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/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <cutils/uevent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
namespace {
// Returns the uid of root in the current user namespace.
// Returns AID_OVERFLOWUID if the root user is not mapped in the current
// namespace.
// Returns 0 if the kernel is not user namespace-aware (for backwards
// compatibility) or if AID_OVERFLOWUID could not be validated to match what the
// kernel would return.
uid_t GetRootUid() {
constexpr uid_t kParentRootUid = 0;
std::ifstream uid_map_file("/proc/self/uid_map");
if (!uid_map_file) {
// The kernel does not support user namespaces.
return kParentRootUid;
}
uid_t current_namespace_uid, parent_namespace_uid;
uint32_t length;
while (uid_map_file >> current_namespace_uid >> parent_namespace_uid >> length) {
// Since kParentRootUid is 0, it should be the first entry in the mapped
// range.
if (parent_namespace_uid != kParentRootUid || length < 1) continue;
return current_namespace_uid;
}
// Sanity check: verify that the overflow UID is the one to be returned by
// the kernel.
std::ifstream overflowuid_file("/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid");
if (!overflowuid_file) {
// It's better to return 0 in case we cannot make sure that the overflow
// UID matches.
return kParentRootUid;
}
uid_t kernel_overflow_uid;
if (!(overflowuid_file >> kernel_overflow_uid) || kernel_overflow_uid != AID_OVERFLOWUID)
return kParentRootUid;
// root is unmapped, use the kernel "overflow" uid.
return AID_OVERFLOWUID;
}
} // namespace
extern "C" {
/**
* Like recv(), but checks that messages actually originate from the kernel.
*/
ssize_t uevent_kernel_multicast_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length) {
uid_t uid = -1;
return uevent_kernel_multicast_uid_recv(socket, buffer, length, &uid);
}
/**
* Like the above, but passes a uid_t in by pointer. In the event that this
* fails due to a bad uid check, the uid_t will be set to the uid of the
* socket's peer.
*
* If this method rejects a netlink message from outside the kernel, it
* returns -1, sets errno to EIO, and sets "user" to the UID associated with the
* message. If the peer UID cannot be determined, "user" is set to -1."
*/
ssize_t uevent_kernel_multicast_uid_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length, uid_t* uid) {
return uevent_kernel_recv(socket, buffer, length, true, uid);
}
ssize_t uevent_kernel_recv(int socket, void* buffer, size_t length, bool require_group, uid_t* uid) {
static const uid_t root_uid = GetRootUid();
struct iovec iov = {buffer, length};
struct sockaddr_nl addr;
char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
struct msghdr hdr = {
&addr, sizeof(addr), &iov, 1, control, sizeof(control), 0,
};
struct ucred* cred;
*uid = -1;
ssize_t n = recvmsg(socket, &hdr, 0);
if (n <= 0) {
return n;
}
struct cmsghdr* cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&hdr);
if (cmsg == NULL || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDENTIALS) {
/* ignoring netlink message with no sender credentials */
goto out;
}
cred = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
*uid = cred->uid;
if (cred->uid != root_uid) {
/* ignoring netlink message from non-root user */
goto out;
}
if (addr.nl_pid != 0) {
/* ignore non-kernel */
goto out;
}
if (require_group && addr.nl_groups == 0) {
/* ignore unicast messages when requested */
goto out;
}
return n;
out:
/* clear residual potentially malicious data */
bzero(buffer, length);
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
int uevent_open_socket(int buf_sz, bool passcred) {
struct sockaddr_nl addr;
int on = passcred;
int s;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pid = getpid();
addr.nl_groups = 0xffffffff;
s = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT);
if (s < 0) return -1;
/* buf_sz should be less than net.core.rmem_max for this to succeed */
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &buf_sz, sizeof(buf_sz)) < 0) {
close(s);
return -1;
}
setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof(on));
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
close(s);
return -1;
}
return s;
}
} // extern "C"