Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 3ba6ef50..16f8693 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 106be0d..a3cd8ca 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
- if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
+ if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
size = dev->cfg_size;
} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
size = 128;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index 44f76e8..c77628a 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
goto next_msg;
}
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto next_msg;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 9252ee3..c602b8d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
- permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a63d13d..12d52de 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -380,7 +380,6 @@
struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
/*
@@ -544,9 +543,10 @@
extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 4030896..adadf71 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -358,10 +358,12 @@
#define current_security() (current_cred_xxx(security))
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define task_user_ns(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), user_ns))
#else
extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns)
+#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns)
+#define task_user_ns(task) (&init_user_ns)
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 800f113..a27e56c 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -127,8 +127,9 @@
struct task_struct *new_parent);
extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer);
-#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 1
-#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02
+#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0ccceb9..83c18e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
* as the default capabilities functions
*/
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@
struct seq_file;
extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
void reset_security_ops(void);
@@ -799,12 +798,6 @@
* @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
* Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
* is allowed to be transmitted.
- * @netlink_recv:
- * Check permission before processing the received netlink message in
- * @skb.
- * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
- * @cap indicates the capability required
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
* Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
*
@@ -1268,7 +1261,6 @@
* @capable:
* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
* credentials.
- * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
* @cred contains the credentials to use.
* @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
@@ -1392,8 +1384,8 @@
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+ int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1563,7 +1555,6 @@
struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1675,12 +1666,10 @@
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap);
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
- int cap);
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_syslog(int type);
@@ -1817,7 +1806,6 @@
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1875,32 +1863,15 @@
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
- const struct cred *cred, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
- int ret;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return ret;
-}
-
-static inline
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
- int ret;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return ret;
+static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) {
+ return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
@@ -2517,11 +2488,6 @@
return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
}
-static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
- return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2c1d6ab..57e3f51 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,13 @@
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871..0fcf1c1 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,24 +287,7 @@
}
/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
-{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
-
- return (ret == 0);
-}
-
-/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
* @t: The task in question
* @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
@@ -317,13 +300,58 @@
bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return (ret == 0);
}
/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+ return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
* @t: The task in question
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
@@ -335,28 +363,10 @@
*/
bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
-
- return (ret == 0);
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
/**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
- *
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
- */
-bool capable(int cap)
-{
- return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
-
-/**
* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@
BUG();
}
- if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+ if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
/**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
- * Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
*/
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
{
- return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+ return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78ab24a..00ab2ca 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@
return ret;
}
+static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ else
+ return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@
cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
cred->gid == tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -207,7 +215,7 @@
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
@@ -277,7 +285,7 @@
task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
if (seize)
task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED;
- if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index fd7b25e..df00cb0 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@
goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
}
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index dbf2dda..f16444b 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@
sz_idx = type>>2;
kind = type&3;
- if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (kind != 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 69975e0..1531135 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
index a057fe6..94d45e1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
index fb80a23..a34c9e4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index b4f8d84..4d70785 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
int type, err;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index a403b61..c29d256 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 637f11a..66b84fb 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 68d50c5..97ce8fa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@
return 0;
}
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+ error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
}
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 3b5883b..2f680eb 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -998,7 +998,6 @@
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f848..7ce191e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,17 +56,8 @@
return 0;
}
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
- if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +71,8 @@
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +213,8 @@
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -874,7 +864,7 @@
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
@@ -940,7 +930,7 @@
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -967,7 +957,7 @@
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 214502c..d754249 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -155,35 +155,16 @@
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
- int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap)
{
- const struct cred *cred;
- int ret;
-
- cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
- put_cred(cred);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
- const struct cred *cred;
- int ret;
-
- cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- put_cred(cred);
- return ret;
+ return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -994,12 +975,6 @@
return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
}
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
- return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
-
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7cd4c3a..6a3683e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1415,8 +1415,7 @@
#endif
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1427,7 +1426,7 @@
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
- ad.tsk = tsk;
+ ad.tsk = current;
ad.u.cap = cap;
switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1811,7 +1810,7 @@
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 csid = task_sid(child);
return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
@@ -1868,16 +1867,16 @@
* the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
*/
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1954,8 +1953,7 @@
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2859,8 +2857,7 @@
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2993,8 +2990,8 @@
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
- error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -4718,24 +4715,6 @@
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
-{
- int err;
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid;
-
- err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
- ad.u.cap = capability;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
-}
-
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
@@ -5464,7 +5443,6 @@
.vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
.netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
- .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
.bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
.bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,