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.x; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"publ_key_used.x", |
| BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used.y; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"publ_key_used.y", |
| BT_OCTET32_LEN); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.randomizer; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print, (const UINT8 *)"randomizer", |
| BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| p_print = (UINT8*) &p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.commitment; |
| smp_debug_print_nbyte_little_endian (p_print,(const UINT8 *) "commitment", |
| BT_OCTET16_LEN); |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(""); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* pass created OOB data up */ |
| p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SC_LOC_OOB_DATA_UP_EVT; |
| smp_send_app_cback(p_cb, NULL); |
| |
| smp_cb_cleanup(p_cb); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_link_encrypted |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called when link is encrypted and notified to |
| ** slave device. Proceed to to send LTK, DIV and ER to master if |
| ** bonding the devices. |
| ** |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_link_encrypted(BD_ADDR bda, UINT8 encr_enable) |
| { |
| tSMP_CB *p_cb = &smp_cb; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable); |
| |
| if (memcmp(&smp_cb.pairing_bda[0], bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) |
| { |
| /* encryption completed with STK, remmeber the key size now, could be overwite |
| * when key exchange happens */ |
| if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable) |
| { |
| /* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */ |
| btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size); |
| } |
| |
| smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENCRYPTED_EVT, &encr_enable); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_proc_ltk_request |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called when LTK request is received from |
| ** controller. |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| BOOLEAN smp_proc_ltk_request(BD_ADDR bda) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s state = %d", __func__, smp_cb.state); |
| if ( smp_cb.state == SMP_STATE_ENCRYPTION_PENDING && |
| !memcmp(bda, smp_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN)) |
| { |
| smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL); |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_process_secure_connection_long_term_key |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called to process SC LTK. |
| ** SC LTK is calculated and used instead of STK. |
| ** Here SC LTK is saved in BLE DB. |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_process_secure_connection_long_term_key(void) |
| { |
| tSMP_CB *p_cb = &smp_cb; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(p_cb); |
| |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE); |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_set_derive_link_key |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called to set flag that indicates that |
| ** BR/EDR LK has to be derived from LTK after all keys are |
| ** distributed. |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_set_derive_link_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("%s", __func__); |
| p_cb->derive_lk = TRUE; |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK, FALSE); |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called to derive BR/EDR LK from LTK. |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_derive_link_key_from_long_term_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tSMP_STATUS status = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (!smp_calculate_link_key_from_long_term_key(p_cb)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("%s failed", __FUNCTION__); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** |
| ** Function smp_br_process_link_key |
| ** |
| ** Description This function is called to process BR/EDR LK: |
| ** - to derive SMP LTK from BR/EDR LK; |
| *8 - to save SMP LTK. |
| ** |
| ** Returns void |
| ** |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_process_link_key(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| tSMP_STATUS status = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN; |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (!smp_calculate_long_term_key_from_link_key(p_cb)) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_ERROR ("%s failed",__FUNCTION__); |
| smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: LTK derivation from LK successfully completed", __FUNCTION__); |
| smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(p_cb); |
| smp_update_key_mask (p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, FALSE); |
| smp_br_select_next_key(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_key_distribution_by_transport |
| ** Description depending on the transport used at the moment calls either |
| ** smp_key_distribution(...) or smp_br_key_distribution(...). |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_key_distribution_by_transport(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| if (p_cb->smp_over_br) |
| { |
| smp_br_select_next_key(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /******************************************************************************* |
| ** Function smp_br_pairing_complete |
| ** Description This function is called to send the pairing complete callback |
| ** and remove the connection if needed. |
| *******************************************************************************/ |
| void smp_br_pairing_complete(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) |
| { |
| SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); |
| |
| if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) |
| { |
| /* process the pairing complete */ |
| smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #endif |